Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 55 (2014) 284–298

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

Ideological symmetries and asymmetries in political intolerance and prejudice toward political activist groups

Jarret T. Crawford

Psychology Department, The College of New Jersey, 2000 Pennington Rd., Ewing, NJ 08628, USA

HIGHLIGHTS

- I identify ideological symmetry in intergroup outcomes, but asymmetry in processes.
- Symbolic threat predicts prejudice, but not political intolerance.
- Threat-based antecedents of political intolerance depend on the target's ideology.
- Equivalent levels of political intolerance and prejudice emerge on the left and right.
- Results are consistent across multiple studies and methodological approaches.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:
Received 2 February 2014
Revised 12 July 2014
Available online 22 August 2014

Keywords:
Political intolerance
Prejudice
Threat
Ideology
Political psychology

ABSTRACT

Three studies examined ideological symmetries and asymmetries in political intolerance and prejudice toward political activist groups. Using both student and non-student samples, and two alternative methodologies for studying political intolerance, the results of these studies converge on three important and novel conclusions. First, consistent with the ideological conflict hypothesis, both liberals and conservatives were politically intolerant and prejudiced toward ideologically dissimilar groups, to similar degrees. Second, whereas political intolerance and prejudice are related intergroup phenomena, they have different threat-based antecedents. Specifically, whereas symbolic threat significantly predicted prejudice, it did not predict political intolerance of the same groups. Finally, the threat-based antecedents of political intolerance depended on the political objectives of the group itself. Across studies, only safety threat predicted intolerance of left-wing groups. In Studies 1 and 2, only realistic threat predicted intolerance of right-wing groups; however, Study 3 revealed that those effects are attributable to beliefs that right-wing groups are a threat to people's rights. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, including their relevance to political intolerance and prejudice reduction interventions.

Introduction

There has been recent controversy regarding the role of political ideology in political intolerance judgments. Whereas some perspectives argue that conservatives are more politically intolerant than liberals (i.e., *ideological asymmetry* in political intolerance judgments), others suggest that liberals and conservatives are equally politically intolerant of their disliked groups (i.e., *ideological symmetry*). On the one hand, Lindner and Nosek (2009) recently found evidence of ideological asymmetry: specifically, conservatism predicted political intolerance of anti-American (and presumably left-wing) speech, but liberalism did not predict political intolerance of anti-Arab (and presumably right-wing) speech. However, Crawford and Pilanski (2013) noted several limitations to Lindner and Nosek's (2009) approach, such as examining a) only a single comparison of targets (anti-Arab vs. anti-American) who did not clearly possess directly contrasting political objectives, b) only one mode of political expression (i.e., free speech rights), and c) intolerance of individuals but not groups, which is the typical unit of analysis in political tolerance research (e.g., Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995).

In their study, Crawford and Pilanski (2013) assessed the protection of both free speech rights as well as rights to assembly of multiple left-wing and right-wing groups and individuals with directly contrasting political objectives (e.g., pro-life vs. pro-choice activists). Across seven comparisons, Crawford and Pilanski (2013) found clear evidence of ideological symmetry in political intolerance judgments: conservatism predicted intolerance of left-wing targets, whereas liberalism predicted intolerance of right-wing targets. Moreover, liberals were more intolerant of right-wing than left-wing targets, whereas conservatives were more intolerant of left-wing than right-wing targets.

E-mail address: crawford@tcnj.edu.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.08.002
0022-1031/

Although Crawford and Pilanski's (2013) results are inconsistent with Lindner and Nosek's (2009), as well as some other evidence of ideological asymmetry in the literature (e.g., Davis & Silver, 2004; Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989), they are consistent with other evidence of ideological symmetry in political intolerance judgments (e.g., Suedfeld, Steel, & Schmidt, 1994), including evidence stemming from one of the most highly influential research programs in the political intolerance literature: Sullivan, Marcus and colleagues' studies of people's intolerance of their least-liked groups (Marcus et al., 1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). In the least-liked groups (LLG) paradigm, people first indicate the group they dislike the most through either free response or from an experimenter-generated list of possible groups, and then provide intolerance judgments regarding their chosen group. This method has become the standard for examining political intolerance judgments (Gibson, 2006; Gibson & Gouws, 2003), and reveals intolerance among those on both the political right and left (Marcus et al., 1995; Sullivan et al., 1981).

Crawford and Pilanski's (2013) results are also consistent with other recent evidence that liberals and conservatives are equally prejudiced against (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013) and willing to discriminate against (Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013) each other. Summarizing these recent results, Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, and Wetherell (2014) developed the ideological conflict hypothesis (ICH), which argues that people across the political spectrum are prejudiced against and intolerant of ideologically dissimilar others, largely because of the threat these groups pose to one's deeply held worldviews, and the values and beliefs that underlie them.

While there is a good deal of theory and empirical evidence to support the ICH, some of its arguments likely require further refinement. First and foremost, the ICH does not make a conceptual distinction between political intolerance and prejudice, despite both theoretical and empirical reasons for suspecting that they are related but distinct intergroup outcomes. Prejudice (or "social intolerance," as it has been sometimes labeled in the political tolerance literature; e.g., Gibson, 2006) refers to negative evaluations of or feelings toward particular social groups and their individual members (Allport, 1954; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). Prejudice is typically distinguished from beliefs about groups and their individual members (i.e., stereotypes) and behavioral expressions of negative feelings and beliefs (i.e., discrimination). On the other hand, political intolerance refers to the willingness to deny certain social groups democratically-guaranteed rights, such as the freedom to assemble, to speak publicly regarding their beliefs, to run for public office, or to organize in order to influence policy (see Sullivan & Transue, 1999 for a review).

Perhaps at the heart of the conceptual distinction between political intolerance and prejudice is the fact that political intolerance reflects antipathy at a level beyond simple prejudice. As multiple scholars have noted, it is one thing to dislike a group, but a step beyond that to willingly allow that groups' rights and freedoms to be restricted (Gibson, 2006; Skitka et al., 2013; van der Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010). It is therefore possible to be politically tolerant of groups toward whom we feel great hostility and prejudice. For example, adherence to democratic principles and values can often override intolerance judgments against even one's least-liked group (Marcus et al., 1995; Skitka et al., 2013; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). This conceptual distinction between political intolerance and prejudice is further borne out in research utilizing the LLG paradigm, which carries the built-in assumption that people are prejudiced against their selected *least-liked* group. The fact that non-trivial proportions of respondents express political tolerance toward even their least-liked group indicates that political intolerance and prejudice do not necessarily go hand-in-hand (Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995; see also van der Noll et al., 2010 for evidence of this distinction outside of the LLG paradigm).

Additional research provides empirical support for this conceptual distinction. For example, Skitka et al. (2013) recently found in a U.S. sample that moral conviction predicted prejudice against targets who held opposing positions on deeply moral issues, but was unrelated to political intolerance toward these same targets. This was not the case, however, in a Chinese sample, in which moral conviction predicted both political intolerance and prejudice toward dissimilar targets. These results suggest that different psychological processes are associated with political intolerance and prejudice, at least in countries with relatively strong democratic norms like the U. S. Finally, Gibson (2006) noted that in contrast to scholars who have conceptually conflated political intolerance and prejudice (e.g., Stenner, 2005, p. 325), he has observed only small or even non-significant correlations between political intolerance and prejudice toward Whites in South Africa and toward Jews in Russia. Gibson (2006, p. 26) subsequently argued that understanding the apparent disjunction between political intolerance and prejudice is "one of the most important tasks of future [political tolerance] research."

Thus, whereas some previous scholarship has implicitly (Brandt et al., 2014) or explicitly (Stenner, 2005) equated the two, there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to expect political intolerance and prejudice to be distinct intergroup phenomena. If so, they should have different antecedents, as Skitka et al.'s (2013) findings suggest. Further, given that different values and motives underlie liberalism and conservatism (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010), it is plausible that different antecedents would underlie liberals' and conservatives' political intolerance and prejudice toward right-wing and left-wing political activist groups, respectively. Given that perceived threat is a powerful antecedent of both political intolerance (Feldman, 2003; Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995) and prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Duckitt, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), the present studies examined different types of threat as predictors of political intolerance and prejudice against left-wing and right-wing activist groups.

Whereas Crawford and Pilanski (2013) found that perceived threat mediated the relationship between political ideology and political intolerance, their threat item ("How threatening is this group to our country as a whole?") did not clearly identify the *type* of threat being assessed. Both the political science (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995) and social psychology (e.g., Pettigrew et al., 2008) literatures point toward intergroup (or "sociotropic") threats as more predictive of political intolerance and prejudice than interpersonal (or "egocentric") threats. Further, multiple theoretical perspectives such as the sociofunctional threat-based approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) and integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) recognize the multi-dimensionality of intergroup threat, and posit that the effects of different types of threat depend on the intergroup context. The present investigation focused primarily on *symbolic threat*, which stems from intergroup conflict over values and beliefs (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), *realistic threat*, which stems from real or perceived group competition over limited societal resources (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and *safety threat*, which stems from perceived physical danger to the group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).

Following Gibson's (2006, p. 26) recommendation to asses both political intolerance and prejudice toward the same target groups in order to compare these intergroup phenomena, the present studies examined political intolerance and prejudice toward both left-wing (e.g., pro-choice) and right-wing (e.g., pro-life) political activist groups. Using political activist groups as targets provides a more controlled test of the distinction between political intolerance and prejudice (and the processes that underlie them) than using non-political social groups (e.g., African-Americans; Muslims; atheists). Specifically, a non-political social group's political identity is far more apparent in political intolerance judgments than in prejudice judgments toward them; however, an activist group's political identity is apparent regardless of

whether one is making prejudice or political intolerance judgments toward them.

