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The ideologically objectionable premise model: Predicting biased political judgments on the left and right

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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), which predicts that biased political judgments will emerge on both the political left and right, but only when the premise of a judgment is not ideologically objectionable to the perceiver. The IOPM generates three hypothesized patterns of bias: biases among both those on the left and right, bias only among those on the right, and bias only among those on the left. These hypotheses were tested within the context of the dual process motivational model of ideological attitudes (DPM; Duckitt, 2001), which posits that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are related but distinct ideological attitudes. Across two studies, all three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported on the RWA ideological attitude dimension, and two of the three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported on the SDO dimension. These findings indicate that the context of the judgment is an important determinant of whether biases emerge in political judgment.

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Introduction

Despite our best efforts to remain objective observers of our social worlds, prior attitudes and beliefs frequently color our social perception and judgment (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Kunda, 1987; 1990). Political attitudes are an especially potent source of motivated reasoning, and have been shown to bias judgments on the state of the economy, same-sex relationships, affirmative action, the death penalty, and gun control, among other issues (Bartels, 2002; Crawford, Jussim, Cain, & Cohen, in press; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985).

A particularly illustrative example of how political beliefs bias judgment is provided by Altemeyer's (1988, 1996, 1998) research on the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and double standards in political judgment. Altemeyer (1996) conceived of RWA as the covariation of three attitudinal clusters: submission to established authorities, aggression against those who challenge such authorities, and adherence to social conventions. In a series of studies, Altemeyer (1988, 1996, 1998) found that those high in RWA committed double standards in political judgments, whereas those low in RWA did not. For example, in a hypothetical scenario in which Christian or Muslim school prayer (varied between subjects) becomes mandatory in secular public schools, those high in RWA more strongly favored mandatory Christian school prayer over

Muslim school prayer. Those low in RWA committed no such bias (Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer attempted but failed to capture double standards among those low in RWA, even on issues he reasoned would be attitudinally important to them (e.g., environmentalism, affirmative action; Altemeyer, 1996, p. 120–121). His interpretation of these findings, which has been echoed by others (Perkins & Bourgeois, 2006; Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002), offers a dispositional explanation for the association between RWA and double standards in political judgment:

“Since High RWAs compartmentalize their thinking a lot, we can expect them to have lots of double standards” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 115).

“[High RWAs] do appear to have more than their share [of double standards], on quite a variety of topics. I think we can call it a feature of their thinking... Lows [RWAs] in turn show more interconnectedness, consistency, and fairness” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 122, emphasis added).

This interpretation is consistent with the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a), which posits a positive linear relationship between political conservatism and cognitive rigidity. The contention of the model presented in this paper, however, is that the content of political attitudes is not the primary determinant of biases in political judgment; rather, the context of the judgment determines whether biases will emerge on either the political right or left.

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The ideologically objectionable premise model

The purpose of these studies was to test a model that predicts when double standards in political judgment will or will not emerge among those on the political right *and* left. To this end, this paper introduces the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM). The IOPM assumes that ideological attitudes bias political judgments, regardless of their specific content. This assumption is consistent with theory and research on motivated reasoning in general (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Kunda, 1987; 1990), and specific evidence that biased judgments occur across the political spectrum (Bartels, 2002; Crawford et al., in press; Lord et al., 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006). However, the IOPM suggests that whether such biases emerge depends on whether or not the judgment premise is *ideologically objectionable* to the perceiver. A judgment premise is ideologically objectionable if the very conditions of the judgment are objectionable to or inconsistent with the perceiver's ideological attitudes. If the perceiver has rejected the conditions of the judgment outright, little else about the judgment will matter, short-circuiting the application of a double standard. However, if the judgment premise is *ideologically acceptable*, additional aspects of the judgment will influence the decision, allowing biased double standards to emerge.

When ideological attitudes are considered along a one-dimensional, left–right continuum, the IOPM generates three hypotheses:

- (1) *Symmetrical biases hypothesis*: When the judgment premise is acceptable to those on both the left and right, double standards will emerge among those on both the left and right.
- (2) *Asymmetrical right bias hypothesis*: When the judgment premise is objectionable to those on the left but not on the right, a double standard will emerge only among those on the right.
- (3) *Asymmetrical left bias hypothesis*: When the judgment premise is objectionable to those on the right but not on the left, a double standard will emerge only among those on the left.

