Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

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Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model *(IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right-wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.*

KEY WORDS: right-wing authoritarianism, motivated reasoning, political bias, political intolerance, political demonstration

> "We're seeing more and more folks realize the strength of this grassroots movement, and they're wanting to be involved. I say right on!"
> > —Former Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin on the Tea Party,
> > September 5, 2011

> "I think it speaks to what part of that mission is on the left, and that is disruption, it is distraction . . . These folks are misguided and I think it's just atrocious what is going on."
> > —Sarah Palin on Occupy Wall Street, November 17, 2011

> "I just want them to work at doing the best job that they can do to bring attention to this economic crisis and the unfairness of the system at this time."
> > —Democratic Congresswoman Maxine Waters on Occupy Wall Street,
> > November 16, 2011

> "You can't be intimidated. You can't be frightened. And as far as I'm concerned, the Tea Party can go straight to hell."
> > —Maxine Waters on the Tea Party, August 20, 2011

Do ideologues reflexively hold groups that they oppose to vastly different standards? The social psychology and political science literatures attest to the pervasiveness of such politically biased judgments (Bartels, 2002; Cohen, 2003; Taber & Lodge, 2006), and the above quotes illustrate this lack of evenhandedness. As the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement arose in September 2011, many in the media called attention to the tendency for partisans and ideologues to hold the left-wing OWS movement and the right-wing Tea Party movement to different standards. Whereas commentators on the right suggested that media coverage of the Tea Party was more negative than that of OWS (Wehner, 2011), those on the left chastised conservatives who had praised Tea Party demonstrators but now criticized OWS demonstrators (Nichols, 2011). More moderate voices recognized the inconsistencies of both sides (Avlon, 2011).

But will partisans and ideologues always hold such double standards when evaluating politically sympathetic and unsympathetic groups? Or, might the way in which the group's political activities are portrayed influence not only *if* these biases emerge, but among whom? The ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM; Crawford, 2012), a recently developed model of political judgment, posits that *premise objectionableness* determines whether or not biases emerge in political judgment.

According to the IOPM, objectionable premises present perceivers with considerations that they should reject outright. Once a perceiver deems a judgment premise as objectionable, little else about that judgment (e.g., one's attitude toward the judgment target) will matter, short-circuiting biases against one target relative to another. On the other hand, ideologically acceptable premises allow perceivers to give fuller consideration to a judgment (including one's attitude toward the target) and thus allow for biases to emerge. From these assumptions, the IOPM predicts three patterns of biases among the political left and right: when the premise is objectionable only to people on the left, biases will emerge only among people on the right (*asymmetrical right-wing bias*); when the premise is objectionable only to people on the right, biases will emerge only among people on the left (*asymmetrical left-wing bias*); and when the premise is acceptable to people on both the left and right, biases will emerge among people on the left and right (*symmetrical biases*).

Crawford (2012) tested all three IOPM predictions within the context of the dual-process motivational (DPM) model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), which suggests that there are two related but distinct ideological attitude dimensions, best captured by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996; 1998) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). According to the DPM model, RWA more strongly relates to concerns over social cohesion, collective security, and traditional values, whereas SDO more strongly relates to concerns over intergroup dominance and superiority (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).

The results of Crawford (2012) illustrate the IOPM's predictions regarding RWA.[1] Figure 1 displays these predicted patterns of bias. In two studies, Crawford (2012) varied whether premises were objectionable or acceptable to people low or high in RWA. Premise objectionableness was determined both a priori based on extant theorizing on RWA and empirically through participant ratings of premise objectionableness. Three premises were examined: mandatory school prayer in public schools, voluntary school prayer space in public schools, and criticism of a sitting U.S. President.

The mandatory school prayer scenario was a replication of an Altemeyer (1996) study that varied between-subjects whether participants evaluated mandatory Christian school prayer in Western public schools or mandatory Muslim school prayer in public schools in an Arab democracy.

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[1] We focus on RWA because our predictions regarding OWS and the Tea Party are related to RWA, not SDO. See Crawford (2012) for evidence of support for IOPM predictions regarding SDO.