The ICH predicts that people across the political spectrum will direct prejudice against groups with dissimilar worldviews. Worldviews contain the symbolic values and beliefs that provide meaning and importance to their adherents (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Groups perceived as worldview threats should therefore be perceived as symbolic threats. Consistent with this argument, Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna (2013); Wetherell, Reyna, and Sadler (2013) found that perceived value violations predicted the willingness of both liberals and conservatives to discriminate against ideological dissimilar groups. Other evidence indicates that symbolic threat primarily predicts prejudice against ideologically dissimilar groups over and above realistic and safety threats (Crawford et al., 2014). Further, Skitka et al.'s (2013) finding in a U.S. sample that moral convictions predicted prejudice but not political intolerance against ideologically dissimilar targets suggests that symbolic threat (which captures threat to moral values and beliefs) is more strongly related to prejudice than political intolerance. Thus, symbolic threat should be a stronger predictor of prejudice than of political intolerance in the present studies, even when directed toward the same groups.

Regarding political intolerance, multiple theoretical perspectives suggest that conservatism is related to needs for security and certainty (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003). Consistent with these accounts, political conservatism is related to fear of dangerous events or people (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996), increased physiological responses to threatening visual stimuli (Oxley et al., 2008), fear of loss and death (Jost et al., 2003), and other-focused prevention motives toward maintaining social order (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). Recent evidence has directly linked right-wing authoritarianism (which is positively correlated with political conservatism; Jost et al., 2003) to political intolerance of left-wing groups, especially under conditions of public disorder (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). All of the above suggests that safety threat should most strongly predict political intolerance of left-wing groups.

Finally, although there are notable exceptions (Graham et al., 2009; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2010), social and political psychologists have generally placed greater emphasis on understanding the motivations underlying conservatism than on those underlying liberalism (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; see Duarte et al., in press for a discussion). Indeed, with the exception of LLG studies which have typically not focused on the political orientation of the perceiver or the group, extant studies have focused almost exclusively on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing, socially deviant, or low status groups (see Brandt et al., 2014 for a discussion of this issue).

There is therefore limited existing theoretical or empirical basis for predictions regarding the types of threat specifically related to liberals' underlying psychological motives. If distinct processes do *not* underlie political intolerance and prejudice, then symbolic threat would likely also predict political intolerance of right-wing groups. However, realistic threat may be a viable candidate mechanism, for several reasons. First, with recent progressive victories in the U.S. (e.g., the election and re-election of the first African-American president; passage of the Affordable Care Act; strides toward marriage equality), liberals may feel they have more to lose from potential conservative gains. Second, given that liberals perceive conservatives as relatively low in warmth but high in competence (Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013), they may oppose conservatives' rights because they see them as highly capable of successfully competing for political power, which is certainly a scarce resource in political conflict (Velasco-Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). The present studies will therefore openly explore the threat perceptions that underlie political intolerance of right-wing groups.

The present studies

These predictions and possibilities were tested across three studies. Study 1 utilized the content-controlled method employed by Crawford and Pilanski (2013), experimentally varying whether participants evaluated multiple left-wing or right-wing groups. This study tested whether ideologically symmetrical biases in political intolerance and prejudice emerged, in line with Crawford and Pilanski (2013) more specifically, and the ICH more generally. Importantly, it also examined whether different types of threats mediated the relationships between political ideology and both political intolerance and prejudice toward activist groups. In an attempt to both replicate Study 1's findings and to test these predictions within the context of the standard method of studying political intolerance, Study 2 utilized the LLG method. This study also provided an analysis of the *reasons* people gave for choosing their least-liked group, and possible ideological symmetries and asymmetries in those choices. Finally, Study 3 returned to the content-controlled method and sought to provide further support for these hypotheses with improved measures of core constructs, while also extending Study 2's findings regarding the reasons that people gave for choosing their least-liked group.

The studies can potentially make several important contributions to our understanding of political intolerance and prejudice. First, they may identify the differential processes that underlie these distinct intergroup phenomena. Second, they may reveal important differences in the motivations that underlie political intolerance on the left and right. Third, these results may explain not only why political intolerance and prejudice are distinct intergroup phenomena, but also why some studies reveal moderate correlations between the two (e.g., Crawford & Pilanski, 2013) while others reveal no relationship between them (e.g., Gibson, 2006). Finally, these studies can provide further evidence pertaining to controversy regarding whether ideological variation in political intolerance and prejudice is characterized by symmetry or asymmetry. Relatedly, these findings can potentially bridge these two often conflicting accounts by suggesting that there are symmetries in outcomes (i.e., little difference between liberals and conservatives in levels of political intolerance and prejudice) but asymmetries in processes (i.e., different motivations for political intolerance on the left and right) related to intergroup attitudes.

Study 1

Study 1 tested the differential effects of symbolic, realistic, and safety threats on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing and right-wing political activist groups using the content-controlled method recently developed by Crawford and Pilanski (2013). This approach has at least two advantages over the LLG method. First, whereas the LLG method essentially holds ideology constant (as conservatives and liberals generally select left-wing and right-wing groups, respectively), the content-controlled method allows variation in ideology within randomly assigned target group conditions, and thus allows for a test of the indirect effects of political ideology on political intolerance and prejudice via the different types of threat. Second, whereas participants only evaluate groups they dislike in the LLG method, they evaluate groups they dislike *or* like in the content-controlled method, allowing for tests of ideological *biases* in political intolerance judgments (Crawford & Pilanski, 2013).

Method

Participants

Two separate samples were collected for Study 1. Sample 1 consisted of 151 college students (70% female; 76% White; Mage = 20 years) who

Table 1
Left-wing and right-wing political activist groups used in Studies 1, 2 and 3.

Political issue	Left-wing group	Right-wing group
Gun control	Gun control activist group	Gun rights activist group
Abortion rights	Pro-choice activist group	Pro-life activist group
Marriage equality	Pro-gay marriage activist group	Anti-gay marriage activist group
Church–state separation	Activist group for church–state separation	Activist group against church–state separation
Affirmative action	Pro-affirmative action activist group	Anti-affirmative action activist group
Social welfare	Pro-welfare activist group	Anti-welfare activist group
Immigration reform	Pro-immigrant rights activist group	Anti-immigrant rights activist group

Note: All groups were used in Study 2. All groups were used in Studies 1 and 3 except the immigration reform groups.

completed the survey online for course credit. Sample 2 consisted of 177 U.S. residents (36% female; 83% White; Mage = 33 years) recruited through the online labor market Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), where well-established findings in social psychology and political science have been replicated (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). Interested individuals selected a link to the online survey and were compensated 50 cents for their participation. These samples were combined for a total of 328 participants (52% female; 80% White; M_{age} = 27 years).

Materials and procedures

Participants were first randomly assigned to provide political intolerance judgments of either six left-wing or six right-wing activist groups, representing directly contrasting positions on six political issues. The groups selected were similar to those used in Crawford and Pilanski (2013). Political intolerance of each group was assessed with one 6-point item (1 = *Strongly Disagree*; 6 = *Strongly Agree*) for each target. These items were similar to those used by Crawford and Pilanski (2013), which were derived from Marcus et al.'s (1995) political intolerance measure. Items were averaged to form the political intolerance measure (α = .82), which was balanced with positively and negatively worded items (see Appendix A).

On a separate page, participants then provided feeling thermometer ratings for each target (0 = very cold, 100 = very warm; reverse-scored so that higher scores indicated more prejudice), which were averaged to form the prejudice measure (α = .85). The target descriptions are provided in Table 1. Participants then indicated the extent to which they think each group: "violates your core values and beliefs" (*symbolic threat*); "takes away societal resources from people like you" (*realistic threat*); and "makes our society more dangerous and less safe" (*safety threat*). These items were derived from extant measures of these different types of intergroup threat (Duckitt, 2006; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and were measured on 7-point scales (1 = *To no extent at all*; 7 = *To a great extent*). Scores were averaged across the six targets to form three separate threat measures (αs = .87, .88, and .89 for symbolic, realistic, and safety threats, respectively).

Participants then indicated whether liberals or conservatives support eight different policies (e.g., same-sex marriage). Correct and incorrect answers were coded as 1 and 0 respectively, and were summed to form a political knowledge measure (α = .65).[1] Lastly, participants reported political ideology (1 = *Extremely Liberal*; 7 = *Extremely Conservative*) and party affiliation (1 = *Strong Democrat*; 7 = *Strong Republican*), and provided demographic information such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and socioeconomic status.

[1] In all three studies, the internal reliability for political knowledge is somewhat low. This is likely due to the fact that the political knowledge measure was highly negatively skewed (skewness greater than the absolute value of 1.33 in all three studies), thus suffering from severe range restriction, which can attenuate item inter-correlations (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), and thus internal reliability estimates (Cronbach, 1951). Despite its low internal reliability, it was consistently negatively correlated with political intolerance in accordance with extant findings (e.g., Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations

Table 2 reports the correlations among and descriptive statistics for the study variables. Political ideology was weakly negatively correlated with political knowledge, and weakly positively correlated with political intolerance. The three measures of perceived threat were strongly correlated with each other. Each type of threat was moderately correlated with political intolerance, and strongly correlated with prejudice. Unlike in typical LLG studies, but similar to Crawford and Pilanski's (2013) results, political intolerance and prejudice were moderately positively correlated.

Replicating ideological symmetry in political intolerance and prejudice

A moderated multiple regression was computed with participant ideology (mean-centered) and group ideology (0 = right-wing, 1 = left-wing) entered in Step 1, and the Ideology × Group interaction entered in Step 2 (Aiken & West, 1991). In Step 1, a main effect of Ideology emerged, $b = .10$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = .13$, $p = .017$, such that conservatism predicted political intolerance. However, a main effect of Group also emerged, $b = -.24$, $SE = .11$, $\beta = -.12$, $p = .032$, such that there were higher levels of political intolerance expressed toward right-wing than left-wing groups.

