Political Intolerance, Right *and* Left

Jarret T. Crawford
The College of New Jersey

Jane M. Pilanski
The College of New Jersey

Research recently published in Political Psychology *suggested that political intolerance is more strongly predicted by political conservatism than liberalism. Our findings challenge that conclusion. Participants provided intolerance judgments of several targets and the political objective of these targets (left-wing vs. right-wing) was varied between subjects. Across seven judgments, conservatism predicted intolerance of left-wing targets, while liberalism predicted intolerance of right-wing targets. These relationships were fully mediated by perceived threat from targets. Moreover, participants were biased against directly opposing political targets: conservatives were more intolerant of a left-wing target than the opposing right-wing target (e.g., pro-gay vs. anti-gay rights activists), while liberals were more intolerant of a right-wing target than the opposing left-wing target. These findings are discussed within the context of the existing political intolerance and motivated reasoning literatures.*

KEY WORDS: political intolerance, ideology, liberalism, conservatism, political attitudes, motivated reasoning

Is political intolerance more strongly predicted by political conservatism than by liberalism? Lindner and Nosek (2009) suggested so in an article recently published in *Political Psychology*. In their article, they reviewed the literature on the relationship between conservatism and political tolerance—that is, the extent to which people extend civil liberties and rights to groups or individuals with whom they disagree (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981). While Lindner and Nosek cited some political commentators who argue that political censorship occurs on both the right *and* left (Hentoff, 1992; Will, 2002), the empirical evidence reviewed implicates political conservatism as a stronger predictor of political intolerance (Altemeyer, 1996; Davis & Silver, 2004; Fisher et al., 1999; Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989). To address this issue experimentally, Lindner and Nosek (2009) manipulated the content of an individual's speech act. Participants read a news article about an individual pasting a poster to his garage that read either "Americans are the problem" or "Arabs are the problem." In two studies, across both explicit and implicit measures of political ideology, conservatism predicted intolerance of anti-American speech, while liberalism did not predict intolerance of anti-Arab speech.

While Lindner and Nosek (2009) interpreted their findings as consistent with existing empirical evidence linking conservatism to intolerance, they were also careful to not overgeneralize their findings. They acknowledged that their experiments examined intolerance of "racially charged speech," which might differ qualitatively from intolerance of speech from people with opposing

ideologies. In order to further address these questions, Lindner and Nosek (2009) called on other political psychologists to "use a variety of statements that are representative of extreme left-wing or extreme right-wing *ideological* positions" (p. 89, emphasis in original).

In the present study, we accepted Lindner and Nosek's advice to examine intolerance of left-wing and right-wing targets, and we adopted their novel experimental approach to studying political intolerance. However, our assumption about the relationship between political ideology and intolerance differs from theirs. From our perspective, those on the political right and left should be just as likely to express intolerance of targets with ideologically opposing positions. This assumption rests not only in theory on motivated reasoning, but in some empirical work on political intolerance not reviewed by Lindner and Nosek (2009). First, as Taber and Lodge (2006) note, "all reasoning is motivated" (p. 756), and influential theories of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) do not make exceptions for those on one end of the ideological spectrum or the other. Second, a host of empirical studies demonstrate motivated reasoning on both the left and right in other political judgment contexts (Crawford, 2012; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Finally, some evidence from the extant literature does indicate that liberals are intolerant of targets with ideologically opposing positions. First, Suedfeld, Steel, and Schmidt (1994) found support for censoring racist and sexist materials among so-called "radicals" and members of Canada's left-wing New Democratic Party. Moreover, in their highly influential work on political tolerance, Sullivan et al. (1981) and Marcus et al. (1995) used a "content-controlled" measure of political tolerance, which separates the target's actions (e.g., speech) from the target's intentions (i.e., left-wing or right-wing political objectives). Using this method, they find intolerance of both left-wing *and* right-wing "least-liked" groups among their respondents.

Based on this previous theoretical and empirical work, we therefore predicted that while conservatism would predict intolerance of left-wing targets, liberalism would predict intolerance of right-wing targets. Moreover, we predicted that those on both the left and right would be biased against ideologically opposing targets relative to ideologically supporting targets. For example, we expect that liberals will be more intolerant of an anti-gay rights group than a pro-gay rights group, whereas conservatives will be more intolerant of a pro-gay rights group than an anti-gay rights group.