(a) *Asymmetrical High-RWA bias*   (b) *Symmetrical RWA biases*   (c) *Asymmetrical Low-RWA bias*

Figure 1. Predicted patterns of bias among people high and low in RWA. Asymmetrical High-RWA bias results when the premise is objectionable to people low in RWA but acceptable to people high in RWA. Symmetrical RWA biases result when the premise is acceptable to people low and high in RWA. Asymmetrical Low-RWA bias results when the premise is objectionable to people high in RWA but acceptable to people low in RWA.

Crawford (2012) replicated Altemeyer's (1996) finding of *asymmetrical High-RWA bias*: bias emerged in favor of Christian over Muslim school prayer among people high in RWA, but no bias emerged among people low in RWA. Altemeyer (1996) interpreted this pattern of bias as evidence of the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, from an IOPM perspective, this pattern emerged because mandatory school prayer is objectionable to people low in RWA, who value personal freedom and autonomy, but acceptable to people high in RWA, who value conformity to societal norms (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006).

In another study, Crawford (2012) maintained the comparison of Christian and Muslim school prayer but changed the premise to *voluntary* school prayer. Designating space for voluntary prayer allows students to exercise religious liberty, which should be acceptable to people low in RWA. It also allows prayer in public schools, which should be acceptable to people high in RWA (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Stenner, 2005). As predicted by the IOPM, *symmetrical RWA biases* emerged: people low in RWA were biased in favor of Muslim school prayer space,[2] whereas people high in RWA were biased in favor of Christian school prayer space.

Finally, Crawford (2012) varied whether a military general questioned the war-time decisions of either President George W. Bush or President Barack Obama. Because criticism of legitimate authority is acceptable to people low in RWA but objectionable to people high in RWA (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), *asymmetrical Low-RWA bias* emerged: people low in RWA more harshly sanctioned the general critical of President Obama, whereas people high in RWA sanctioned the two generals equally. Importantly, feeling thermometer ratings of Presidents Bush and Obama indicated that people high in RWA *preferred* Bush to Obama, but this preference did not influence their judgment under this objectionable premise. Together, these findings supported the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness determines whether biases emerge in political judgment. Moreover, they were in direct contrast with assumptions that people on the right, especially people high in RWA, are more prone to such double standards in political judgment (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002).

Extending this initial work testing the IOPM, the present experiment examined biases against the OWS and Tea Party movements. It is difficult to separate discussion of these movements from

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[2] Crawford (2012) explains that people low in RWA favor Muslim over Christian school prayer space because they typically express low in-group identification (Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru, & Krauss, 2009) and are motivated to respond without prejudice to stigmatized groups (Plant & Devine, 1998).

political protest or demonstration, and thus from research on political tolerance, which addresses the extent to which people support civil liberties (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Pieroson, 1981). In their influential research on political tolerance, Marcus et al. (1995) found that *normative threat*, which entails disorderly, chaotic, and sometimes violent political expression, increases political intolerance. On the other hand, *normative reassurance*, which is characterized by more peaceful and orderly political expression, leads to relatively greater tolerance (for a recent discussion, see Gibson, 2006). Importantly, while authoritarianism is generally a strong predictor of political intolerance (Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Marcus et al., 1995; Stouffer, 1955), Stenner (2005) finds that this relationship is exacerbated by normative threat, but attenuated by normative reassurance.

All of this implies that people high in RWA should deem disruptive, normatively threatening political demonstrations as objectionable and peaceful, normatively reassuring demonstrations as relatively acceptable. People low in RWA should find both premises relatively acceptable, given their greater support for free expression and individual liberty. Thus, integrating research on political intolerance, the DPM model, and the IOPM, we hypothesized that when OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are portrayed as demonstrating peacefully, symmetrical RWA biases should emerge— people low in RWA should be more biased against the right-wing Tea Party movement, whereas people high in RWA should be more biased against the left-wing OWS movement. However, when the groups are portrayed as demonstrating disruptively, asymmetrical Low-RWA bias should emerge—people low in RWA should be more biased against the Tea Party, whereas people high in RWA should be equally intolerant of the two targets.