The expected Ideology × Group interaction in Step 2 was robust, $b = .44$, $SE = .08$, $\beta = .43$, $p < .001$. As Fig. 1 (panel A) shows, conservatism predicted political intolerance of left-wing groups, whereas liberalism predicted political intolerance of right-wing groups. Further, whereas liberals (1 SD below the mean) were more intolerant of right-wing than left-wing groups, $b = -.86$, $SE = .15$, $\beta = -.42$, $p < .001$, conservatives (1 SD above the mean) were more intolerant of left-wing than right-wing groups, $b = .38$, $SE = .15$, $\beta = .19$, $p = .013$. These results fully replicate Crawford and Pilanski's (2013) findings. Further, liberals' and conservatives' levels of political intolerance toward ideologically dissimilar targets were roughly equivalent (see Fig. 1, panel A). However, liberals' intolerance of left-wing targets was considerably lower than conservatives' intolerance of right-wing targets. Thus, whereas the observed main effect of conservatism on political intolerance may at face seem consistent with Lindner and Nosek's (2009) findings, the interactive effect indicates that this main effect is driven by the fact that liberals were much more tolerant of ideologically similar groups than were conservatives.

In a similar analysis of prejudice ratings, there was no significant ideology main effect ($p = .707$), but there was an Ideology × Group interaction, $b = 19.44$, $SE = 1.22$, $\beta = .80$, $p < .001$. Consistent with the ICH and related research (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013), conservatism predicted prejudice against left-wing groups, $b = 9.40$, $SE = .86$, $\beta = .66$, $p < .001$, whereas liberalism predicted prejudice against right-wing groups, $b = -10.04$, $SE = .86$, $\beta = -.69$, $p < .001$, to similar degrees.

Table 2
Study 1: correlations, descriptive statistics, and reliability coefficients.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Political ideology							
2. Political knowledge	−.15**						
3. Symbolic threat	.02	−.07					
4. Realistic threat	.06	−.21***	.59***				
5. Safety threat	.01	−.17**	.71***	.68***			
6. Prejudice	.02	−.03	.71***	.51***	.67***		
7. Political intolerance	.13*	−.37***	.32***	.41***	.41***	.32***	
M	3.28	6.85	3.34	2.78	2.71	52.68	2.45
SD	1.40	1.49	1.76	1.66	1.66	24.62	1.02
Skewness	.58	−1.56	.19	.57	.57	.11	.39

Note: *df*s for correlations ranged between 299 and 323.
* $p < .05$.
** $p < .01$.
*** $p < .001$.

Effects of threat on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing groups

A path analysis tested the indirect effects of ideology on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing activist groups via symbolic, realistic, and safety threats. Using M*plus* version 7 software (Muthén & Muthén, 2008–2012), political intolerance and prejudice were specified as separate outcome variables, symbolic, realistic, and safety threats as separate and correlated mediators, and ideology as the independent variable. Table 3 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model (with 5000 bootstrapped samples). As expected, safety threat was the only significant predictor of political intolerance, along with a marginally significant direct effect of ideology. Also as expected, symbolic threat predicted prejudice; additionally, there was a direct effect of ideology and an effect of safety threat. Fig. 2 (panel A) displays a model with all non-significant paths trimmed, which had excellent fit to the data ($\chi^2 = .40$, $\chi^2/df < 1$; CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .006). Moreover, the indirect effect of ideology on political intolerance via safety threat was significant ($b = .18$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$, 95% CI .12, .25), as were the indirect effects of ideology on prejudice via symbolic ($b = 2.14$, $SE = .76$, $p < .005$, 95% CI .64, 3.39) and safety ($b = 2.55$, $SE = .67$, $p < .001$, 95% CI 1.23, 3.66) threats.

Effects of threat on political intolerance and prejudice toward right-wing groups

A path analysis identical to the one described above was computed for right-wing groups. Table 3 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model. Only realistic threat significantly predicted political intolerance. Unlike for left-wing groups, there was no direct effect of ideology on political intolerance. The results regarding prejudice were less straightforward. Ideology had a strong direct effect on prejudice. There was an unexpected effect of safety threat on prejudice, and the effect of symbolic threat approached but did not reach significance. This model was next trimmed to only include significant or predicted effects; however, neither symbolic threat nor safety threat reached significance in predicting prejudice in this model (*p*s = .157 and .151, respectively). As a test of the fit of the predicted model, the model was re-specified to include the indirect effect of ideology on political intolerance via realistic threat, and the indirect effect of ideology



*$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$

Fig. 1. Ideology × target interactive effect on political intolerance in Studies 1 and 3.
*$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$.

Table 3
Study 1: path analyses on political intolerance and prejudice against left-wing and right-wing activist groups.

		Left-wing targets			Right-wing targets		
		N = 165			*N* = 163		
Outcome variable	Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Political intolerance	Realistic	.07	.11	.505	.12	.05	.012
	Symbolic	.03	.07	.643	−.06	.07	.353
	Safety	.31	.12	.011	.09	.05	.089
	Ideology	.11	.06	.066	−.07	.07	.286
Prejudice	Realistic	1.45	1.57	.358	−1.19	.74	.109
	Symbolic	3.37	1.16	.004	1.92	1.32	.136
	Safety	4.50	1.76	.011	2.05	1.02	.043
	Ideology	4.75	.94	<.001	−8.32	1.07	<.001
Realistic	Ideology	.54	.07	<.001	−.43	.09	<.001
Symbolic	Ideology	.58	.08	<.001	−.58	.08	<.001
Safety	Ideology	.47	.07	<.001	−.49	.08	<.001



*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Note: Tests are reported with 5,000 bootstrapped samples.

Fig. 2. Path analyses of effects of threat on political intolerance of and prejudice against left-wing targets in Studies 1 (panel A) and 3 (panel B). *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$. *Note*: Tests are reported with 5000 bootstrapped samples.

on prejudice via symbolic threat, along with the direct effect of ideology on prejudice, which was quite robust in the original model. This model, presented in Fig. 3, had excellent fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 2.16$, $\chi^2/df < 1$; CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .022). The indirect effect of ideology on political intolerance via safety threat was significant ($b = -.06$, $SE = .02$, $p = .008$, 95% CI −.11, −.02), and the indirect effect of symbolic threat on prejudice was marginally significant ($b = -1.42$, $SE = .74$, $p = .053$, 95% CI −2.87, .02, 90% CI −2.64, −.22).[2]

Discussion

Consistent with recently emerging evidence (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Skitka et al., 2013), political intolerance and prejudice appear to be distinct intergroup outcomes, even when directed against the same target group. Specifically, symbolic threat predicted prejudice but not political intolerance against political activists, despite the fact that political intolerance and prejudice were moderately correlated with one another. These findings are also consistent with recent empirical evidence that symbolic threat, but not other types of threat, predicts political prejudice (Crawford et al., 2014), and that at least in societies with rich democratic traditions, moral convictions predict prejudice but not political intolerance (Skitka et al., 2013).

For left-wing target groups, both symbolic and safety threat mediated the ideology-prejudice relationship. For prejudice against right-wing target groups, the results were less straightforward: whereas symbolic threat was clearly related to prejudice, it did not have significant unique effects on prejudice when safety threat was included in the model. This result is somewhat inconsistent with the robust indirect effects of ideology on prejudice via symbolic threat observed by Crawford et al. (2014).

Most interestingly, different types of threats emerged as predictors of political intolerance of left-wing and right-wing groups: whereas only safety threat predicted political intolerance of left-wing groups, only realistic threat predicted political intolerance of right-wing groups, and these types of threat mediated the relationship between political ideology and political intolerance. Study 1 therefore offers the first evidence that political intolerance and prejudice not only derive from different threat-based sources, but that the sources of political intolerance vary by the target group's political objectives.

Study 2

The primary purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the main findings of Study 1 using the LLG method (Marcus et al., 1995). It is important to replicate Study 1's findings in this other methodological context for several reasons. First, replication would show comparability between the newly developed content-controlled and the standard LLG methods, which has yet to be established. Second, differences between the two methods could potentially alter the effects observed in Study 1. For example, political intolerance and prejudice appear moderately correlated in content-controlled studies (Study 1; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013), but uncorrelated in LLG studies (see Gibson, 2006). Thus, Study 2 could help rule out whether the differential antecedents of political intolerance and prejudice observed in Study 1 are due to differences between these two alternative methods.

[2] Sample (student vs. MTurk) did not moderate the reported effects. No threat × target × sample interactions were significant for either political intolerance or prejudice, *ps* > .183.



*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Note: Tests are reported with 5,000 bootstrapped samples.

Fig. 3. Path analyses of effects of threat on political intolerance of and prejudice against right-wing groups in Studies 1 (panel A) and 3 (panel B). *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$. *Note*: Tests are reported with 5000 bootstrapped samples.

Additionally, at the end of the survey, participants indicated *why* they chose their particular group as their least-liked group. Responses to this question were analyzed in order to shed further light on ideological symmetries and asymmetries in people's opposition to ideologically dissimilar political activist groups.

Finally, one limitation of Study 1 was that whereas the political intolerance items tended to mention specific target groups (e.g., Lambda Legal; see Appendix A), the prejudice and perceived threat items mentioned general target groups (e.g., pro-gay marriage activist group; see Table 1). Despite this difference in group description, political intolerance was still moderately correlated with prejudice and perceived threat. That said, to address this limitation, all measures used in Study 2 referenced general target groups.

Method

Participants

Two-hundred two current U.S. residents were recruited through MTurk. Twenty participants failed to correctly identify their previously chosen least-liked group at the end of the survey (described below) and were therefore removed, leaving 182 participants in the final analysis (47% female; 82% White; $M_{age} = 36$ years).

Materials and procedures

Participants were first presented with a list of fourteen different political activist groups (see Table 1). They were asked to choose the group they dislike the most, and were told that they would be asked several questions about this group on subsequent pages.

After selecting their least-liked group, participants completed five items that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure (1 = *Strongly Disagree*; 6 = *Strongly Agree*; $\alpha = .88$). These items were also derived from Marcus et al. (1995) and Crawford and Pilanski (2013), and are reported in Appendix A. Participants then completed the same measures of symbolic, realistic and safety threat used in Study 1, and rated their least-liked group on a 0–100 feeling thermometer scale (reverse-scored). They then completed a 7-item political knowledge measure ($\alpha = .55$) similar to that used in Study 1. Participants were next asked to recollect the activist group they had initially chosen as their least-liked group, and were given space to indicate why they chose this particular group as their least-liked political activist group. Finally, they completed ideology, party, and demographic information.

