It May Be Harder Than We Thought, But Political Diversity Will (Still) Improve Social Psychological Science

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[This is a response to commentaries on our target article, Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science, published in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*. Note that this version does not reflect minor copyediting, and so is slightly different from the final published version.]

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Abstract

In our target article, we made four claims: 1) Social psychology is now politically homogeneous; 2) This homogeneity sometimes harms the science; 3) Increasing political diversity would reduce this damage; and 4) Some portion of the homogeneity is due to a hostile climate and outright discrimination against non-liberals. In this response, we review these claims in light of the arguments made by a diverse group of commentators. We were surprised to find near-universal agreement with our first two claims, and we note that few challenged our fourth claim. Most of the disagreements came in response to our claim that increasing political diversity would be beneficial. We agree with our critics that increasing political diversity may be harder than we had thought, but we explain why we still believe that it is possible and desirable to do so. We conclude with a revised list of 11 recommendations for improving political diversity in social psychology, as well as in other areas of the academy.

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When we began writing our target article in 2011, our goal was to begin a conversation about what we saw as the problem of political homogeneity in social and personality psychology. The quality and diversity of perspectives, arguments, and new ideas offered by the 33 commentators strengthens our faith in social psychology as a field that is open to criticism, able to use its own work to examine itself, and ultimately committed to "getting it right." We are pleased that so many of our peers have taken our ideas seriously and joined the conversation about how social psychology can improve the quality of its work.

The wealth of ideas in the commentaries makes it impossible to respond to each point. Instead, we organize our response into four sections that correspond to the four claims in our target article: 1) Social psychology is now politically homogeneous; 2) This homogeneity sometimes harms our science; 3) Increasing political diversity would reduce this damage; and 4) Some portion of the homogeneity is due to a hostile climate and outright discrimination against non-liberals. We begin each section by noting support for our position, then acknowledging the arguments of our critics, and then responding to their critiques. To foreshadow our conclusion: We think the 33 commentaries, taken as a whole, strengthen claims #1 and #2. We think claim #3 still stands, but we are now more aware of obstacles, complications, and downsides that might be associated with our recommendations for increasing political diversity. It will be harder than we thought, and we see merit in some of the additional ideas proposed for reducing the effects of political bias. We think claim #4 stands as well; none of the commentators presented evidence that rebuts the multiple sources of evidence that we presented on this point.

Claim 1: Social Psychology is Now Politically Homogenous

Almost all commentators accepted our contention that social psychology largely lacks political diversity, even the commentators who strongly disagreed with other claims (e.g., Eagly). This consensus is striking. In a field that typically touts the importance of diversity, it is valuable to discover that most of us recognize the extraordinary lack of political diversity in social psychology. Nonetheless, three commentators disagreed. Those disagreements revolved around a few key points:

Haidt's "show of hands" demonstration is unconvincing

Seibt et al, referring to Haidt's demonstration that few social psychologists would publicly self-identify as conservative at a major conference, suggested that "The evidence for the claims of underrepresentation is rather weak" That would be true if our evidence were limited to Haidt's "show of hands." But in our target article we presented multiple forms of evidence, including a graph showing how partisan identity and ideological orientation have both been moving leftward, and a survey of the field that included self-reports of political identity and of willingness to discriminate (Inbar and Lammers, 2012). Those who think that conservatives are properly represented should offer some evidence, or at least tell us where the missing conservatives can be found.

The American political system is unusual, in ways that render our claim invalid

Hilbig and Moshagen claimed that our evidence that psychologists are likelier to identify as Democrats than Republicans (Gross & Simmons, 2007; Rothman & Lichter, 2008) is invalid

because, they argue, U.S. Democrats are actually moderates or centrists when their policy views are examined in relation to policy views in Europe and elsewhere.