Method

Participants

We recruited 225 current U.S. residents through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor market where researchers can recruit participants. Samples obtained from MTurk possess greater demographic diversity and representativeness than student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and are comparable to nationally representative samples on many important demographic variables (see Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). Moreover, well-established findings in social psychology and political science have been replicated in MTurk samples (Berinsky et al., 2012; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011), indicating that they produce valid data. Interested individuals selected a link to the online survey and were compensated 50 cents. One participant was dropped for having incomplete data, leaving 224 participants (76% White; 41% female; $M_{age} = 35$ years).

Materials and Procedures

Participants first completed a shortened 18-item version of Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, and Heled's (2010) 36-item RWA scale and a shortened 10-item version of the 16-item SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Shortened versions of these scales have shown sufficient internal reliability and predictive validity (Duckitt et al., 2010; Thomsen et al., 2009). Both scales were balanced for protrait and contrait items. Scale presentation order and scale item order were randomized across participants. All items were measured on 7-point scales (1 = *Strongly Disagree*; 7 = *Strongly Agree*), and average RWA and SDO scales were computed.

Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four political demonstration conditions, with Demonstration type and Target crossed in a 2 (Demonstration: Peaceful, Disruptive) × 2 (Target:

OWS, Tea Party) between subjects design.[3] Scenario texts are available in online supplemental materials. The dependent measure of political demonstrator support was computed as the average of three items measured on 6-point scales (1 = *Strongly Disagree*; 6 = *Strongly Agree*): "Occupy Wall Street (Tea Party) demonstrators should continue to be allowed to demonstrate"; "Police should increase their efforts to control Occupy Wall Street (Tea Party) demonstrators" (reverse scored); and "Occupy Wall Street (Tea Party) demonstrators should not be allowed to demonstrate" (reverse scored). Item order was randomized (α = .79). A manipulation check item assessed how disruptive the demonstrators were perceived ("Occupy Wall Street [Tea Party] demonstrators are creating a public disturbance").

To assess premise objectionableness, all participants completed a three-item scale measuring the extent to which they found each premise (disruptive political demonstration and peaceful political demonstration) to be (1) "objectionable," (2) "immoral," and (3) "disgusting" (1 = *Not at all*; 5 = *To a great extent*). The presentation of the two premises and the three objectionableness items was randomized, and an average objectionableness rating for each premise was computed. The measures of demonstrator support and premise objectionableness were similar to those used in Crawford (2012), which produced reliable and valid tests of the IOPM across two studies.

Participants then reported political orientation (1 = *Extremely Liberal*; 7 = *Extremely Conservative*), party affiliation (1 = *Strong Democrat*; 7 = *Strong Republican*), and feeling thermometer ratings (0–100) towards Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party. Given that the dependent measure of demonstrator support itself assesses political tolerance, we included a 6-item measure of political intolerance adapted from Altemeyer's (1996) Censorship and Freedom of Speech scale as a covariate. Because this is an adapted measure, its exact reliability and validity is unknown, although Altemeyer (1996) found his scale to have sufficient internal reliability (α = .75). Item order was randomized and an average intolerance scale was computed. Finally, participants completed a measure of political knowledge and provided demographic information (e.g., age, gender, race/ethnicity, religion).

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Table 1 reports correlations among and means, standard deviations, and reliability coefficients for the study variables. All measures were highly reliable (αs ≥ .80). RWA was more strongly correlated with objection to disruptive demonstration than to peaceful demonstration. Political

Table 1. Correlations and Descriptive Statistics

	1	2	3	4	5
1. RWA					
2. SDO	.30***				
3. Political intolerance	.58***	.35***			
4. Peaceful demonstration	.21**	.46***	.41***		
5. Disruptive demonstration	.54***	.10	.44***	.19**	
M	3.66	2.66	2.64	2.85	1.54
SD	1.12	1.24	1.06	1.16	.92
α	.92	.91	.84	.80	.86

**p < .01; ***p < .001

[3] In these study materials, we also replicated asymmetrical High-RWA bias in the mandatory school prayer scenario described in the introduction (Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford, 2012). Although space considerations prevent us from detailing these findings, data are available from the first author upon request.