Results

Preliminary analyses

Descriptive statistics

Table 4 reports the correlations among and descriptive statistics for the study variables. As in Study 1, there was a weak negative correlation between political intolerance and political knowledge, and a weak positive correlation between political intolerance and ideology. Political intolerance was moderately positively correlated with realistic and safety threats, but uncorrelated with symbolic threat.

Table 4
Study 2: correlation among and descriptive statistics for study variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Political ideology							
2. Political knowledge	−.13						
3. Symbolic threat	−.09	.30***					
4. Realistic threat	.18*	.05	.24**				
5. Safety threat	−.003	.06	.36***	.37***			
6. Prejudice	−.07	.27**	.37***	.16*	.16*		
7. Political intolerance	.18*	−.24**	.06	.38***	.31***	.08	
M	3.34	6.04	5.80	4.15	4.90	88.96	3.09
SD	1.64	1.23	1.42	2.01	1.88	18.55	1.27
Skewness	.45	−1.33	−1.39	−.07	−.63	−2.47	.45

Note: *df*s for correlations ranged between 172 and 180.
* $p < .05$.
** $p < .01$.
*** $p < .001$.

The three threat measures were weakly to moderately correlated with prejudice and with one another.

Unlike in Study 1, but consistent with extant LLG studies, political intolerance was uncorrelated with prejudice. However, this is likely due to severe restriction in range for prejudice ratings: the modal response (40% of respondents) was 100, which is the maximum score on the feeling thermometer scale. Further, 90% of respondents rated their least-liked group above 60 on the 100-point scale, leaving the distribution highly negatively skewed (see Table 4). Thus, in all likelihood, prejudice is uncorrelated with political intolerance in Study 2 (and other LLG studies) because range restriction on any given variable can deflate its correlation with other variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Therefore, the differences in the relationship between political intolerance and prejudice observed in Studies 1 and 2 likely reflect differences between the content-controlled and LLG methods in range restriction of prejudice ratings.[3]

Differences in political intolerance and prejudice by chosen least-liked group

One hundred twenty-two participants (67%) selected a right-wing group, whereas 60 participants (33%) selected a left-wing group. Conservatism was strongly correlated with choosing a left-wing group, $r(180) = .61$, $p < .001$. Consistent with the weak bivariate correlation between political intolerance and ideology reported in Table 4, people who chose a left-wing group ($M = 3.38$, $SD = 1.38$) were slightly more intolerant of that group than those who chose a right-wing group ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.19$), $F(1,178) = 4.45$, $p = .036$. That said, the average level of political intolerance was below the scale midpoint of 3.5 for both left-wing and right-wing target groups, indicating that on average, participants were mostly tolerant of their least-liked group. There was a marginally significant tendency for those who chose a right-wing group ($M = 90.79$, $SD = 16.08$) to report more prejudice than those who chose a left-wing group ($M = 85.24$, $SD = 22.46$), $t(174) = 1.88$, $p = .062$.

Effects of threat on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing groups

A path analysis was computed with political intolerance and prejudice included as separate outcome variables, and symbolic, realistic, and safety threats as separate independent variables. Table 5 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model. As expected, safety threat was the only significant predictor of political intolerance of left-wing groups. Prejudice against left-wing groups was expectedly predicted by symbolic threat, but also unexpectedly by realistic threat. (Recall that there was an unexpected effect of safety threat on prejudice against left-wing groups in Study 1). A trimmed model with paths from safety threat to political intolerance ($b = .27$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$), and from symbolic threat ($b = 5.24$, $SE = 2.13$, $p = .014$) and realistic threat ($b = 2.93$, $SE = 1.22$, $p = .016$) to prejudice had excellent fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 1.71$, $\chi^2/df < 1$, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .032).

Effects of threat on political intolerance and prejudice toward right-wing groups

A path analysis identical to the one described above was computed for right-wing groups. Table 5 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model. As in Study 1, realistic threat was the only significant predictor of political intolerance of right-wing groups. As expected, symbolic threat was the only significant predictor of prejudice against right-wing groups. A trimmed model with paths from realistic threat to political intolerance ($b = .27$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$), and from symbolic threat ($b = 4.41$, $SE = 1.53$, $p = .004$) to prejudice had excellent fit to the data ($\chi^2 = .83$, $\chi^2/df < 1$; CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .020).

Reasons for choosing least-liked groups

Participants' written reasons for choosing their least-liked group were examined using a grounded approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1997). Responses were reviewed by two independent coders to identify themes that were theoretically relevant to the political intolerance literature (i.e., *personally affected by the group or its policies*; belief *that the group possesses too much power*; *making the country less safe*; Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995; Stenner, 2005) and themes that emerged in participants' responses: *threatening other people's rights*, *taking away resources from others*, *harmful or hateful toward others*, *cognitively or personally deficient* (e.g., extreme, ignorant, hypocritical), and *principled*

Table 5
Study 2: path analyses of political intolerance and prejudice against left-wing and right-wing activist groups.

		Left-wing targets			Right-wing targets		
		$N = 60$			$N = 122$		
Outcome variable	Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Political intolerance	Realistic	.06	.08	.482	.26	.05	<.001
	Symbolic	−.08	.11	.421	−.09	.08	.229
	Safety	.28	.08	<.001	.08	.06	.133
Prejudice	Realistic	2.57	1.30	.049	.31	.75	.680
	Symbolic	4.56	2.24	.042	4.68	1.44	.001
	Safety	1.34	1.46	.357	−.84	.67	.333

[3] In contrast, prejudice ratings in Studies 1 and 3, which each utilized the content-controlled method, were not significantly skewed (skewness less than the absolute value of .50; see Tables 2 and 7). Moreover, none of the political intolerance measures in any of the three studies were significantly skewed (see Tables 2, 4 and 7).

or moral objection to the group or its policies. Initial inter-coder reliability was adequate for each theme ($K > .70$) with the exception of *harmful or hateful toward others* ($K = .66$). After initial independent coding, the two coders then reviewed and resolved coding discrepancies.

The frequencies with which these eight themes emerged in the responses of participants who chose left-wing or right-wing groups were compared, and are reported in Table 6. Consistent with political intolerance theories that find little role for being personally affected by a group or its policies (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Stenner, 2005) or believing that the group is too powerful (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995), these themes were hardly mentioned in participants' responses, and no significant between-group differences emerged. Consistent with research on ideological symmetries in dehumanizing political opponents (Crawford, Jussim, & Pilanski, 2013; Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013; Crawford, Wiley, & Ventresco, 2013), there were no significant group differences in seeing one's chosen group as personally or cognitively deficient.

Participants who chose left-wing groups were more likely to mention themes of taking away resources from others (usually in the context of "reverse racism," or taking away resources from "hard-working" people), and were more likely to raise principled moral objections to the policies advocated for by the activist group. Somewhat surprisingly, while they were slightly more likely to mention safety concerns, this difference was not significant. Among participants who chose right-wing targets, a large proportion of them raised concerns about the group taking away or threatening the rights of others. They were also more likely to mention how hateful or harmful the group was toward others. Finally, although very few participants mentioned being personally affected by the group, people who chose right-wing groups were marginally more likely to mention this theme.

Discussion

Study 2 largely replicated Study 1's findings. Specifically, symbolic threat predicted prejudice but not political intolerance against both left-wing and right-wing political activist groups. And again, whereas only safety threat predicted political intolerance of left-wing groups, only realistic threat predicted political intolerance of right-wing groups. Thus, these findings replicate across two different research designs that produce very different relationships between political intolerance and prejudice (i.e., correlated in the content-controlled, but uncorrelated in the LLG method).

The analysis of participants' reasons for choosing their least-liked group provided additional evidence of both symmetry and asymmetry in the processes underlying antipathy toward ideologically dissimilar others. Whereas people across the political spectrum think of their political opponents as deficient, ignorant, extreme, and hypocritical (see also Crawford, Jussim, & Pilanski, 2013; Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013; Crawford, Wiley, & Ventresco, 2013), there were notable differences in the themes that emerged between people choosing left-wing or right-wing groups. Those choosing left-wing groups were more likely to mention their moral or principled objections to the targets' policies.

Table 6
Study 2: emergence of themes in participants' reasons for choosing their least-liked group.

	Left-wing groups		Right-wing groups			
	N	%	*N*	%	χ^2	*p*
Personal	0	0.00	7	5.70	3.58	.058
Too powerful	0	0.00	3	2.50	1.50	.221
Less safe	10	16.70	14	11.50	.95	.331
Threaten rights	10	16.70	52	42.60	12.06	<.001
Take away resources	19	31.70	10	8.20	16.54	<.001
Harmful and hateful	10	16.70	39	32.00	4.79	.029
Deficient	15	25.00	39	32.00	.94	.333
Principled/moral objection	37	61.70	45	36.90	9.98	.002

Many of these responses made it clear that the participant strongly objected to the policy advocated for by the chosen activist group. These participants were also more likely to mention their belief that the target groups' policies took resources away from the deserving and gave them to the undeserving. This theme is consistent with evidence that conservatives perceive those who benefit from public assistance as violating values of hard work and self-reliance (Wetherell, Reyna, & Sadler, 2013).

In contrast, those choosing right-wing groups were much more likely to emphasize the impact that the target groups' policies had on other people: restricting their rights, and expressing hatred toward them or causing them harm. These concerns appear to map onto the moral foundations of fairness and harm, respectively (e.g., Graham et al., 2009, 2013), and to the values of universalism and egalitarianism, which are also linked to left-wing beliefs (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Crawford, Wiley, & Ventresco, 2013).