Cross-national comparisons of extremism are notoriously difficult (what criteria should we use in judging whether leftwing Democrats are to the right of the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown wing of the British Labor Party?). But even if we treat the claim as largely true, it does not alter our conclusion that social psychology leans left. Our conclusions do not hinge on a single source of data, as we present evidence from multiple sources that social psychologists are politically homogeneous (see Figure 1 of the target article). This includes party identification, ideological identification, and attitudes towards policy issues (see Inbar & Lammers, 2012). Neither Hilbig & Moshagen nor Seibt et al. present evidence showing that social psychologists are more aptly characterized as moderates or centrists. We also note that it is ever convenient to characterize one's own ideology as centrist or "moderate", while casting the other side as the true ideologues. Moreover, our paper presented direct evidence and examples of biased research, which is ultimately the core issue. Hilbig and Moshagen did not address that evidence.

What would change our view? When research starts to report that large minorities (say, 20%) of social psychologists are members of moderate right or libertarian (classic liberal) parties (e.g., European Christian Democrats, American Republicans, Coalition Australian parties, etc.), identify as non-left, and support non-left policies, our view that social psychology lacks diversity will change. For now, such data do not exist.

We found Bilewicz et al.'s data fascinating and a valuable step toward understanding the ideological characteristics of social psychologists outside of Western democracies. Their data from Eastern Europe suggest that social psychologists are not universally left-wing, at least on economic issues, especially in countries in which the left is still tainted by its association with

communism. But we find it noteworthy that, like U.S. social psychologists, the Western *and* Eastern European social psychologists in this sample report being "liberal" (leftist) in their positions on social issues – those certainly likely to inform and distort social psychological research. Indeed, these data largely mirror those of Inbar and Lammers (2012), who find that whereas there is some variation among social psychologists on economic and foreign policy issues, there is little variation on social issues.

Claim #2: The Lack of Political Diversity Sometimes Harms Our Science

We were pleasantly surprised by the complete agreement with this claim. Not one commentator contested our claim that the lack of political diversity can in principle distort the field's scientific conclusions. Even our harshest critics acknowledged that there was a potential problem. Hilbig and Moshagen wrote that "a severe asymmetry of relevant (political) viewpoints in any scientific community could endanger objectivity and progress." Eagly disagreed with many of our specific examples of biased research, but wrote that she agreed with us that "political diversity, along with other forms of diversity, stands to benefit social psychology." This claim was the centerpiece of our target article. An ideological monoculture is seen by all as a *scientific* problem, even by those who doubt that it is an ethical problem or that it is caused by discrimination.

Many commentators added insights into how intellectual diversity can improve research. For example, Nisbett noted the benefits that East Asian social psychologists brought to the field's understanding of cultural differences in social cognition.

Other commentators expanded our arguments by identifying additional examples of harm brought to the field by political homogeneity. They noted widely varying substantive research

areas that may be suffering from ideological distortion, including political psychology (Chambers & Schlenker), studies of the power of the situation and the fundamental attribution error (Funder), personality and behavioral genetics (Charney; Lilienfeld), intelligence (Pinker), group differences (McCauley; Pinker), and prejudice (McCauley). Had we surveyed 100 additional psychologists, we would surely have found more.

Taken together, the commentaries have significantly *strengthened* our conclusion that political homogeneity is a threat to the integrity of social psychology (and other social sciences; the problem is not unique to social psychology). Although general claims that motivated reasoning can distort scientific thinking have long been recognized (e.g., Ioannidis, 2012; Nickerson, 1998), our target article and the many commentaries constitute the clearest documentation of *specific* domains in which political biases seem to be particularly problematic. Social psychology (like many other academic fields) has a motivated reasoning problem. This was our central point.

Claim #3: Increasing Political Diversity Would Improve the Quality of Our Science

Given the near-universal acceptance of our claims that 1) social psychology is politically homogenous, and 2) this political homogeneity can harm our science, it is unsurprising that many commentators endorsed our third claim: increasing political diversity would improve the state of our science. Some, such as Chambers and Schlenker, Lilienfeld, and Redding, agreed that increasing political diversity would reduce the epistemic costs our science faces. Others, such as Gross and Gelman, Hibbing et al., Nisbett, and Pinker, endorsed our argument that increased political diversity would improve elite and public perceptions of our field.