Table 2. Multiple Regression Analyses on Premise Objection-ableness Ratings

	b	SE	B	t
Peaceful Demonstration				
Political intolerance	.31	.07	.34	4.65***
RWA	−.08	.06	−.09	1.25
SDO	.27	.05	.37	5.80***
R^2				.29***
Disruptive Demonstration				
Political intolerance	.23	.08	.21	2.83**
RWA	.45	.08	.44	6.04***
SDO	−.09	.06	−.09	1.49
R^2				.31***

Note. Predictor variables are mean-centered.
**$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

intolerance was strongly correlated with objection to both peaceful and disruptive political demonstration, suggesting that it is a valid measure of political intolerance.

Manipulation check. As expected, demonstrators were perceived as creating more of a public disturbance in the disruptive demonstration condition than in the peaceful demonstration condition, $t(221) = 4.34$, $p < .001$, $Ms = 3.54$ and 2.73, respectively.

Premise objectionableness ratings. We predicted that peaceful demonstration should be acceptable to people low and high in RWA, whereas disruptive demonstration should be objectionable to people high but not low in RWA. Given these hypotheses, RWA should not significantly predict objection to peaceful demonstration but should positively predict objection to disruptive demonstration. To test these predictions, we regressed objection to peaceful demonstration and objection to disruptive demonstration on political intolerance, RWA, and SDO in two separate multiple regression analyses. As Table 2 shows, both hypotheses were supported, verifying the conditions assumed by the IOPM.

Primary Analyses

As predicted, premise objectionableness ratings indicated that peaceful political demonstration presents a relatively acceptable premise to both people low and high in RWA, whereas disruptive political demonstration presents an objectionable premise to people high but not low in RWA. Given these conditions, the IOPM predicts that symmetrical RWA biases should emerge in the peaceful demonstration condition, while asymmetrical Low-RWA bias should emerge in the disruptive demonstration condition. Within each Demonstration condition, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis on demonstrator support, with political intolerance, RWA, SDO, and Target (0 = OWS, 1 = Tea Party) entered in Step 1, and the RWA × Target and SDO × Target interactions entered in Step 2 (Aiken & West, 1991).[4]

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[4] Our hypotheses would optimally yield an RWA × Demonstrator × Target interaction. Under these circumstances, however, such an interaction would be difficult to observe. First, the DPM model's requirements that RWA and SDO effects be compared leads to a saturated model with one covariate, four independent variables, six two-way interactions, and four three-way interactions. Second, the predicted differences in the RWA × Target interaction between Demonstrator conditions are very subtle (i.e., one crossover interaction and one spreading interaction, in which the pattern only changes among people high in RWA). Unsurprisingly, the RWA × Demonstration × Target interaction was not significant in the saturated model ($p = .963$). A less saturated but incomplete model including just the RWA × Demonstration × Target interaction and critical independent variables yielded an interaction approaching significance ($p = .148$). We believe that our data analytic strategy was the most appropriate in both simultaneously testing SDO effects and recognizing the subtlety of these predictions.

Table 3. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses

Peaceful	Step 1				Step 2			
	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t
Political Intolerance	−.58	.10	−.54	5.69***	−.64	.10	−.59	6.52***
RWA	.01	.09	.01	.06	−.17	.11	−.18	1.56
SDO	−.13	.08	−.14	1.69	−.18	.09	−.20	2.04*
Target	−.08	.18	−.04	.44	−.07	.17	−.03	.38
RWA × Target					.45	.16	.30	2.86**
SDO × Target					.20	.15	.14	1.38
R^2				.36***				.43***
ΔR^2				.36***				.08**
Constant				4.83				4.80