According to the IOPM, then, the kind of double standard observed by Altemeyer (1996; 1998), in which biases emerged only among those on the right (i.e., high in RWA), is just one of a number of patterns of bias that can emerge in political judgment. Furthermore, these double standards are predicted not solely by the ideological attitudes of the perceiver, but rather by the interaction between these ideological attitudes and the judgment context.

Although the role of premise objectionableness in social judgment has not yet been explored in the extant literature, some recent evidence suggests that the context in which political judgments are made alters how ideological attitudes affect those judgments. For example, Morgan, Mullen, and Skitka (2010) found that the ideattribution effect, by which conservatives and liberals are more likely to make dispositional vs. situational behavioral attributions, respectively (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002), can be reversed when attributional conclusions are inconsistent with the ideological values made salient by the judgment context. Similarly, liberals deviate from their preferred moral principles (e.g., consequentialism) when those principles conflict with ideological motives made salient by the judgment context (Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009).

Testing the predictions of the IOPM

The tests of the IOPM in this paper are modeled on Altemeyer's double standards studies, as they offer a clear paradigm for examining biased political judgment. Although most of his research described double standards associated with RWA, Altemeyer (1998) also examined whether double standards were linked to social dominance orientation (SDO), which Sidanius and Pratto (1999, p. 61) characterize as the “general support for the domination of certain socially constructed groups

over other socially constructed groups”. Altemeyer (1998) found no relationship between SDO and double standards, bolstering his argument that right-wing authoritarianism uniquely predicts such internal inconsistencies of judgment. Given Altemeyer's inclusion of both RWA and SDO as predictors of double standards in political judgment, in this paper, the IOPM is tested within the context of the dual process motivational model of ideological and social attitudes (DPM; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), which posits that RWA and SDO represent two related but distinct dimensions of ideological attitudes.

According to the DPM, RWA expresses “beliefs in coercive social control, in obedience and respect for existing authorities, and in conforming to traditional moral and religious norms and values” (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a, pp. 1863–1864), whereas SDO expresses dispositional tough-mindedness and motives to maintain or enhance intergroup dominance and superiority (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Consequently, these two ideological motives differentially predict sociopolitical and intergroup attitudes. RWA more strongly predicts attitudes on socio-cultural issues, whereas SDO more strongly predicts attitudes on economic and status hierarchy-related issues (Altemeyer, 1996; Haley & Sidanius, 2006; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). Furthermore, RWA more strongly predicts attitudes toward groups perceived as socially normative or deviant, whereas SDO more strongly predicts attitudes toward groups perceived as socially dominant or subordinate (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

According to the differential moderation hypothesis derived from the DPM (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a, 2010b), the effects of RWA and SDO on sociopolitical judgment should be differentially moderated by the salience of these concerns. Thus, if a scenario judgment is related to concerns over coercion, obedience and respect for authority, or traditionalism, RWA should more strongly predict this judgment. However, if a scenario judgment is related to tough-mindedness or concerns over intergroup dominance, intergroup superiority, or hierarchical social arrangements, SDO should more strongly predict this judgment. Those low in RWA should be driven by the *opposite* motives of those high in RWA; thus, they should be more likely than those high in RWA to support socially deviant, non-normative individuals or groups, defy or question authority and other coercive forces, oppose restrictions on individual liberty, and support liberal or progressive social policies (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006, pp. 110 and 113). Those low in SDO should be motivated to attenuate intergroup dominance and status differences, whereas those high in SDO should be motivated to maintain or enhance intergroup dominance and status differences (Pratto & Cathey, 2002; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Altemeyer's (1996) mandatory school prayer scenario can be used to illustrate the IOPM's predictions regarding RWA. Recall that those high in RWA held a double standard, favoring Christian over Muslim mandatory school prayer, whereas those low in RWA did not, equally opposing both forms of mandatory school prayer. Altemeyer (1996, 1998) offered a dispositional account for this result, suggesting that right-wing authoritarians are predisposed to making such biased judgments. However, consider this finding from the perspective of the IOPM. Mandatory school prayer in public schools, the judgment premise, forces adherence to religious and governmental authority, promotes conformity to the society's traditional social norms, and negates individual liberty. Thus, this premise should be objectionable to those low in RWA, making the religion of the target irrelevant to the judgment, and short-circuiting the application of a double standard. However, the coerced adherence to religious norms and values fits the very definition of right-wing authoritarianism, and should therefore be acceptable to those high in RWA. Double standards in favor of Christians should then emerge. Thus, like Altemeyer, the IOPM predicts that double standards will emerge among those high but not low in RWA in this scenario. However, in contrast to a dispositional explanation, the IOPM posits that the objectionableness of the

judgment premise to those low in RWA determines their unwillingness to apply a double standard in this scenario.