That said, our third claim elicited by far the most disagreement, which took five primary forms: 1) Conservatives are just not interested or capable of conducting social psychological science; 2) Calling for increased political diversity is premature and not data-driven; 3) Increasing political diversity will cause unanticipated problems; 4) Other forms of diversity are as (or more) important than political diversity; and 5) Political diversity is not necessary for protecting the field from political bias. We address each of these counterclaims below.

Conservatives are just not interested in—or capable of –conducting social psychological science

Several commentators repeated the argument for self-selection of liberals into (and conservatives out of) social psychology that we addressed in our target article. Eagly notes that liberals are more attracted to the type of progressive social change highlighted by social psychology. Gross and Gelman highlight how people self-select into environments that promise ideological fit, using the military as a career more attractive to conservatives.[1]

Hibbing et al. argue that we ignore fundamental differences between liberals and conservatives that explain conservatives' self-selection out of social psychology. We agree that there are important differences between liberals and conservatives, and indeed some of own research has shown fundamental differences in liberals' and conservatives' values and moral beliefs (e.g., Crawford, 2012; 2014; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). We included a section in our paper describing the evidence that "differences of interest" were relevant, and likely to account for some portion of the underrepresentation of non-liberals.

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[1]Gross and Gelman wonder why we don't call for more diversity within the military. The main reason is that we are social psychologists, not members of the armed forces. A second reason is that cohesion is extremely important in military units, which are organized for effective action. This is not the case in any science, where truth seeking is more important than cohesion.

That said, we are unconvinced that these differences are robust or reliable enough to produce the types of career-determining decisions that Hibbing et al. suggest. One problem is that Hibbing et al.'s argument collapses social and economic conservatism, despite abundant evidence of the importance of this distinction (e.g., Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Malka & Soto, in press). Indeed, much of the evidence in favor of Hibbing et al.'s thesis has relied on measures of social conservatism, but has been generalized to "conservatism" writ large. Second, meta-analytic treatments of behavioral measures of psychological rigidity (van Hiel et al., 2010) have produced much less robust results than did the Jost et al (2003) meta-analysis of self-report measures (for details, see Jussim et al., in press). Finally, a recent set of studies showing ideological differences in avoiding dissonance-arousing situations (Nam, Jost, & van Bavel, 2013) have proven difficult to replicate (Brandt & Crawford, 2014; Crawford, Collins, & Brandt, 2015).

As we said in our target article, we agree that self-selection contributes to the political homogeneity of the field. This is, however, a chicken-and-egg problem: are social psychological phenomena inherently more attractive to liberals, or have pressures to conform to liberal norms influenced the questions that social psychologists pose—and the phenomena they discover. If there were more lines of inquiry attractive to conservatives, or at least more lines of inquiry that didn't have obvious liberal values embedded within them, would social psychology attract more conservatives? This is an open question, and one way to find out is to change how we conduct our work and frame our hypotheses. This is precisely the change we proposed in our target article.

Although we showed the implausibility of claims that cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives are sufficient to explain the massive ideological lopsidedness of the

field, some commentators endorsed such claims. For example, Beit-Hallami argues that conservatives are religious and conformist, and that religiosity and conformity are the antithesis of science. This exaggerated view of conservatism ignores the multi-dimensionality of political orientation (and it is consistent with research findings that partisans often exaggerate opponents' positions—see Jussim et al, in press-c, for a review). We reviewed evidence (Kemmelmeier, 2008) in our target article that cognitive ability is negatively related to social conservatism (akin to the religiosity and Beit-Hallami mentions) but *positively* to economic conservatism. Beit-Hallami argues that the fact that liberal academics have risen to the top is evidence of their intellectual superiority. We would invite Beit-Hallami to consider the following turnabout test—would this argument be accepted as valid if it pertained to female or African-American scientists' positions in STEM fields?