Study 3

The results of Studies 1 and 2 converge to indicate that whereas symbolic threat underlies prejudice but not political intolerance across the political spectrum, different types of threats underlie political intolerance of left-wing and right-wing activist groups (safety and realistic threat, respectively). That said, there are three important limitations to the previous two studies that need to be addressed in order to gain greater confidence in their conclusions. First, with the exception of Study 2's measure of political intolerance, all constructs were operationalized with single-item measurements, which tend to be less reliable than multiple-item measures. Study 3 therefore employed multi-item measures of political intolerance, prejudice, and threat.

Second, and relatedly, Studies 1 and 2 operationalized prejudice using single-item feeling thermometer ratings. Whereas feeling thermometer ratings capture global affective target evaluations (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982), they do not necessarily capture the physical or psychological distancing that often characterizes prejudice (e.g., Dovidio, Esses, Beach, & Gaertner, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Therefore, Study 3 utilized a multi-item measure of social distance (Skitka et al., 2013) as an additional measure of prejudice.

Third, whereas the measures of symbolic and realistic threat used in Studies 1 and 2 either explicitly or implicitly referred to an intergroup context, the safety threat measure referred to how the group makes society as a whole more dangerous and less safe, and may have captured concerns regarding the superordinate category (i.e., society). To rectify this limitation, the additional threat measures used in Study 3 also explicitly or implicitly referred to an intergroup context.

Finally, there are several potential explanations for why realistic threat consistently predicted political intolerance of right-wing targets in Studies 1 and 2, including concerns over conservative activist groups potentially eliminating recent progressive gains, stereotypical beliefs of conservatives as cold but efficient (Crawford, Jussim, & Pilanski, 2013; Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013; Crawford, Wiley, & Ventresco, 2013), and the zero-sum nature of political conflict itself (Velasco-Gonzalez et al., 2008). However, although participants' qualitative responses in Study 2 regarding their reasons for choosing a right-wing group as their least-liked group should be interpreted as being related to political intergroup outcomes more broadly (as participants chose their least-liked group prior to completing the political intolerance and prejudice measures), they may explain why realistic threat predicted political intolerance against such groups. Specifically, participants who chose right-wing groups were much more likely to believe that their chosen group violates the rights of others. This suggests that they may have interpreted the realistic threat item ("takes away societal resources from people like me") in terms of taking away democratically guaranteed rights and freedoms from like-minded or allied groups and individuals. Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) finding that Evangelical Christians strongly elicit threats to rights and freedoms is also consistent with

this interpretation. To examine this possibility, *rights threat* was also measured in Study 3. If the effects of realistic threat on political intolerance of right-wing activists observed in Studies 1 and 2 reflect concerns over rights, then any effects of realistic threat on political intolerance of right-wing groups should evaporate once rights threat is taken into account.

Method

Participants

Three hundred participants were recruited via MTurk. Two attention checks were embedded within the survey for the purpose of excluding inattentive participants (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Fifty-five participants failed to pass both attention checks and were removed, leaving 245 participants in the final analysis (56% female, 80% White, $M_{age} = 36$ years). This 18% attention check failure rate is consistent with those observed in typical MTurk samples using similar procedures (e.g., Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; Oppenheimer et al., 2009).

Materials and procedures

As in Study 1, participants were first randomly assigned to either six left-wing or right-wing targets, and then provided political intolerance judgments of each target, followed by prejudice measures (i.e., feeling thermometer and social distance ratings). Participants then completed the four different threat measures (i.e., symbolic, realistic, safety, and rights) in random order. They then completed the same political knowledge measure ($\alpha = .59$) used in Study 1, followed by ideology, party, and demographic information.

Political intolerance was measured with three items used in Study 2 (see Appendix A), measured on 6-point scales (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 6 = *Strongly agree*; $\alpha = .95$). Feeling thermometer ratings (reverse-scored to indicate greater prejudice) were identical to those used in Studies 1 and 2 ($\alpha = .86$). Social distance was measured with three items drawn from Skitka et al. (2013), each following the stem, "How willing or unwilling would you be to have someone from each of the following groups…?": "come work in the same place as you do," "marry into your family," and "as a close personal friend." Items were completed on a 6-point scale (1 = *Very unwilling*; 6 = *Very willing*), and were reverse-scored to indicate greater social distance ($\alpha = .97$).

In addition to the three threat items used in Studies 1 and 2, two additional items were included for each type of threat, each following the stem, "To what extent do you think the following groups…?": "strengthen the values, norms, and traditions that are important to you" [reverse-scored], and "reject moral values that are important to you" (symbolic threat); "should have more influence in our society" [reverse-scored], and "hold too many positions of power and responsibility in our society" (realistic threat); "are not physically dangerous to people like you" [reverse-scored], and "endanger the physical safety of people like you" (safety threat).

As in Studies 1 and 2, the additional symbolic and realistic threat items were drawn from existing intergroup threat measures (i.e., Duckitt, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The additional safety threat items were drawn from Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) "endangered physical safety" measure. Rights threat was measured with two items drawn from Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) "personal rights and freedoms" measure ("restrict the personal rights of people like you," and "limit the personal freedoms of people like you"), and with one item created by the author ("protect the personal rights of people like you" [reverse-scored]). Each threat scale was balanced with two positively worded items and one negatively worded item, and was completed on 7-point scales (1 = *To no extent at all*; 7 = *To a great extent*). In all cases, measures of political intolerance, prejudice, and threat were constructed by averaging across the items for all six target groups. Each threat measure was internally reliable (αs between .92 and .94 for the four threat scales).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations

Table 7 reports the correlations among and descriptive statistics for the study variables. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, but similar to Crawford and Pilanski (2013a), there was no significant relationship between ideology and political intolerance. As in the other content-controlled study (Study 1), political intolerance was moderately correlated with both prejudice indicators (i.e., feeling thermometer and social distance ratings). The four threat measures were strongly correlated with each other. Each type of threat was moderately correlated with political intolerance, and strongly correlated with both prejudice indicators.

Replicating ideological symmetry in political intolerance and prejudice

Ideological symmetry in political intolerance judgments was again observed. A moderated multiple regression model was computed with participant ideology and group ideology (0 = right-wing, 1 = left-wing) entered in Step 1, and the Ideology × Group interaction entered in Step 2. Unlike Study 1, there were no unexpected main effects of ideology ($b = .05$, $p = .270$) or condition ($b = -.23$, $p = .109$); instead, the expected Ideology × Group interaction emerged in Step 2, $b = .42$, $SE = .09$, $\beta = .40$, $p < .001$. Fig. 1 (panel B) shows that as in Study 1, conservatism predicted political intolerance of left-wing groups and liberalism predicted political intolerance of right-wing groups. Further, whereas liberals were more intolerant of right-wing than left-wing groups, $b = -.89$, $SE = .20$, $\beta = -.39$, $p < .001$, conservatives were more intolerant of left-wing than right-wing groups, $b = .41$, $SE = .20$, $\beta = .18$, $p = .040$. The magnitude of these effects is quite similar to those observed in Study 1.

Similar analyses were performed on feeling thermometer and social distance ratings. There were no significant ideology main effects on either feeling thermometer ($b = -.35$, $p = .196$) or social distance ratings ($b = -.06$, $p = .300$). Instead, as expected, Ideology × Group interactions emerged for both feeling thermometer, $b = 23.86$, $SE = 1.39$, $\beta = .95$, $p < .001$, and social distance ratings, $b = .99$, $SE = .09$, $\beta = .75$, $p < .001$. Consistent with Study 1, conservatism predicted prejudice against left-wing groups (feeling thermometer: $b = 11.15$, $SE = 1.03$, $\beta = .70$, $p < .001$; social distance: $b = .46$, $SE = .06$, $\beta = .56$, $p < .001$), and liberalism predicted prejudice against right-wing groups (feeling thermometer: $b = -12.71$, $SE = .93$, $\beta = -.79$, $p < .001$; social distance: $b = -.54$, $SE = .07$, $\beta = -.61$, $p < .001$), to similar degrees.

Primary analyses plan

The purposes of Study 3 were to replicate the primary effects from Studies 1 and 2 using multi-item construct measures, extend the prejudice findings to social distance ratings, and examine the potential effects of rights threat on political intolerance and prejudice. Analyses are first presented with models excluding rights threat, and then with models including rights threat. Models excluding rights threat allow for a test of the replication of Studies 1 and 2, and a comparison of models with and without rights threat allows a test of whether the effect of realistic threat on political intolerance of right-wing targets observed in Studies 1 and 2 is accounted for by rights threat, as suggested by the qualitative responses in Study 2. In all models, feeling thermometer and social distance ratings were examined as separate outcome variables in order to both test the replicability of the findings from Studies 1 and 2 (which only included

Table 7
Study 3: correlation among and descriptive statistics for study variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Political ideology									
2. Political knowledge	−.09								
3. Symbolic threat	.001	.07							
4. Realistic threat	−.03	−.03	.85***						
5. Safety threat	−.04	−.15*	.63***	.74***					
6. Rights threat	−.05	−.09	.81***	.85***	.68***				
7. Prejudice (FTs)	−.06	.01	.88***	.81***	.59***	.78***			
8. Prejudice (SD)	−.04	−.02	.76***	.73***	.66***	.68***	.75***		
9. Political intolerance	.08	−.42***	.28***	.41***	.46***	.44***	.35***	.41***	
M	3.35	6.91	3.67	3.49	2.76	3.24	51.58	2.80	2.41
SD	1.56	1.37	1.65	1.44	1.35	1.38	26.87	1.42	1.13
Skewness	.36	−1.34	.30	.18	.24	.36	.07	.30	.47

Note: *df*s for correlations ranged between 226 and 241.
* $p < .05$.
*** $p < .001$.

feeling thermometer ratings) and whether those previous findings extend to a different measure of prejudice (i.e., social distance).