The present studies

An advantage of testing the IOPM within the context of the two-dimensional DPM is that it generates hypotheses regarding both RWA and SDO, providing more precision than the one-dimensional conceptualization of ideological beliefs. In the context of the DPM, then, the IOPM generates six hypothesized patterns of bias in political judgment, three for each ideological attitude dimension:

- *Symmetrical RWA (or SDO) biases*: When the judgment premise is acceptable to both those low and high in RWA (or SDO), double standards will emerge among both those low and high in RWA (or SDO).
- *Asymmetrical High RWA (or SDO) bias*: When the judgment premise is objectionable to those low but not high in RWA (or SDO), a double standard will emerge only among those high in RWA (or SDO).
- *Asymmetrical Low RWA (or SDO) bias*: When the judgment premise is objectionable to those high but not low in RWA (or SDO), a double standard will emerge only among those low in RWA (or SDO).

In two studies, all three IOPM hypotheses were tested in regards to RWA. Study 1 tested the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis with a scenario related to traditional religious norms and values (setting aside space in public schools for voluntary prayer). Study 2 tested the asymmetrical High RWA bias hypothesis with a scenario related to both coercive social control and conformity to traditional religious norms and values (mandatory school prayer). Study 2 also tested the asymmetrical Low RWA bias hypothesis with a scenario related to obedience and respect for established authority (questioning the U. S. President's authority). In regards to SDO, Study 1 tested the asymmetrical High SDO bias hypothesis with a scenario related to intergroup dominance and tough-mindedness (mistreatment of a prisoner-of-war), and Study 2 tested the symmetrical SDO biases hypothesis with a scenario related to intergroup dominance and status hierarchy concerns (social group preferences in university admissions policies). Support for these hypotheses across and within studies would demonstrate that biases will emerge among those on both the political left and right, and that these biases in political judgment may be turned on or off by the ideological objectionableness of the judgment premise. Finally, the IOPM predicts that certain premises will be perceived as ideologically objectionable, whereas others will not. Although these assumptions are derived from extant empirical and theoretical work, Study 2 explicitly tested these assumptions for each premise used in these studies.

Study 1

The primary purpose of Study 1 was to clearly contrast the dispositional and IOPM perspectives by examining judgments of the same topic domain (i.e., prayer in public schools) and targets (Christians vs. Muslims) studied by Altemeyer (1996). To this end, a scenario was devised that maintains the between-subjects comparison of Christian and Muslim school prayer, but alters the judgment premise to be more acceptable to those low in RWA: setting aside physical space in public schools for voluntary prayer.

The issue of school prayer is more strongly related to traditional religious norms and values than intergroup dominance and superiority. Therefore, RWA should more strongly predict judgments in this scenario than SDO. Given that authoritarians tend to be more supportive of prayer in public schools (Stenner, 2005), those high in RWA should find this school prayer space premise ideologically acceptable, allowing double standards among them to emerge. RWA predicts strong ingroup identification (Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic,

Dru, & Krauss, 2009), as well as perceptions of threat from both Muslim individuals and Islam itself (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). Therefore, those high in RWA (especially Christians) should more strongly support Christian over Muslim school prayer space. In contrast to the coercive action of mandatory school prayer, setting aside physical space in public schools for voluntary prayer allows people to freely express their beliefs without pressure from authority to conform to societal norms. Those low in RWA value autonomy and individual freedom instead of coercive social control (Cohrs et al., 2005; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006), and therefore should also find this premise ideologically acceptable, allowing double standards among them to emerge. Those low in RWA have relatively more positive attitudes toward Muslims (Skitka et al., 2006), are internally motivated to respond without prejudice toward stigmatized groups (Plant & Devine, 1998), and are relatively low in ingroup identification (Bizumic et al., 2009). Thus, those low in RWA (even Christians) should more strongly support Muslim over Christian school prayer space. Therefore, because the judgment premise is ideologically acceptable to both those low and high in RWA, the IOPM predicts that double standards will emerge among both those low and high in RWA (symmetrical RWA biases).