Relatedly, there seem to be several misconceptions surrounding just *who* we suggest join the ranks of social psychology. We acknowledge, as several commentators noted (Kessler et al.; Wright), that we did not clearly *define* political diversity in our target article. First, we reiterate, we are not calling for Nazis, KKK members, terrorists, anti-Semites, racists, Creationists or other political-religious extremists (as variously questioned or insinuated by, e.g., Beit-Hallami; Pfister & Bohm; Ross; Seibt et al.). In fact, we are not even necessarily calling for *conservatives*—instead, we clearly state throughout our target article (pps. XX) that we are calling for *non-liberals*, which could certainly include conservatives, but also moderates, libertarians, apolitical people, etc. We agree with Ross that "reasonable conservatives" (e.g., economic conservatives[2]) would be quite welcome, but we cringe at the idea that a left-leaning field should get to judge

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[2]Interestingly, despite Ross' claim, there is evidence that liberals (especially those who consider themselves economically liberal) are actually willing to discriminate against more economically conservative individuals (Crawford, Brandt, Chambers, Inbar, Motyl, & Wance, 2014).

what counts as "reasonable" conservatism. (We would also want to know whether applicants to graduate programs who are on the left would be limited to "reasonable liberals," or whether applicants on the far left would still be admitted.) Further, Ross' call for "reasonable" conservatives implies that typical conservatives are unreasonable (and indeed, even Funder wonders whether there are such conservatives to join our ranks).

Calling for increased political diversity is premature and not data-driven

Pfister and Bohm and Gross and Gelman are skeptical of the applicability to social psychology of the findings reviewed in our target article that increased diversity improves decision-making (Crano, 2012; Mannix & Neale, 2005). Gross and Gelman acknowledge the leftward tilt of the field, but want more evidence that diversity improves science before calling for more diversity. (It is tempting to replace political diversity with gender diversity and see if the authors would feel the same way about the need for more research). These authors suggest that we cannot apply the results from small-scale organizational diversity to large-scale diversity (such as in the field of social psychology). Yet the goal of much social science experimentation is to design small scale studies to understand and generalize to larger populations. For example, should we not seek to apply lab-based evidence that anthropomorphizing environmental protection causes increases environmentalism (Ahn, Kim, & Aggarwal, 2014) to inform large-scale environmental protection campaigns? Should we not seek to apply lab-based evidence that superordinate goals improve intergroup relations (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989) to large-scale settings?

Increasing political diversity will cause unanticipated problems

Several commentators raised concerns about epistemic costs that could *result* from political diversity. Ditto et al. offer several concerns, from a splintering of the field into ideological camps (also expressed by Kessler et al.) and the creation of new ideologically homogenous journals, to a transformation from a field that produces more left-leaning conclusions to one that is muddled in moderation and an "equivalency bias." Relatedly, several commentators (Pinker; Pfister & Bohm; Seibt et al; Wright.) expressed concern with a "cancelling out" approach by which conservatives were recruited to "cancel out" the biases of liberal social psychologists (especially if such practices led to quotas for conservative psychologists; Pinker).

Some clarification of our point is necessary here. We are not calling for a field in which there are equal numbers of right-wing extremists to "cancel out" the left-wing extremists—and we regret the use of this "cancel out" phrase on p. x of our target article, which likely led to confusion. We would simply prefer a field in which there are enough non-liberals to provide checks and balances on the types of motivated reasoning that undercut the quality of theories, methods, statistical decision-making, and interpretation. Our desired endstate is not a field in which ideological battles rage, but rather one that is intellectually honest, tolerant, and dynamic. We find little fault with van der Vossen's vision of a depoliticized scientific field (although we disagree that political agnosticism among the members of our field is required[3]), or with Pinker's vision of the field of politically disinterested inquiry (see also Tybur & Navarette; Winegard et al.). Indeed, Baumeister speaks from his own personal experience of trying to personally disengage from politics, and how it has made him more open to data, whatever its political implications.

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[3]We find it ironic that a libertarian scholar would advocate for restrictions of people's ability to join professions of their choice.

Complete value neutrality may be an impossible ideal, yet it may still be worth quixotically striving for, because the price of abandoning the quest is our slippery-slope degeneration into an anything-goes, advocacy-driven pseudo-science, with a methodological façade of rigor (Tetlock, 1994). Political diversity is important not to provide equal time or to cancel out one side; it is important to ensure that politically popular notions presented as science are subjected to sufficient skeptical scrutiny to maximize the chance of "accepted science" actually being valid.