Disruptive	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t
Political Intolerance	−.49	.13	−.42	3.70***	−.50	.13	−.43	3.81***
RWA	−.05	.12	−.05	.44	−.28	.16	−.25	1.71
SDO	−.13	.09	−.13	1.44	−.09	.13	−.09	.69
Target	−.53	.20	−.22	2.62*	−.52	.20	−.22	2.60*
RWA × Target					.40	.20	.27	2.06*
SDO × Target					−.03	.17	−.02	.19
R^2				.33***				.36***
ΔR^2				.33***				.03
Constant				4.56				4.55

Note. Predictor variables are mean-centered. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Peaceful demonstration. As Table 3 shows, the predicted RWA × Target interaction in the peaceful demonstration condition was significant. Testing the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis involves comparing support for OWS versus the Tea Party among people low in RWA (−1 *SD*) and separately among people high in RWA (+1 *SD*). This hypothesis was supported: people low in RWA more strongly supported OWS than the Tea Party, $b = -.59$, $SE = .25$, $B = -.26$, $t = 2.33$, $p < .05$, whereas people high in RWA more strongly supported the Tea Party than OWS, $b = .46$, $SE = .25$, $B = .20$, $t = 1.83$, $p = .070$ (Figure 2). This interaction qualified a political intolerance main effect.

Disruptive demonstration. As Table 3 shows, the predicted RWA × Target interaction in the disruptive demonstration condition was significant. The asymmetrical Low-RWA bias hypothesis was supported: people low in RWA more strongly supported OWS than the Tea Party, $b = -.94$, $SE = .29$, $B = -.40$, $t = 3.31$, $p = .001$, whereas people high in RWA did not differ in their support for the two targets, $b = -.09$, $SE = .29$, $B = -.04$, $t = .30$, $p = .763$ (Figure 3). This interaction qualified political intolerance and target main effects.

Feeling thermometers. Dependent samples *t*-tests indicated that while people low in RWA preferred OWS to the Tea Party, $t(40) = 11.90$, $p < .001$, *M*s = 74.45 and 10.23, respectively, people high in RWA tended to prefer the Tea Party to OWS, $t(27) = 1.32$, $p = .199$, *M*s = 45.74 vs. 31.59, respectively. These results largely support the IOPM prediction that although people high in RWA prefer the Tea Party to OWS, this preference does not bias their judgment under an objectionable premise.

Discussion

Elite and lay discourse has highlighted the hypocritical positions of OWS and Tea Party opponents and supporters. This study integrated the newly developed ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM; Crawford, 2012) with theory and research on political tolerance (Marcus

Figure 2. RWA × Target interaction in the peaceful demonstration condition. Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors are reported for the simple slopes. *$p < .10$.

Figure 3. RWA × Target interaction in the disruptive demonstration condition. Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors are reported for the simple slopes. *$p < .05$.

et al., 1995) to demonstrate that the ways in which the political activities of these groups are portrayed determine whether such double standards in political tolerance emerge among people low and high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996).

The IOPM contends that political biases emerge when the premise of a political judgment is ideologically acceptable to the perceiver but not when the premise is ideologically objectionable to the perceiver. Whereas people high in RWA found the normatively reassuring act of peaceful demonstration a relatively acceptable means of political expression, they found the normatively threatening act of disruptive demonstration ideologically objectionable. In contrast, people low in RWA found both peaceful and disruptive political demonstration relatively acceptable. Consistent with the IOPM's predictions, people high in RWA were biased in favor of the Tea Party over OWS when the target groups were portrayed as demonstrating peacefully, but they showed no bias in favor of the Tea Party when the targets were portrayed as demonstrating disruptively, despite a preference

for the Tea Party over OWS. In contrast, biases in favor of OWS over the Tea Party emerged among people low in RWA regardless of how the political activities of the groups were portrayed, reflecting their preference for OWS over the Tea Party.