To test these hypotheses, we adopted Lindner and Nosek's (2009) approach by varying the target's political objectives in a between-subjects experimental design. Thus, some participants assessed left-wing targets, while others assessed right-wing targets. We made several methodological decisions to enhance the potential generalizability of our findings. First, in contrast to Lindner and Nosek, we assessed intolerance on not just one issue (anti-American vs. anti-Arab speech) but eight separate political issues: gay rights, abortion rights, separation of church and state, affirmative action, health care reform, criticism of political leaders, political party activism, and immigration policy. This decision was broadly consistent with Lindner and Nosek's (2009, p. 89) suggestion for future research. Importantly, we chose domestic issues that were explicit in their political content and left-right differences and chose targets with directly contrasting political objectives (e.g., pro- vs. anti-abortion rights). This is in contrast to Lindner and Nosek's comparison of anti-American versus anti-Arab speech, which was less explicit in its left-right distinction and included targets that are not necessarily opposite each other. This design also improves upon other research comparing targets with different but not necessarily directly contrasting political objectives (e.g., a comparison of atheists vs. racists; Sniderman et al., 1989). Moreover, this method is consistent with the content-controlled approach advocated by Marcus et al. (1995) as it controls for the target's actions while varying the directly contrasting political objectives of the target.

Second, expanding on Lindner and Nosek's examination of speech protection, we examined both speech protection and protection of collective action rights aimed at influencing legislative outcomes (Prothro & Grigg, 1960). Third, we examined intolerance of both individual and

collective rights, in contrast to Lindner and Nosek's more limited focus on intolerance of individual acts. By examining intolerance across a number of political issues, modes of political expression, and towards groups and individuals, we believe that we have enhanced the potential generalizability of our findings. Lastly, we considered several variables related to political intolerance, including internalization of democratic norms, political knowledge, and perceived threat from the target (Marcus et al., 1995). The belief that a target poses a threat is one of the primary sources of political intolerance (Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995; Sullivan, Pireson, & Marcus, 1982). We therefore measured perceived threat from each target and predicted that perceived threat would mediate the relationship between political ideology and intolerance, such that threat from left-wing targets would mediate the relationship between conservatism and intolerance of left-wing targets, and threat from right-wing targets would mediate the relationship between liberalism and intolerance of right-wing targets.

Method

Participants

The limitations of using college student samples for research on sociopolitical attitudes are well-known (Henry, 2008; Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000). Moreover, Lindner and Nosek (2009) used nonstudent samples in their research. We therefore recruited 160 current U.S. residents through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online labor market where researchers can recruit participants to complete survey research for compensation. Samples obtained from MTurk possess greater demographic diversity and representativeness than college student samples and meet or exceed the diversity and representativeness provided by typical Internet samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Researchers using MTurk samples have replicated well-established findings in the social psychology and political science literatures (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). Interested individuals selected a link to the online survey and were compensated 50 cents for their participation. Seventy-six percent of participants self-identified as White and 52% as female. The average age was 34 years. Consistent with the ideological distributions observed in Lindner and Nosek's (2009) samples, 55% of participants identified as either *Extremely liberal*, *Liberal*, or *Somewhat liberal*, 24% as *Moderate/middle of the road*, and 21% as either *Extremely conservative*, *Conservative*, or *Somewhat conservative*.

Materials and Procedure

Following informed consent and instructions, participants provided intolerance judgments for the eight targets, which were scored so that higher values reflected greater intolerance (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 6 = *Strongly agree*). Half of participants evaluated left-wing targets, whereas the other half evaluated right-wing targets (see the appendix for intolerance judgments).[1] Warmth ratings for each target were then assessed on 0–100-point scales. Participants then evaluated how threatening each target was to our country as a whole (1 = *not at all threatening to our country;* 7 = *very threatening to our country*). Item order was randomized across participants within the intolerance judgment, warmth rating, and threat assessment sections of the questionnaire.

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[1] There were 49 self-identified liberals and 14 self-identified conservatives in the left-wing target condition and 39 self-identified liberals and 19 self-identified conservatives in the right-wing target condition.