Other forms of diversity are as (or more) important than political diversity

Motyl and Iyer did not challenge the importance of political diversity but they did argue for the importance of other types of diversity, such as methodological or religious. We agree, but point out that more diverse religious perspectives would likely produce more diverse political perspectives, given the relationship between religiosity and political orientation, at least among the politically engaged (Malka et al., 2012). We acknowledge the validity of Seibt et al.'s argument that there are many sources of political diversity lacking from social psychology besides conservatism. To reiterate our target article's argument, we are interested in increasing the number of *non-liberal* voices in social psychology, including centrists, libertarians (classic liberals), the politically apathetic, or those whose political views do not easily fall out on a left/right spectrum.

Along with Ross and Seibt et al., Binning and Sears argue that gender and ethnic diversity are more important than political diversity (though they provide no justification for this claim). Pfister and Bohm and Pinker extend this argument by suggesting that political orientation should not be a protected type of diversity such as gender or ethnicity, because political

orientation is not immutable. Comparative discrimination, beliefs about what attributes merit protection, and judgments of importance of various types of biases are all beyond the scope of our article or so subjective that we see no scientific/empirical way to address them. We leave readers to reach their own conclusions about these issues, hopefully informed by our article's points without being constrained by them.

Further, we were surprised by Pfister and Bohm's argument that the improvement of deliberation and outcomes is *not* a function or purpose of diversity efforts. Rather, they declare that the *real* purpose of diversity is justice and equality. However, Redding highlights that many legal arguments in favor of efforts to increase demographic diversity rely on the fact that such diversity provides differences of perspectives. We think the following thought experiment makes our point: Imagine that the last female Supreme Court justice is about to retire. Should the President go to great lengths to find a women to nominate? If so, is it only for the sake of justice and equality, or do we also believe that diversity of perspectives and life experiences will improve the functioning of a deliberative body?

In sum, we agree that many forms of diversity are important, but we repeat that the epistemic benefits of diversity come more from viewpoint diversity than from demographic diversity (Menz, 2012; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). We have norms in our field that strongly encourage demographic diversity; yet, as we pointed out in our target article (and as Binning and Sears acknowledge), there are norms in our field that *discourage* political diversity, one of the most important forms of viewpoint diversity.

Political diversity is not necessary for protecting the field from political bias

Several commentators recognized that political homogeneity can create biased assumptions and research, but questioned (or were at least agnostic about) whether increased diversity is the solution. For example, Brandt and Proulx provided several additional Questionable Interpretative Practices (QIPs), which they cleverly re-named "QTIPS," that can harm theory construction and testing. Washburn et al. suggest adversarial collaboration and additionally provide a helpful checklist that researchers can use to self-monitor against committing QIPs.

Binning and Sears argue that interdisciplinary collaboration can increase diversity of thought and improve social psychological science. Kessler et al. go one step further by arguing that such collaboration can increase the breadth and scope of social psychological theory. This is a point echoed by Tybur and Navarette, who suggest that evolutionary psychology, a discipline which has been tarred as "conservative" (see Seibt et al.) despite the left-wing personal beliefs of many of its practitioners, can be a model for social psychology. Specifically, they argue that a social psychology with a preponderance of theories (versus an overarching one, like natural selection) allows scholars to cherry-pick the theory most amenable to their values and expectations.

Along similar lines, Kessler et al. suggest encouraging "ecological theory testing," and exemplify this strategy with their own research demonstrating that when elicitors of disgust among liberals (e.g., environmental pollution) are included in study materials, the typical relationship between conservatism and disgust sensitivity can be reversed. Pinker likewise encourages scholars to focus on grander theory rather than "interesting" effects. Washburn et al. suggest that social psychologists take advantage of their preponderance of theories by designing studies to provide compelling and fair tests of competing hypotheses.