Effects of threat on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing groups

Excluding rights threat

Path analyses tested the indirect effects of ideology on political intolerance and prejudice toward left-wing activist groups via symbolic, realistic, and safety threats. Political intolerance, feeling thermometer ratings, and social distance ratings were specified as separate outcome variables, symbolic, realistic, and safety threats as separate and correlated mediators, and ideology as the independent variable. Table 8 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model (with 5000 bootstrapped samples). As expected, safety threat emerged as the only significant predictor of political intolerance. Also as expected, symbolic threat emerged as a predictor of both prejudice indicators; there were additional effects, however, with marginally significant effects of safety threat on social distance and significant effects of realistic threat and ideology on feeling thermometer ratings. A trimmed model including the above-mentioned paths had a good fit to the data, and all paths were significant ($\chi^2 = 7.30$, $\chi^2/df < 2$; CFI = .998, RMSEA = .041, SRMR = .035).

Table 8
Study 3: path analyses of political intolerance and prejudice against left-wing and right-wing activist groups with rights threat excluded.

		Left-wing targets			Right-wing targets		
		N = 127			*N* = 118		
Outcome variable	Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Political intolerance	Realistic	.20	.16	.218	.26	.14	.075
	Symbolic	−.09	.12	.450	−.26	.12	.029
	Safety	.37	.09	<.001	.23	.12	.060
	Ideology	.08	.08	.308	−.08	.10	.437
Feeling thermometers	Realistic	4.79	1.95	.014	2.90	1.46	.047
	Symbolic	7.34	2.04	<.001	9.39	1.24	<.001
	Safety	−.80	1.46	.585	−.32	.89	.722
	Ideology	3.72	1.22	.002	−4.67	1.03	<.001
Social distance	Realistic	.22	.15	.162	.06	.10	.558
	Symbolic	.30	.14	.029	.34	.10	<.001
	Safety	.18	.10	.063	.32	.10	.002
	Ideology	.05	.07	.503	−.13	.09	.155
Realistic	Ideology	.57	.06	<.001	−.59	.06	<.001
Symbolic	Ideology	.72	.06	<.001	−.68	.06	<.001
Safety	Ideology	.38	.07	<.001	−.43	.06	<.001

Including rights threat

A second model was computed identical to the above model with the exception that rights threat was also included as a potential mediator. Table 9 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model. Again, only safety threat significantly predicted political intolerance of left-wing groups. Replicating Studies 1 and 2, symbolic threat significantly predicted feeling thermometer ratings (with an additional effect of rights threat and a direct effect of political ideology). Unexpectedly, only rights threat emerged as a significant predictor of social distance, although symbolic and safety threats approached significance. Fig. 2 (panel B) displays a model with all non-significant and unpredicted paths trimmed, which had a good fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 7.35$, $\chi^2/df < 2$; CFI = .996, RMSEA = .061, SRMR = .038).

The indirect effect of ideology on political intolerance via safety threat was significant ($b = .18$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$, 95% CI .12, .25), as were the indirect effects of ideology on feeling thermometer ratings via symbolic ($b = 5.05$, $SE = 1.34$, $p < .001$, 95% CI 2.85, 7.24) and rights ($b = 2.64$, $SE = .83$, $p = .002$, 95% CI 1.27, 4.01) threats, and on social distance via symbolic ($b = .19$, $SE = .09$, $p = .034$, 95% CI .04, .34), safety ($b = .07$, $SE = .03$, $p = .029$, 95% CI .02, .13), and rights ($b = .16$, $SE = .07$, $p = .023$, 95% CI .05, .28) threats.

Table 9
Study 3: path analyses of political intolerance and prejudice against left-wing and right-wing activist groups with rights threat included.

		Left-wing targets			Right-wing targets		
		N = 127			*N* = 118		
Outcome variable	Predictor	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Political intolerance	Realistic	.12	.16	.442	.06	.16	.714
	Symbolic	−.15	.13	.251	−.33	.12	.007
	Safety	.35	.10	<.001	.17	.13	.186
	Rights	.19	.13	.142	.36	.16	.019
	Ideology	.08	.08	.351	−.08	.10	.442
Feeling thermometers	Realistic	2.86	2.11	.175	1.77	1.68	.292
	Symbolic	5.64	2.03	.006	9.14	1.29	<.001
	Safety	−1.18	1.46	.421	−.57	.84	.503
	Rights	4.83	1.74	.006	1.84	1.34	.170
	Ideology	3.61	1.22	.003	−4.62	1.03	<.001
Social distance	Realistic	.08	.17	.668	.10	.12	.417
	Symbolic	.19	.14	.157	.37	.11	.001
	Safety	.15	.10	.130	.33	.10	.001
	Rights	.34	.15	.021	−.10	.14	.493
	Ideology	.04	.07	.531	−.14	.09	.135
Realistic	Ideology	.57	.06	<.001	−.59	.06	<.001
Symbolic	Ideology	.72	.06	<.001	−.68	.06	<.001
Safety	Ideology	.34	.07	<.001	−.43	.06	<.001
Rights	Ideology	.52	.05	<.001	−.53	.06	<.001

Effects of threat on political intolerance and prejudice toward right-wing groups

Excluding rights threat

A path analysis excluding rights threat was first examined, identical to the one conducted for left-wing targets described above. Table 8 reports *b*s, *SE*s, and *p*-values for each path from the fully saturated model. Realistic and safety threats marginally predicted political intolerance of right-wing targets (along with an unexpected *negative* effect of symbolic threat). As expected, symbolic threat significantly predicted both prejudice indicators; for feeling thermometer ratings, there was a relatively weaker additional effect of realistic threat, along with a direct effect of ideology, whereas for social distance, there was an additional effect of safety threat. A trimmed model including the above-mentioned paths had excellent fit to the data, and all paths were significant ($\chi^2 = 3.81$, $\chi^2/df < 1$; CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .017).

Including rights threat

The model including rights threat as an additional mediator is reported in Table 9. As expected, whereas realistic threat was a marginally significant predictor of political intolerance in the model without rights threat, it was not a factor in this model. Instead, only rights threat significantly predicted political intolerance of right-wing groups. Also as expected, symbolic threat significantly predicted both prejudice indicators; these effects were accompanied by a direct effect of ideology on feeling thermometer ratings and an effect of safety threat on social distance ratings. Fig. 3 (panel B) displays a model with all non-significant paths trimmed, which had good fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 12.79$, $\chi^2/df = 2.13$; CFI = .988, RMSEA = .098, SRMR = .029).

The indirect effect of ideology on political intolerance via rights threat was significant ($b = -.26$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$, 95% CI −.38, −.14), as was the indirect effect of ideology on feeling thermometers via symbolic ($b = -7.70$, $SE = 1.00$, $p < .001$, 95% CI −9.33, −6.06) threat, and the indirect effects of ideology on social distance via symbolic ($b = -.32$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI −.42, −.22) and safety ($b = -.14$, $SE = .04$, $p = .002$, 95% CI −.21, −.07) threats.[4]

Discussion

The purposes of Study 3 were to replicate findings from Studies 1 and 2 with multi-item instead of single-item construct measures, extend the operational definition of prejudice to include social distance, and test the hypothesis suggested in Study 2's qualitative findings that political intolerance of right-wing groups is driven by perceived threat to people's rights and freedoms. Each of these purposes were realized. First, replicating findings from Studies 1 and 2, symbolic threat predicted prejudice but not political intolerance toward both left-wing and right-wing activist groups. This relationship emerged across both feeling thermometer and social distance measures of prejudice. As in Studies 1 and 2, while there were some additional threat effects on prejudice, they were generally less robust than those of symbolic threat.

As in Studies 1 and 2, political intolerance of left-wing groups was driven by safety threat. Also as in Study 1 (but not Study 2), safety threat had an additional but less robust effect on prejudice (specifically, social distance, but not feeling thermometer ratings). Study 3 also replicated the finding from Studies 1 and 2 that realistic threat predicts political intolerance of right-wing groups. However, as the qualitative results from Study 2 suggested, this effect of realistic threat was eliminated when rights threat was included in the model, suggesting that the effects of realistic threat on political intolerance of right-wing groups observed in these three studies are attributed to the perceived threat the groups pose to people's rights and freedoms.

General discussion

Across both student and non-student samples, and using both well-established and newly developed methods of studying political intolerance (i.e., the least-liked groups [LLG] and content-controlled methods, respectively), results from these three studies converge on several novel conclusions with important implications for the study of political intolerance and prejudice. First, and consistent with other recently emerging evidence (Gibson, 2006; Skitka et al., 2013; van der Noll et al., 2010), political intolerance and prejudice appear to be related but distinct intergroup phenomena. Specifically, political intolerance and prejudice had distinct threat-based antecedents: whereas symbolic threat predicted prejudice against both left-wing and right-wing activist groups across both feeling thermometer and social distance measures of prejudice, it did *not* significantly predict political intolerance against these same targets. This was the case regardless of whether political intolerance and prejudice were moderately correlated (in Studies 1 and 3 using the content-controlled method) or uncorrelated (in Study 2 using the LLG method). Further, Studies 1 and 3 largely supported the hypothesis that symbolic threat mediates the relationship between ideology and prejudice. These results dovetail nicely with those found in Skitka et al.'s (2013) U.S. sample, in which moral conviction (which captures strength of belief in right and wrong) predicted prejudice, but not political intolerance.

There were some additional predictors of prejudice beyond symbolic threat that should be noted. First, unlike for political intolerance, there were strong direct effects of ideology on prejudice against left-wing and right-wing activists in both content-controlled studies. However, in Study 3, this direct effect only occurred on feeling thermometer but not on social distance ratings. In Study 2, realistic threat also predicted prejudice against left-wing groups, and in Studies 1 and 3, safety threat also predicted prejudice against both left-wing *and* right-wing groups. Interestingly, in Study 3, this effect only occurred on social distance but not feeling thermometer ratings, suggesting that safety concerns influence the desire to physically distance oneself from ideologically dissimilar others. These additional effects were more abundant in the studies utilizing the content-controlled method, likely reflecting the stronger inter-correlations of threat variables in those designs due to relatively less range restriction on those variables. Given the extent to which previous research has linked prejudice to realistic, safety, and rights threats (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), it should perhaps be unsurprising that they had occasional effects on prejudice beyond symbolic threat. That said, the preponderance of evidence from these studies indicates that prejudice against ideologically dissimilar political activist groups is primarily driven by threats to one's deeply held values and beliefs, as predicted by the ICH (Brandt et al., 2014).