Following these target evaluations, we assessed the predictor variable, political Ideology (1 = *Extremely liberal*; 7 = *Extremely conservative*), as well as party affiliation (1 = *Strong Democrat*; 7 = *Strong Republican*). Internalization of democratic norms and political knowledge were then assessed. Participants first completed a six-item measure of support for democratic principles (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 6 = *Strongly agree*) adapted from Altemeyer's (1996) Censorship and Freedom of Speech measure (e.g., "All political groups should be allowed to speak their views in public even if there is a threat of disruption or disorder"). Items were scored so that higher values indicated greater generalized political intolerance, and an average score was computed. Item order was randomized. Participants then indicated whether liberals or conservatives support or oppose the eight policy issues addressed by the targets (e.g., same-sex marriage, affirmative action programs). Correct and incorrect answers were coded as 1 and 0 respectively, and correct scores were summed to form the political knowledge measure (scores ranged from 0 to 8; 90% of participants answered at least five items correctly). Item order on the political knowledge measure was randomized. Lastly, participants provided demographic information such as age, gender, and race/ethnicity.

Results

To test our hypotheses regarding political intolerance of left-wing and right-wing targets, we conducted a series of two-step hierarchical regression analyses on each of the eight target comparisons, following Aiken and West (1991). Political knowledge, generalized political intolerance, ideology, and experimental condition (0 = left-wing targets, 1 = right-wing targets) were entered into Step 1, with continuous variables (including the Ideology independent variable) centered on their respective means. The Ideology × Condition interaction was entered into Step 2. Based on our first set of hypotheses, we expected significant Ideology × Condition interactions in each model, such that conservatism would predict intolerance of left-wing targets while liberalism would predict intolerance of right-wing targets. Table 1 reports Step 2 from these eight hierarchical multiple regression analyses. The Ideology × Condition interaction was significant in all models except the pro- versus anti-immigrant-rights group comparison. Table 2 presents the simple slopes for each interaction. Neither slope was significant for the immigrant-rights group comparison, which is not discussed further. As expected, liberalism predicted intolerance of all other right-wing targets (βs from −.26 to −.47). Conservatism significantly predicted intolerance of four left-wing targets: pro-gay, pro-choice, church-state separation, and Democratic Party activists. The relationship between conservatism and intolerance of the pro-health care reform and anti-Bush targets was in the expected direction, but did not approach statistical significance (*p*s < .325).[2] Contrary to expectations, there was no relationship between conservatism and intolerance of the pro-affirmative action target (*p* = .658).

To examine the pattern of findings across the seven comparisons that yielded significant Ideology × Condition interactions, we computed an average measure of intolerance across those seven judgments. Table 3 reports Step 2 of the hierarchical regression analysis on this measure. Main effects of political knowledge, generalized intolerance, and conservatism were qualified by the expected Ideology × Condition interaction. The simple slopes, reported in Figure 1, indicate that across these target comparisons, liberalism predicted intolerance of right-wing targets while conservatism predicted intolerance of left-wing targets.[3] Moreover, we examined whether both liberals and conservatives were biased against ideologically opposing targets relative to ideologically

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[2] These relationships were significant when generalized political intolerance was removed as a covariate from the models (both *p*s < .05).

[3] A nonsignificant (*p* = .480) Warmth × Ideology × Condition interaction suggested that perceived warmth did not moderate these effects.

Table 1. Step 2 of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses for Each Target Comparison

	Gay Rights				Abortion Rights				Church-State Separation			
	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t
Knowledge	−.12	.07	−.12	1.69	−.08	.06	−.09	1.21	−.13	.08	−.13	1.64
Generalized Intolerance	.45	.11	.29	4.02***	.27	.10	.21	2.60*	.31	.13	.19	2.34*
Ideology	.32	.11	.32	3.05**	.28	.10	.33	2.93**	.33	.12	.30	2.63**
Condition	.44	.22	.14	2.03*	.17	.20	.06	.85	−.13	.26	−.04	.51
Ideology × Condition	−.79	.14	−.57	5.66***	−.52	.13	−.45	4.08***	−.71	.16	−.48	4.33***
R^2			.30***				.17***				.17***	
ΔR^2			.15***				.09***				.10***	
Constant			2.32				2.20				2.85	