We concur with these commentaries. Political bias is *not* inevitable, and social psychologists may be capable of policing themselves and each other to avoid the biased blind spots and embedded assumptions we highlighted in our target article. Indeed, we noted many examples in our target article of ideologically balanced research that did not necessarily involve non-liberal social psychologists. Even if our target article does not end up leading to any increase in the political diversity of the field, an increased awareness of these issues (and scholars' attempts to mitigate them) should help improve the science. At the same time, it is important to recognize the limits of people's abilities to recognize their own biases (e.g., Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002).

That social psychologists *can* limit their political biases falls far short of e*nsuring that all will*. As long as the field is so politically homogenous, and as long as all of its members are not capable of preventing such biases, the field will have a tendency to produce findings that support left-wing values and narratives. Thus, we still think that increasing the number of non-liberals in social psychology will improve theory and research. But we also recognize that this is just one way to protect our science from political bias, and we thank the many commentators for their efforts to highlight the challenges in implementing our recommendation.

Claim #4: Some Portion of Political Homogeneity is Due to a Hostile Climate and Outright Discrimination against Non-Liberals

Our target article noted that some portion of the political homogeneity in social psychology is due to self-selection on the basis of personality and personal interest, and several commentators agreed (e.g., Eagly; Gross & Gelman; Hibbing et al.). But we also presented several sources of evidence that there is a hostile climate for non-liberals—particularly

conservatives—and that direct discrimination against non-liberals happens at several points in the career pipeline and publication process. Although most commentators did not explicitly address this claim, the majority of those who did agreed with it (e.g., Ainsle; Inbar & Lammers; Nisbett).

Only two commentators disputed the claim, and they did so indirectly, not by denying hostility and discrimination, but by declaring the disproportion entirely a result of self-selection. Eagly simply declared that the disproportion derives from self-selection without citing any support of this testable claim. In contrast, Hibbing et al. presented a thoughtful elaboration of the social and psychological bases for expecting self-selection to play a major role. This is a valuable contribution in its own right. We note, however, that their analysis constitutes an excellent theoretical basis for *predicting* self-selection to play a major role. They presented no evidence that directly identified self-selection as the major driver, and they did not grapple with the considerable evidence our target article reviewed documenting pervasive bias against conservative ideas and challenges to liberal narratives. Indeed, even Hibbing et al. acknowledged that, "… given the topics investigated in the modern social sciences, this [reducing the disproportion] is unlikely even if the climate became more welcoming" – implying that even they recognize the climate as unwelcoming.

Overall, therefore, there is clear consensus among our diverse set of commentators that hostile environment and outright discrimination exist, and constitute significant obstacles to the creation of a more politically balanced field. We see this as an extraordinary step forward.

Some Possible Ways Forward

Some commentators recognized the epistemic costs to the field that result from political homogeneity, but expressed skepticism about whether we could actually achieve diversity (Baumeister; Winegard et al., Washburn et al.), especially given the ubiquity of liberalism throughout academia (McCauley). These commentaries have given us a more sober view of the challenge of increasing political diversity within social psychology.

Wright raised important points about exactly how diversity initiatives would be implemented. There are a number of fairly easy things researchers can do, if they choose (see recommendations below).

Everett noted the difficulty of "coming out" as a conservative, and how public acknowledgement of one's political views places undue onus on the minority (non-liberal) relative to the majority (liberal) members of the field (see also Jussim, 2012a). We echo his call for those in the liberal majority to recognize their privileged position, and to express the sort of tolerance of difference suggested by Inbar and Lammers, and in our target article.

Several commentators raised important points regarding who in our field determines whether and how we achieve political diversity (e.g., Pfister & Bohm). First, we should clarify that we never called for quotas. We asked social psychologists, individually and collectively, to monitor their own biases and take proactive steps to encourage political diversity. We did not recommend the type of totalitarian enterprise that Pfister and Bohm hyperbolically invoke (a form of governance that demands the same homogeneity and uniformity that concern us in social psychology today). And we do not wish to see van der Vossen's envisioned field of strictly apolitical social psychologists. But passions must be kept moderate and inquiries guided by good faith attempts to remain value neutral and to test hypotheses, interpret data, and reach conclusions in ways relatively free of political bias.