Most interestingly, the strongest threat-based predictor of political intolerance of activist groups depended on the political objectives of the target group itself. Across all three studies, safety threat emerged as the only significant predictor of political intolerance of left-wing activist groups. In Studies 1 and 2, realistic threat was the only significant predictor of political intolerance of right-wing groups. That said, the qualitative results of Study 2 suggested that people who chose right-wing groups as their least-liked group were very likely to raise concerns regarding how those groups infringe upon the rights and freedoms of

[4] In all three studies, path analyses were reported separately for left-wing and right-wing target groups for ease of interpretation. Alternatively, one could hypothesize significant target × safety threat and target × realistic threat (or target × rights threat, Study 3) interactive effects on political intolerance, and significant main effects of symbolic threat on prejudice. Alternative analyses found models with these specified paths to possess good fit in all three studies (Study 1: CFI = .991, RMSEA = .045, SRMR = .019; Study 2: CFI = .952, RMSEA = .065, SRMR = .042; Study 3: CFI = .968, RMSEA = .101, SRMR = .042). All predicted paths were significant across all three studies, with the exception of the target × realistic threat path in Study 1, which approached significance ($p = .154$). Additional analyses are available from the author upon request.

others, and that rights and freedoms may be considered a threatened resource. Results from Study 3 were consistent with this interpretation: the effect of realistic threat on political intolerance of right-wing groups was eliminated when rights threat was included in the path model. This is consistent with Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) classification of threat to rights and freedoms and threat to more tangible resources (akin to the present operationalization of realistic threat) under the umbrella category of obstacles to the ingroup. In Studies 1 and 3, safety and realistic/rights threats mediated the relationship between ideology and political intolerance against left-wing and right-wing targets, respectively. The addition of the social distance measure in Study 3 is important to further distinguish prejudice from political intolerance, as both social distance and political intolerance could be interpreted as measures of willingness to discriminate. Instead, these outcomes had distinct threat-based predictors. There were no additional effects of other types of threat on political intolerance of activist groups in any of the three studies.

The emergence of safety and rights threat as antecedents of political intolerance converges with findings from Gibson and Gouws' (2003) political tolerance research in South Africa. Gibson and Gouws (2003) report that in unpublished findings (Gouws, 1992), perceptions of one's least-liked group as violent, anti-democratic, and threatening to civil liberties were related to political intolerance. Further, Gibson and Gouws (2003) report other evidence that perceptions of their least-liked group as a danger to society and as anti-democratic were people's most-cited reasons for expressing political intolerance. Unfortunately, in subsequent analyses, Gibson and Gouws (2003, p. 70) collapse across these perceptions of violence and anti-democratic sentiment to create a measure of "sociotropic threat," making it difficult not only to tease apart their effects, but also to examine their effects on political intolerance of left-wing and right-wing groups separately. The present findings are consistent with Gibson and Gouws' (2003) evidence, but make the important contribution that the target's political objectives determine the influence of these types of threat on political intolerance.

Together, these studies provide convincing evidence of ideological symmetries related to intergroup *outcomes*, as people on the right and left were politically intolerant and prejudiced toward ideologically dissimilar groups, to similar degrees. The fact that prejudice against activist groups on the left and right was most strongly predicted by symbolic threat also points toward symmetry in processes associated with political prejudice, consistent with the ICH (Brandt et al., 2014). At the same time, there were important asymmetries in the *processes* by which those on opposite ends of the political spectrum respond with political intolerance of dissimilar others. The observed effect of safety threat on political intolerance of left-wing groups is consistent with extant theorizing and evidence linking conservatism to needs for security and certainty (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003) and avoidance of negative events and dangerous people (Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Oxley et al., 2008). On the other hand, political intolerance of right-wing groups seems to derive from a perception that the group itself threatens the rights of others, especially of like-minded or allied groups or individuals. Thus, ironically, political intolerance against right-wing groups is driven by a concern that these groups are themselves politically intolerant.

Implications, limitations, and future directions

Distinguishing between political intolerance and prejudice

As noted earlier, political intolerance reflects antipathy at a level beyond simple prejudice (Gibson, 2006; Skitka et al., 2013). Likewise, the present findings suggest that whereas perceived value dissimilarity (as captured by symbolic threat) is enough to predict disliking of and distancing from ideologically dissimilar groups, it is not enough to predict political intolerance of those groups. Instead, more tangible threats to rights or physical safety appear necessary to inspire political intolerance. Symbolic threat appears more closely related to group identification than tangible threats (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006), suggesting that any dissimilarity of group identities (but especially political ones) will engender symbolic threats, but not necessarily the tangible threats associated with safety and rights. Together, then, these findings imply a distinction not only between prejudice and political intolerance, but also in the severity between abstract-level threats (e.g., symbolic threat) and concrete-level threats (e.g., realistic, safety, rights), a distinction implied by integrated threat theory (Riek et al., 2006).

The distinction between political intolerance and prejudice is integral not only to our theoretical understanding of these intergroup phenomena, but perhaps more importantly, to designing successful interventions aimed at reducing them. The present findings suggest that a) prejudice may be more difficult to reduce than political intolerance, b) different types of interventions may be necessary for each, and c) the success of different political intolerance reduction interventions may depend on the ideological orientation of the participant. First, prejudice was much more willingly expressed in these studies than political intolerance, consistent with other evidence (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Skitka et al., 2013), and indicative of contexts (like the U.S.) with strong democratic norms. Further, prejudice was consistently predicted by symbolic threat, which reflects deep-seated differences in moral beliefs and values that are relatively resistant to change (Paluck, 2009). Political intolerance, however, seems to be reflected by processes that go beyond value and belief dissimilarity. Instead, it involves more tangible threats (i.e., to safety among those on the right, and to valuable societal resources [including rights themselves] among those on the left). Future work is needed to determine whether challenging these perceptions can reduce political intolerance.

In these studies, prejudice was operationalized as a generally negative reaction toward a group. Following theoretical approaches that recognize that discrete emotions underlie prejudice, future research could explore the distinct emotional reactions that underlie prejudice and political intolerance toward ideologically dissimilar activist groups. For example, drawing on Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) sociofunctional model, disgust (as a consequence of value dissimilarity) may underlie distancing from activist groups across the political spectrum, whereas anger (as a consequence of perceived obstacles to the ingroup) and fear (as a consequence of perceived physical safety) may underlie political intolerance of right-wing and left-wing groups, respectively.

These results indicate that political intolerance and prejudice are related but distinct intergroup phenomena, demonstrated not only in their weak to moderate relationship with each other, but also in their differential threat-based antecedents. That said, despite the fact that these results replicated across multiple samples, construct operationalizations, and methodologies, the present evidence is solely correlational. These studies should provide the basis for future investigations that manipulate the different types of threat to examine their causal influences on political intolerance and prejudice toward ideologically dissimilar groups.

Comparing the LLG and content-controlled methods

These studies provide the first comparison of the well-established LLG method and the more recently-developed content-controlled method for examining political intolerance. Many of the similarities across the three studies suggest that results obtained from the LLG method can be replicated in the content-controlled method. That said, there were several notable differences between the studies that suggest not only important differences between the two methods, but limitations to the LLG method. First and foremost, as Gibson (2006) has reported, political intolerance and prejudice appear to be uncorrelated in studies using the LLG method (see also Sullivan et al., 1982). Rather than reflecting an interesting puzzle regarding the relationship between

political intolerance and prejudice (as suggested by Gibson, 2006, p. 25), however, this non-relationship appears to be an artifact of the LLG method, as the range of prejudice ratings is severely restricted when people evaluate their least-liked group. There is no such range restriction with studies using the content-controlled method (i.e., Studies 1 and 3 of the present paper; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013), and studies using this method reveal moderate correlations between political intolerance and prejudice. These results suggest that there truly is a relationship between political intolerance and prejudice, but that it cannot be detected using the LLG method because of the prejudice rating range restriction endemic to its design.

Second, because participants are randomly assigned to left-wing and right-wing groups as opposed to choosing a single disliked group, only the content-controlled method allows for the examination of biases in political intolerance judgments. This is often a meaningful outcome to social and political psychologists, who debate whether there are ideological symmetries or asymmetries in such biases (Crawford, 2012; Crawford, Jussim, & Pilanski, 2013; Nosek & Lindner, 2013). Finally, the content-controlled method can offer more reliable estimates of political intolerance judgments as researchers can examine judgments toward multiple targets, not just toward the single target chosen in the LLG method.

Conservatism and its relationship with political intolerance and prejudice

Consistent with the ICH, there was no relationship between political conservatism and prejudice in these studies. Thus, the so-called "prejudice gap" (Chambers et al., 2013) between liberals and conservatives appears to be a methodological artifact of almost exclusively using left-wing targets in previous prejudice research (see Brandt et al., 2014 for this argument). Regarding political intolerance, while two of these three studies revealed a small effect of conservatism on political intolerance, it should be interpreted with caution. Fig. 1 makes clear that the main effect of ideology observed in Study 1 was due primarily to how tolerant liberals were of left-wing groups; liberals and conservatives were equally intolerant of ideologically dissimilar groups. Thus, consistent with the ideological conflict hypothesis, these results generally indicate ideological symmetries in the intergroup outcomes of political intolerance and prejudice. To be sure, however, these are just three data points in a sea of evidence. Such controversies regarding ideological symmetry and asymmetry in intergroup phenomena deserve to be resolved through meta-analytic treatment.