	Health Care Reform				Presidential Critics				Party Activists			
	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t
Knowledge	.08	.08	.08	1.00	−.16	.07	−.16	2.09*	−.08	.07	−.09	1.12
Generalized Intolerance	.53	.13	.32	4.07***	.58	.12	.37	4.79***	.43	.11	.30	3.91***
Ideology	.20	.12	.18	1.64	.09	.11	.09	.79	.19	.10	.20	1.83
Condition	−.14	.25	−.04	.55	.10	.24	.03	.41	.11	.21	.04	.50
Ideology × Condition	−.61	.16	−.41	3.77***	−.36	.15	−.26	2.40*	−.52	.14	−.42	3.86***
R^2			.19***				.22***				.20***	
ΔR^2			.08***				.03*				.08***	
Constant			3.26				2.85				2.21	

	Affirmative Action				Immigration			
	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t
Knowledge	−.14	.07	−.15	2.00*	−.07	.06	−.09	1.17
Generalized Intolerance	.42	.12	.29	3.61***	.52	.10	.40	5.09***
Ideology	−.03	.11	−.03	.24	.01	.09	.01	.05
Condition	.02	.23	.01	.10	.10	.20	.04	.50
Ideology × Condition	−.34	.15	−.26	2.36*	−.12	.13	−.11	.98
R^2			.18***				.19***	
ΔR^2			.03*				.01	
Constant			2.62				2.33	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.
Note: dfs = 5, 149 in Step 2 of the models.

Table 2. Simple Slopes for Each Intolerance Judgment

	Left-Wing Targets				Right-Wing Targets			
	b	SE	B	t	b	SE	B	t
Gay Rights	.32	.10	.32	3.19**	−.46	.10	−.47	4.50***
Abortion Rights	.25	.09	.29	2.76**	−.23	.10	−.28	2.44*
Church-State Separation	.28	.12	.25	2.42*	−.36	.12	−.34	3.02**
Affirmative Action	−.05	.11	−.05	.44	−.36	.11	−.37	3.38**
Health Care Reform	.11	.11	.10	.99	−.40	.12	−.38	3.39**
Presidential Critics	.11	.11	.11	1.04	−.28	.12	−.26	2.42*
Party Activists	.20	.10	.21	1.93†	−.34	.10	−.38	3.55**
Immigration	−.01	.09	−.02	.16	−.12	.10	−.13	1.19

†$p = .058$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.
Note: dfs = 5, 149 in Step 2 of the models. Positive regression coefficients indicate that conservatism predicted intolerance of the target, while negative coefficients indicate that liberalism predicted intolerance of the target.

Table 3. Step 2 of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis on the Average Intolerance Measure

	b	SE	B	t
Knowledge	−.09	.04	−.14	2.11*
Generalized Intolerance	.43	.07	.42	6.26***
Ideology	.20	.06	.29	3.09**
Condition	.08	.13	.04	.61
Ideology × Condition	−.55	.09	−.61	6.51***
R^2				.41***
ΔR^2				.17***
Constant				2.62

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.
Note: dfs = 5, 149 in Step 2 of the model.

Figure 1. Ideology × Condition interaction across target judgments. Values represent unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

supporting targets. As expected, liberals (−1 SD) were more intolerant of right-wing targets than left-wing targets, $b = .97$, $SE = .19$, $\beta = .46$, $t = 5.14$, $p < .001$, while conservatives (+1 SD) were more intolerant of left-wing targets than right-wing targets, $b = −.81$, $SE = .19$, $\beta = −.39$, $t = 4.21$, $p < .001$.

These hypotheses assumed that liberals generally disliked right-wing targets, while conservatives generally disliked left-wing targets. To test these assumptions, we conducted the same hierarchical regression analysis reported above, except that we used warmth judgments (aggregated across all seven target comparisons) as the dependent variable instead of political intolerance. A significant Ideology × Condition interaction ($p < .001$) confirmed these assumptions: simple slopes indicated that liberalism predicted disliking of right-wing targets, $b = 8.43$, $SE = 1.03$, $\beta = .69$, $t = 8.15$, $p < .001$, whereas conservatism predicted disliking of left-wing targets, $b = −7.19$, $SE = 1.24$, $\beta = −.53$, $t = 5.82$, $p < .001$.