Another key clarification is that we do not call for the demographics in the field to match those of the population—self-selection is a partial explanation for political homogeneity in the field, and we are not advocates (as perhaps implied by Inbar and Lammers) of requiring the field to reflect population demographics.

A Proposal for Checking Political Biases in Discussions of Political Bias

The accumulation of political bias. Imagine that scholars who suspect that our target article is correct offered the following argument for their position:

Proposition 1: Several lines of research (reviewed earlier) predict intergroup discrimination when majority groups see minority groups as holding different views on ego-involving topics—and preventing the group from achieving its objectives. True effect sizes could average 10% bias or higher.

Proposition 2: But let's posit that the true effect size is as low as 1%. Even then, ideological bias could still be a huge problem because the effects compound through the frequent interactions that the few conservative social psychologists might have with liberal ones. These might involve many subtle forms of hostility (e.g., aloof hallway conversations), or more consequential ones (e.g., sneering comments behind closed doors; biased evaluations of grant proposals).

To threaten the epistemic integrity of social psychology, it is not necessary that such biases *always occur,* only that they occur often enough to tilt the playing field. Eagly, for example, pointed to *exceptions* to our claim of political bias as *refutations* of our argument, as evidence that political bias *does not exist*. But just as the election of Barack Obama to the U.S.

Presidency does not demonstrate the end of racism, we did not argue that bias was *inevitable in every situation, only that it inevitably accumulates across situations*.

Thus, the hypothetical scholar who agrees with us might argue that even if each effect were small, there are so many ways in which bias can creep in every day. A 1% bias effect could easily balloon into a 20% or 40% or 80% difference between liberal and nonliberal researchers on the long-term, professional-outcome dependent variables that count in science (e.g., grants, publications, impact).

Proposition 3. These cumulative biases will inevitably contaminate the scientific knowledge base of the discipline. The "inevitably" flows from mixing assumptions of the following sort. Suppose that the null hypothesis for a popular liberal position—say, on unconscious bias or stereotype threat—represents the true causal state of affairs -- so there is only a 5% chance of getting a significant effect in any given test. Even ideas with zero merit should be able to gain traction in fields in which: (a) liberal proponents out-number conservative skeptics by, say, 5:1 or 10:1; (b) liberals are 5 or 10 times likelier to want to run studies on the topic; (c) proponents are adept at using creative methods to pump up the probability of finding significant results well beyond 5% to 30% or 60% (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn et al., 2011 on p-hacking); (d) the file-drawer problem is at work—and proponents are roughly 3 times or 5 times likelier to submit significant effects for publication than non-significant effects and journals are 3 or 5 times likelier to accept significant than non-significant effects.

Working from these assumptions, the pro-Duarte et al. scholar plots functions that show how fast a non-existent phenomenon can spread in a scientific literature—and announces Q.E.D.

The denial of political bias. Now let's imagine the reaction of a scholar who suspects that our target article exaggerates the problem. She could argue that the cumulative-bias analysis

above is a thinly veiled tautology, an elaborate compound interest equation dressed up as a psychological argument. The simulation of cumulative bias: 1. Does not, by itself, provide a shred of evidence that such biases actually accumulate; and, 2. Failed to build in the influence of *any* countervailing variables, such as the commitment of serious professionals to norms of scientific fair play and the ability of professionals to suppress bias.

Our reaction to this dissection of the simulation is: "Bravo! You have moved the scientific conversation forward by hypothesizing key moderator variables that determine when political biases are likely to be most and least problematic."

Although no one has, to our knowledge, ever advanced the cumulative-political bias simulation just sketched, cumulative-bias simulations are common in debates at the interface of social psychology and the study of larger social systems. In fact, the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* has just published an analysis that is logically equivalent to the first two propositions of the political-bias analysis above, but the focus is on white Americans' biases toward African-Americans (Greenwald, Banaji & Nosek, 2015). These authors argue that even if the behavioral effect sizes for unconscious racial bias were as small as some skeptics insist (Oswald et al., 2013), the cumulative effects across cross-racial encounters could be as oppressive as those laid out in the cumulative-political-bias example. Cumulative-racial-bias arguments of this sort have also been advanced by other investigators as well as by social science experts in employment-discrimination class action litigation (see Tetlock & Mitchell, 2009).