Study 1 also tested the asymmetrical High SDO bias hypothesis. In a separate scenario, participants read about the mistreatment of a prisoner of war (either an American soldier or Iraqi insurgent). The abuse and mistreatment of prisoners in the context of war is more strongly related to tough-mindedness and intergroup dominance and superiority than coercion to existing authority or traditional norms and values. Moreover, McFarland (2005) has found that SDO predicted Iraq war support through tough-minded beliefs about war-related casualties. Therefore, SDO should more strongly predict judgments in this scenario than RWA. Those high in SDO are generally tough-minded (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), and do not endorse values of universalism and benevolence (Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs et al., 2005). They should therefore find this POW mistreatment premise ideologically acceptable, allowing double standards among them to emerge. Given that SDO predicts intergroup ethnocentrism, which is characterized by ethnic superiority and dominance (Bizumic et al., 2009), U.S. born individuals high in SDO should more strongly support the mistreatment of the Iraqi insurgent than the American soldier. In contrast, those low in SDO are relatively low in tough-mindedness and intergroup dominance, but high in values of benevolence, universalism, and social justice (Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs et al., 2005; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). They should therefore find this premise ideologically objectionable and oppose POW mistreatment, regardless of the target's nationality. Therefore, because this premise is objectionable to those low but not high in SDO, the IOPM predicts that double standards should emerge only among those high in SDO (asymmetrical High SDO bias).

Method

Participants

A convenience sample of three hundred fifty-four undergraduates (54% female; 39% White; *M* age = 18 years) enrolled in a general psychology undergraduate course completed the questionnaire packet for course credit.

Materials and procedures

Questionnaire packets were distributed to participants during lecture period. Participants completed the 30-item RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1998) on a 9-point scale¹ (1 = Strongly disagree, 9 =

¹ To facilitate the comparison of unstandardized regression coefficients for RWA and SDO, the RWA scale was re-scaled to a 7-point scale in both studies by multiplying the score on the 9-point RWA scale by 7, and dividing this product by 9.

Strongly agree), and the 16-item SDO scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Participants then completed an ideological self-placement item (1 = Extremely liberal; 7 = Extremely conservative). Given that RWA and SDO are generally correlated with political conservatism both in the extant literature (Jost et al., 2003a) and the present studies (Pearson coefficients ranging from .16 to .60), ideological self-placement was included as a covariate in all reported regression models.²

Participants then read the POW mistreatment scenario (American soldier or Iraqi insurgent, varied between subjects). Support for POW mistreatment was measured with three items on 6-point scales (1 = Strong disagree; 6 = Strongly agree), which were averaged to form a composite measure ($\alpha = .74$). Participants then read the school prayer space scenario (Christian or Muslim, varied between subjects). Support for school prayer space was measured with three items on 6-point scales (1 = Strong disagree; 6 = Strongly agree), which were averaged to form a composite measure ($\alpha = .92$). Appendix A presents the text and dependent items for these two scenarios. Finally, participants completed measures of political knowledge and self-reported religiosity, and provided demographic information (age, gender, race/ethnicity).

Results and discussion

Preliminary analyses

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for and correlations among ideological self-placement (Ideology), RWA, and SDO. All three variables were positively correlated with one another. Average RWA and SDO scores were consistent with those obtained in the extant literature (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 56; Duckitt et al., 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, pgs. 69–70), suggesting that the distributions of scores in this sample were comparable with previous investigations.

Testing the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis

According to the dual process model (DPM; Duckitt, 2001), RWA but not SDO should predict judgments in the school prayer space scenario. Furthermore, because the judgment premise is ideologically acceptable to both those low and high in RWA, the IOPM predicts that those low in RWA should more strongly support the Muslim over the Christian school prayer space law, whereas those high in RWA should more strongly support the Christian over the Muslim school prayer space law (symmetrical RWA biases).