Conclusion

There has been reasoned debate in the literature regarding ideological symmetry vs. asymmetry in an assortment of social psychological outcomes (e.g., Brandt & Crawford, 2013; Crawford, 2012; Crawford, Jussim, & Pilanski, 2013; Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013; Nosek & Lindner, 2013). The present studies are consistent with the ideological conflict hypothesis (Brandt et al., 2014), which posits ideological symmetry in intergroup outcomes such as political intolerance and prejudice. Whereas these results underscore symmetries in the processes underlying political prejudice, they point toward fundamental asymmetries in the processes underlying political intolerance of left-wing and right-wing groups. Together, these studies therefore recognize and reflect ideological symmetries in intergroup outcomes, but also important symmetries and asymmetries in the processes underlying those outcomes.

Acknowledgments

I thank Stephanie Mallinas for her assistance with coding the open-ended responses in Study 2.

Appendix A

Political intolerance items used in Studies 1, 2 and 3.

Study 1

1. I believe that a group that supports (*opposes*) affirmative action should not be allowed to organize in order to influence government policy on affirmative action in higher education.
2. I believe that members of American Welfare Advocates (*Americans Against Welfare*) should not be allowed to organize in order to advocate for more generous (*restrictive*) social welfare policies.
3. I believe that members of Lambda Legal (*Focus on the Family*) should not be allowed to organize in order to pass laws legalizing (*banning*) gay marriage.
4. I think that members of a state Pro-Choice (*Right to Life*) organization should be allowed to distribute pro-choice (*pro-life*) pamphlets and buttons on local college campuses (reverse-scored).
5. I think that an Atheist (Evangelical Christian) group should not be allowed to organize in order to remove the phrase "Under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance (*allow school prayer*) in American public schools.
6. I believe that the Brady Campaign (*NRA*), a pro-gun control (*rights*) group, should be allowed to hold a rally in support of stricter (*more lenient*) gun laws (reverse-scored).

Studies 2 and 3

1. I think that this group should not be allowed to organize in order to influence public policy.*
2. I believe that this group should not be allowed to hold rallies outside of government buildings.*
3. I think that this group should be allowed to distribute pamphlets and other materials on local college campuses (reverse-scored)*.
4. I think that members of this group should be allowed to run for public office in the U.S. (reverse-scored).
5. I believe that members of this group should not be allowed to teach in public schools and universities.

Note: For Study 1 items, text for left-wing targets is in regular font, whereas text for right-wing targets is in italicized font. Items with asterisks were also used in Study 3.

References

Abelson, R. P., Kinder, D. R., Peters, M.D., & Fiske, S. T. (1982). Affective and semantic components in political person perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *42*, 619–630.

Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Allport, G. (1954). *The nature of prejudice.* Cambridge, MA: Addison Wesley.

Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis*, *20*(3), 351–368.

Brandt, M. J., & Crawford, J. T. (2013). Replication–extension of 'Not for All the Tea in China!' Political Ideology and the avoidance of dissonance-arousing situations (Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013, Plos One). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365281

Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *23*(1), 27–34.

Chambers, J. R., Schlenker, B. R., & Collisson, B. (2013). Ideology and prejudice: The role of value conflicts. *Psychological Science*, *24*, 140–149.

Cohrs, C. J., Moschner, B., Maes, J., & Kielmann, S. (2005). The motivational bases of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Relations to values and attitudes in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(10), 1425–1434.

Cottrell, C. A., & Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different groups: A sociofunctional threat-based approach to "prejudice.". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(5), 770–789.

Crawford, J. T. (2012). The ideologically objectionable premise model: Predicting biased political judgments on the left and right. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *48*(1), 138–151.
Crawford, J. T., Jussim, L., & Pilanski, J. M. (2013). How (not) to interpret and report main effects and interactions in multiple regression: Why Crawford and Pilanski (2013) did not actually replicate Lindner and Nosek (2009). *Political Psychology*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12050.
Crawford, J. T., Modri, S. A., & Motyl, M. (2013). Bleeding-heart liberals and hard-hearted conservatives: Subtle political dehumanization through differential attributions of human nature and human uniqueness traits. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, *1*(1), 86–104, http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v1i1.184.
Crawford, J. T., & Pilanski, J. M. (2013). Political intolerance, right and left. *Political Psychology*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00926.x.
Crawford, J. T., & Pilanski, J. M. (2014). The differential effects of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on political intolerance. *Political Psychology*, *35*(4), http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12066.
Crawford, J. T., Wance, N. M., Brandt, M. J., Chambers, J. R., Inbar, Y., & Motyl, M. (2014). Differential effects of social and economic ideologies on political prejudice: Further evidence for the ideological conflict hypothesis. Unpublished manuscript.
Crawford, J. T., Wiley, S., & Ventresco, N. (2013). Examining Americans' attitudes toward drone strikes on the eve of the 2012 presidential election. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/asap.12030.
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. *Psychometrika*, *16*, 297–334.
Davis, D. W., & Silver, B.D. (2004). Civil liberties vs. security: Public opinion in the context of the terrorist attacks on America. *America Journal of Political Science*, *48*, 28–46.
Dovidio, J. F., Esses, V. M., Beach, K. R., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). The role of affect in determining intergroup behavior: The case of willingness to engage in intergroup affect. In D.M. Mackie, & E. R. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 153–171). New York: Psychology Press.
Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2014). Ideological diversity will improve social psychological science. in press. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000430.
Duckitt, J. (2006). Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *32*(5), 684–696.
Feldman, S. (2003). Enforcing social conformity: A theory of authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, *24*(1), 41–74.
Gibson, J. L. (2006). Enigmas of intolerance: Fifty years after Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. *Perspectives on Politics*, *4*(1), 21–34.
Gibson, J. L., & Gouws, A. (2003). *Overcoming intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in democratic persuasion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goodman, J. K., Cryder, C. E., & Cheema, A. (2012). Data collection in a flat world: The strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *26*(3), 213–224.
Gouws, A. (1992). A study of political tolerance in the context of South Africa (unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S., et al. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *47*, 55–130.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B.A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *96*, 1029–1046.
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the coherence of social motivation. *Personality and Social Psychological Review*, *10*(2), 88–111.
Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. (2014). Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *37*(3), 297–307.
Horton, J. J., Rand, D.G., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2011). The online laboratory: Conducting experiments in a real labor market. *Experimental Economics*, *14*(3), 399–425.
Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Baldacci, K. G. (2008). Mapping moral motives: Approach, avoidance, and political orientation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*(4), 1091–1099.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*(3), 339–375.
Lindner, N. M., & Nosek, B.A. (2009). Alienable speech: Ideological variations in the application of free-speech principles. *Political Psychology*, *30*(1), 67–92.
Mackie, D.M., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.). (2002). *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups*. New York: Psychology Press.
Marcus, G. E., Sullivan, J. L., Theiss-Morse, E., & Wood, S. L. (1995). *With malice toward some: How people make civil liberties judgments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Morgan, G. S., Mullen, E., & Skitka, L. J. (2010). When values and attributions collide: Liberals' and conservatives' values motivate attributions for alleged misdeeds. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *36*, 1241–1254.
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (1998–2012). *Mplus user's guide* (Seventh ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén.
Nam, H. H., Jost, J. T., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2013). "Not for All the Tea in China!" Political ideology and the avoidance of dissonance-arousing situations. *PloS One*, *8*, e59837.
Nosek, B.A., & Lindner, N. M. (2013). Replication actually: Comment on Crawford and Pilanski (2013). *Political Psychology*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12051.
Oppenheimer, D.M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks:Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *45*(4), 867–872.
Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., Scalora, M., et al. (2008). Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. *Science*, *321*(5896), 1667–1670.
Paluck, E. L. (2009). Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *96*(3), 574–587.
Pettigrew, T. F., Christ, O., Wagner, U., Meertens, R. W., Van Dick, R., & Zick, A. (2008). Relative deprivation and intergroup prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*(2), 385–401.
Riek, B.M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *10*(4), 336–353.
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005). Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength or something more? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*, 895–917.
Skitka, L. J., Liu, J. H., Yang, Y., Chen, H., Liu, L., & Xu, L. (2013). Exploring the cross-cultural generalizability and scope of morally motivated intolerance. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *4*(3), 324–331.
Sniderman, P.M., Tetlock, P. E., Glaser, J. M., Green, D. P., & Hout, M. (1989). Principled tolerance and the American mass public. *British Journal of Political Science*, *19*, 25–45.
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, *Vol. 24*. (pp. 93–159). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Stenner, K. (2005). *The authoritarian dynamic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing prejudice and discrimination* (pp. 23–45). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1997). *Grounded theory in practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Suedfeld, P., Steel, G. D., & Schmidt, P. W. (1994). Political ideology and attitudes toward censorship. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *24*(9), 765–781.
Sullivan, J. L., Marcus, G. E., Feldman, S., & Piereson, J. E. (1981). Political tolerance: A multivariate approach. *American Political Science Review*, *75*(1), 92–106.
Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J. E., & Marcus, G. E. (1982). *Political tolerance and American democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sullivan, J. E., & Transue, J. E. (1999). The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and social capital. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *50*, 625–650.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). *Using multivariate statistics* (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
van der Noll, J., Poppe, E., & Verkuyten, M. (2010). Political tolerance and prejudice: Differential reactions towards Muslims in the Netherlands. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *32*, 46–56.
Velasco-Gonzalez, K., Verkuyten, M., Weesie, J., & Poppe, E. (2008). Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing integrative threat theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *47*(4), 667–685.
Wetherell, G., Brandt, M. J., & Reyna, C. (2013). Discrimination across the ideological divide: The role of perceptions of value violations and abstract values in discrimination by liberals and conservatives. *Social Psychology and Personality Science*, *4*(6), 658–667.
Wetherell, G., Reyna, C., & Sadler, M. (2013). Public option vs. the market: Perceived value violations drive opposition to healthcare reform. *Political Psychology*, *34*, 43–66.
Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Demoulin, S. (2010). Intergroup relations. (5th ed.). In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology*, *Vol. 2*. (pp. 1024–1083). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.