Neither reviewers nor the editor for the top journal in the field saw a need to qualify the Greenwald et al. (2015) simulation by noting either the absence of supporting data or of the exclusion of countervailing variables from the model. We respectfully submit the following to our colleagues who, like Eagly, claim that science trumps politics and political bias is not a

problem: To pass the logical-consistency check and avoid falling prey to double standards, you cannot both accept the racial-bias simulation and reject the political-bias simulation. Assuming ceteris paribus, you must either: 1. Reject *both* simulations; or 2. Accept both. This turnabout thought experiment strikes us as a litmus test of scientific even-handedness.

Of course, a politically motivated observer will challenge ceteris paribus and argue that it is unreasonable to posit that all things are equal with respect to the two cumulative-bias models. A liberal could argue that "everyone knows racial bias is far more tenacious than political bias." A conservative might counter, "In some place, yes, but have you listened to social psychologists at cocktail parties?" Daniel Kahneman's (2012) adversarial-collaboration model tells us what needs to be done to escape a solipsistic stalemate. Each side should step back and acknowledge the other side's strongest points, itemize where they diverge, specify, ex ante, the types of evidence that would induce them to move toward the other side's position, and agree on a process for collecting that evidence. If adversarial collaborations of this sort arise from the current exchange, we would count that as a triumph of science over politics.

Final (Revised and Augmented) Recommendations

So, what do we recommend for researchers interested in engaging in good faith attempts to protect themselves and their field from political biases? We summarize our original recommendations and now add the most constructive ones based on the commentaries:

1. Acknowledge the problem and raise awareness about it.

2. Seek feedback from nonliberals.

3. Expand organizational diversity statements to include politics.

4. Add a statement to your own academic website acknowledging that you encourage collaboration among people of diverse political views.

5. Eliminate pejorative terms referring to nonliberals; criticize others' scholarship when they uses those terms. As an editor or reviewer, do not permit such terms to pass without comment.

6. Avoid "leakage" of political hostilities or presumptions (including jokes) when functioning in any teaching or research capacity, but especially around students and junior colleagues.

7. Encourage young scholars who are not liberals to pursue careers in social psychology.

8. Be alert to double standards. Use turnabout tests to reveal bias.

9. Support adversarial collaborations that encourage competing ideological camps to explore the boundary conditions on each other's claims, in joint data collection and model building efforts.

10. Assign in classes, especially for graduate students, the growing scholarship taking social psychology and related disciplines to task for having a *scientific* problem stemming from political bias (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Crawford, 2012; Eagly, 1995; 2013; Inbar & Lammers, 2012; Jussim, 2012a; Jussim, 2012b; Jussim et al., in press-a; Jussim et al., in press-b; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994). Teach eliminating such biases as a core component of methods, validity and scientific integrity.

11. Use Washburn et al.'s checklist in one's own work, especially in politicized areas.

12. Use Popperian falsification. If you are a liberal social psychologist, to guard against potential bias, seek to falsify rather than confirm your preferred prediction.

Conclusion

In his commentary, Funder suggests that the reactions to our target article will demonstrate just how difficult it will be to change the landscape of political diversity and to remove embedded values from the field. Although he made many excellent points in his commentary, this is one on which we have to disagree. The majority of the commentaries reflect agreement with arguments for increased political diversity that we laid out in our target article. Where there was disagreement, most of it was constructive. We do not believe increasing political diversity in social psychology will be easy; however, we are encouraged by this set of commentaries.

We also hope that these issues will be discussed in other social sciences, and in humanities departments as well. We are optimistic that academics in many disciplines will share our appreciation of the power of viewpoint diversity to improve the quality of thought. We hope that our arguments and solutions will be considered by those who practice not just social psychology, but the social sciences and humanities broadly, and who train future generations of scholars and citizens for life in a vibrant democracy.

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