Finally, we tested our last prediction that perceived threat would mediate the relationship between political ideology and political intolerance. To do so, we first created an average measure of perceived threat across the seven perceived threat assessments (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics for and correlations among this and other study variables). We then tested two separate mediational analyses using Preacher and Hayes's (2008) indirect macro: one examining intolerance of left-wing

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for and Correlations Among Study Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Knowledge							
2. Generalized intolerance	−.25**						
3. Warmth ratings	.06	−.07					
4. Perceived threat	−.07	.20*	−.69***				
5. Ideology	−.03	.24**	.08	−.15			
6. Condition	.01	.08	−.45***	.36***	.10		
7. Average intolerance measure	−.23**	.46***	−.47***	.57***	−.05	.06	
M	6.72	2.57	47.12	2.95	3.29	.49	2.61
SD	1.64	1.03	22.30	1.64	1.61	.50	1.05
α	.70	.84	.83	.91	–	–	.79

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

targets and the other examining intolerance of right-wing targets. As expected, the effect of conservatism on intolerance of left-wing targets was fully mediated by perceived threat from those targets, as the relationship between conservatism and intolerance of left-wing targets (the c path) was reduced to nonsignificance when controlling for perceived threat (the c′ path) (see Figure 2). Likewise, the effect of liberalism on intolerance of right-wing targets was fully mediated by perceived threat from those targets (see Figure 3).

Ancillary Analyses

While our study has several advantages over Lindner and Nosek's (2009) methods, one noteworthy limitation of our study compared to theirs and others in political psychology is our relatively small sample ($N = 160$), which could be threatened by extreme outliers in the data. To examine whether extreme scores in this small sample unduly influenced our conclusions, we calculated Mahalanobis and Cook's distances to identify potential multivariate outliers in each of our hierarchical regression analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Only one participant in the right-wing target condition was determined an outlier by Mahalanobis distance ($\chi^2 > 20.515$, $p < .001$, $df = 5$); that said, this participants' responses did not significantly exert influence, as measured by Cook's distance ($D < 1$). As a precaution, we removed this participant and recalculated each of our hierarchical regression analyses. Because removal of this participant did not alter any of our conclusions, we retained this participant for the analyses reported here.

Discussion

Using an experimental approach, Lindner and Nosek (2009) found that conservatism predicted intolerance of anti-American speech, but liberalism did not predict intolerance of anti-Arab speech. Their conclusion, based on their evidence that conservatism is more strongly related to political intolerance, is consistent with the correlational evidence from the extant literature they reviewed (Altemeyer, 1996; Davis & Silver, 2004; Fisher et al., 1999; Sniderman et al., 1989). We adopted Lindner and Nosek's approach of experimentally manipulating the stated position of political targets, but contrary to their findings, our study offers clear evidence that both political liberalism and conservatism predict intolerance of politically opposing targets and that such intolerance is explained by perceived threat from these targets. Moreover, both liberals and conservatives were biased in their intolerance judgments, with conservatives expressing more intolerance of left-wing than comparable right-wing targets and liberals expressing more intolerance of right-wing than comparable left-wing

Figure 2. Mediation of the relationship between conservatism and intolerance of left-wing targets by perceived threat from left-wing targets. Path labels are based on Baron and Kenny's (1986) nomenclature. Values represent unstandardized regression coefficients. Ideological self-placement and perceived threat were mean-centered. Political knowledge and generalized political intolerance were included as covariates in the model. Adjusted $R^2 = .55$. Confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstrap samples for the indirect effect, lower = .03, upper = .18. $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$.