These findings build upon the initial support for the IOPM. Across two studies, Crawford (2012) found that the type of school prayer (mandatory or voluntary) determined whether biases emerged among people low and high in RWA. Whereas biases in favor of Muslims only emerged among people low in RWA under voluntary school prayer, biases in favor of Christians emerged among people high in RWA for both mandatory and voluntary school prayer. In our study, we found that the type of political protest (disruptive or peaceful) determined whether biases emerged among people low and high in RWA. Importantly, however, whereas biases in favor of the Tea Party only emerged among people high in RWA under peaceful protest, biases in favor of OWS among people *low* in RWA emerged for both types of protest. Thus, whereas Crawford (2012) showed right-wing biases in both prayer conditions, our study showed *left-wing* biases in both protest conditions. Therefore, this study provides additional evidence that premise objectionableness, not right-wing political orientation as suggested by Altemeyer (1996, 1998) and others (Peterson et al., 2002) determines whether or not biases emerge in political judgment. As a methodological point, the IOPM and its supportive evidence strongly suggest the need for researchers to determine premise objectionableness before drawing conclusions about ideological differences in the tendency towards double standards in political judgment.

Future research could consider the conditions that would eliminate biases in favor of OWS among people low in RWA. According to the IOPM, biases among people low in RWA should be eliminated if they object to the political activities of the target. Considering the extent to which people low in RWA value liberty and individual autonomy (Altemeyer, 1996; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006), biases in favor of OWS should not emerge if OWS demonstrators are portrayed as forcefully *preventing* other people (e.g., Tea Party demonstrators) from demonstrating peacefully.

The purpose of the IOPM is to show how political biases in favor of ideologically sympathetic targets over comparable unsympathetic targets can be turned on and off by the objectionableness of the judgment premise. Crawford (2012) tested four such comparisons (i.e., Christians vs. Muslims, American soldiers vs. Iraqi insurgents, Bush vs. Obama, and legacy students vs. minority students). We believe our comparison of OWS and the Tea Party, two contemporary grassroots activist movements, is consistent with that approach. The media has characterized OWS and the Tea Party as left-wing and right-wing movements, respectively (Reyes-Chow, 2011), and evidence in our data support this observation: conservatism, Republican Party affiliation, and RWA were all positively correlated with feeling thermometer ratings of the Tea Party (rs > .41; ps < .001) but negatively correlated with ratings of OWS (rs > −.39; ps < .001). What is less clear is whether OWS and the Tea Party are *diametrically opposite* each other—in other words, is OWS as left-wing as the Tea Party is right-wing? We certainly cannot be sure, although the negative correlation between OWS and Tea Party feeling thermometer ratings [$r(209) = −.26$, $p < .001$] observed in our study indicates that in people's minds, these groups occupy positions relatively opposite one another on the political spectrum. That said, it appears unnecessary to compare diametrically opposite targets when testing the IOPM—e.g., Christians are not necessarily the exact opposite of Muslims, and President Bush is not necessarily as right-wing as President Obama is left-wing (Crawford, 2012). Rather, it is important to contrast biases towards targets for which sympathies clearly lie on the political left and right, which we did in the comparison of the OWS and Tea Party movements.

Finally, these findings have implications for framing theory (Chong & Druckman, 2007), which assumes that attitudes towards a policy or event can be shaped by the different values or considerations emphasized by a political message. Consistent with framing theory, our results indicate that the portrayal of the targets' political activities determined tolerance for their activities. Importantly, however, the values of the perceiver mattered—whereas people low in RWA were biased in favor of

OWS regardless of the frame, biases in favor of the Tea Party among people high in RWA clearly depended on the frame. Thus, these findings imply that elites can tailor messages to certain perceivers in order to influence their responses to the message and that the IOPM can be used to predict how people will respond towards such frames. Future research could explore applications of the IOPM towards policy message framing.

Conclusion

In this study, people low in RWA were more biased against the right-wing Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against the left-wing OWS movement than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. Both as scientists and as citizens, we are tempted to believe that we are evenhanded in our political beliefs and that our opponents are hypocrites (Cohen, 2003; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). However, the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM; Crawford, 2012) and its supportive evidence indicate that under the right circumstances, we all have the capacity to engage in political hypocrisy.

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