Figure 3. Mediation of the relationship between liberalism and intolerance of right-wing targets by perceived threat from right-wing targets. Path labels are based on Baron and Kenny's (1986) nomenclature. Values represent unstandardized regression coefficients. Ideological self-placement and perceived threat were mean-centered. Political knowledge and generalized political intolerance were included as covariates in the model. Adjusted $R^2 = .44$. Confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstrap samples for the indirect effect, lower = −.47, upper = −.14. $***p < .001$.

targets. These patterns emerged across a variety of political issues and two different modes of individual and collective political expression (i.e., speech protection and collective action rights).[4]

While our findings are inconsistent with Lindner and Nosek's and with the literature they reviewed, they are consistent with theories of motivated reasoning in general (Kunda, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), empirical demonstrations of motivated political reasoning on both the left and right (Crawford, 2012; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006), and even evidence from the extant political tolerance literature (Marcus et al., 1995; Suedfeld et al., 1994; Sullivan et al., 1981). The finding that the relationship between ideology and political intolerance is mediated by perceived threat from ideologically opposing targets is also broadly consistent with the existing literature on political tolerance (Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995). Moreover, by manipulating the intent of the target while controlling for the targets' actions, we offer a new strategy for employing content-controlled measurement in the study of political intolerance (Marcus et al., 1995; Sullivan et al., 1981).

Also noteworthy is our finding that conservatives were more intolerant of left-wing than right-wing targets while liberals were more intolerant of right-wing than left-wing targets. Lindner and Nosek (2009) found that liberals more strongly defended anti-American than anti-Arab speech,

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[4] In this study, we experimentally manipulated whether participants evaluated all left-wing or all right-wing targets. We replicated the present findings in an unpublished study in which participants evaluated a mix of both left-wing and right-wing targets (Crawford & Pilanski, unpublished data).

while conservatives did not differ in their defense of these two targets. They interpreted this absence of differential judgments among conservatives as consistent with the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, which suggests that rigidity, dogmatism, and inflexibility are more strongly associated with the political right (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, others have argued that the *presence* of differential judgments among those on the right indicates that they are psychologically rigid (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002). Clearly both cannot be true (see Crawford [2012] for a discussion of this issue). Our findings cannot resolve this particular issue, but do provide consistent evidence that *both* liberals and conservatives are motivated to afford more rights to groups and individuals they agree with than those they do not. Given that previous research has linked dogmatism and rigidity to political intolerance (Marcus et al., 1995; Sullivan et al., 1982), future research may examine whether trait-based rigidity (e.g., PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; NFC; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993) moderates intolerance judgments on the left and right.

Conclusion

There is clearly disagreement among scholars regarding the relationship between political ideology and intolerance. While some argue that political intolerance is more endemic to the political right than the left (Altemeyer, 1996; Davis & Silver, 2004; Fisher et al., 1999; Lindner & Nosek, 2009), others have noted how those on both the political right *and* left can be intolerant of those with whom they disagree (Marcus et al., 1995; Suedfeld et al., 1994; Sullivan et al., 1981). Our findings clearly support the latter perspective: Across a variety of political issues and modes of political expression, both liberals and conservatives were intolerant of those with whom they disagreed, and such intolerance was explained by how threatening those political opponents were perceived.

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Appendix

Intolerance Judgment Items

1. I believe that members of Lambda Legal (*Focus on the Family*) should not be allowed to organize in order to pass laws legalizing (*banning*) gay marriage.
2. I think that members of a state Pro-Choice (*Right to Life*) organization should be allowed to distribute pro-choice (*pro-life*) pamphlets and buttons on local college campuses.
3. I think that an Atheist (*Evangelical Christian*) group should not be allowed to organize in order to remove the phrase "Under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance in American public schools (*allow school prayer in American public schools*).
4. I believe that a group that supports (*opposes*) affirmative action should not be allowed to organize in order to influence government policy on affirmative action in higher education.
5. I believe that a person who supports (*opposes*) Obama's health care reform should not be allowed to disrupt a Congressman's town hall meeting.
6. I think that a protestor should be allowed to give a speech entitled "George W. Bush (*Barack Obama*), Our Generation's Hitler".
7. I think that the Democratic (*Republican*) Party should not be allowed to visit college campuses in order to register potential voters.
8. I think that protestors who disapprove (*approve*) of Arizona's law requiring all non-U.S. citizens to carry immigration documents should be allowed to demonstrate outside the Arizona state capitol building.

Note: Text for left-wing targets is in regular font outside parentheses; text for right-wing targets is italicized in parentheses.