Given the nature of the target groups under consideration, this analysis was limited to Christian participants ($N = 211$).³ The symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis was tested with a four-step hierarchical regression analysis on the composite measure of support for school prayer space (Aiken & West, 1991). Ideology, RWA, and SDO were centered on their respective means. The Ideology covariate was entered into Step 1. The independent variables of RWA, SDO, and experimental Condition (0 = Christian, 1 = Muslim) were entered into Step 2. The RWA \times Condition, SDO \times Condition, and RWA \times SDO interactions were entered into Step 3. The RWA \times SDO \times Condition interaction was entered into Step 4 (see Table 2).

² Across both studies, the conclusions were unchanged by whether many controls/covariates (i.e., age, gender, religiosity, political knowledge) or zero controls/covariates were included in the regression models.

³ A significant RWA \times Condition interaction supporting the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis was observed when all participants, regardless of religious identification, were included in the analysis. A five-step hierarchical regression analysis with participant religious identification (Christian, non-Christian) as a moderator revealed a Religion \times RWA \times Condition interaction ($p = .060$). A separate analysis of non-Christian participants ($N = 137$) revealed only a significant Condition main effect ($p < .01$), such that non-Christians favored Muslim over Christian school prayer space, regardless of RWA. The RWA \times Condition interaction among non-Christians was not significant ($p = .777$).

Table 1

Study 1: Descriptive statistics for and correlations among ideological self-placement, RWA, and SDO.

	1	2	3
1. Ideology			
2. RWA	.50***		
3. SDO	.16**	.13*	
<i>M</i>	3.43	3.02	2.53
<i>SD</i>	1.32	.96	.97
α	–	.93	.90

*** $p < .001$

** $p < .01$.

* $p < .05$.

Consistent with the DPM, there was a significant Condition \times RWA interaction, but no significant SDO \times Condition interaction (Table 2, Step 3). Fig. 1 displays the RWA \times Condition interaction. The critical test of the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis involves comparing support for Christian vs. Muslim school prayer space among those low in RWA ($-1 SD$), and separately among those high in RWA ($+1 SD$). The symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis was supported: those low in RWA favored Muslim over Christian school prayer space, $b = .72$, $SE = .37$, $t = 1.94$, $p = .05$, whereas those high in RWA favored Christian over Muslim school prayer space, $b = -.98$, $SE = .30$, $t = 3.24$, $p = .001$. This predicted interaction qualified an RWA main effect and an RWA \times SDO interaction. Additionally, an unexpected RWA \times SDO \times Condition interaction suggested that symmetrical RWA biases were most robust among those low in SDO: double standards in favor of Christian school prayer space were most robust among those high in RWA and low in SDO, and double standards in favor of Muslim school prayer space were most robust among those low in RWA and low in SDO.

These findings support for the IOPM's prediction that double standards in political judgment will emerge when the judgment premise is ideologically acceptable to the perceiver. Consistent with the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis, double standards emerged among both those low and high in RWA in a scenario in which the judgment premise (school prayer space) is ideologically acceptable to both those low and high in RWA. Importantly, these double standards emerged within the same topic domain (school prayer) and for the same target groups (Christians, Muslims) examined in Altemeyer's (1996) mandatory school prayer scenario, suggesting that the context of the judgment, not the perceiver's level of RWA, determines whether people engage in double standards in political judgment.

Testing the asymmetrical High SDO bias hypothesis

According to the DPM, SDO but not RWA should predict judgments in the POW mistreatment scenario. Furthermore, because this premise is objectionable to those low but not high in SDO, the IOPM predicts that those high in SDO should more strongly support the mistreatment of the Iraqi insurgent than the American soldier, whereas those low in SDO should oppose mistreatment of the two targets equally (asymmetrical High SDO bias).

Because this scenario involved the abuse and mistreatment of national ingroup and outgroup members, this analysis was limited to U.S.-born participants ($N = 289$). Table 3 presents the results of the four-step hierarchical regression analysis (described above) performed on the composite measure of support for POW mistreatment (0 = American target; 1 = Iraqi target). Consistent with the DPM, there was a significant SDO \times Condition interaction, but no significant RWA \times Condition interaction (Table 3, Step 3). Fig. 2 displays the SDO \times Condition interaction. The asymmetrical High SDO bias hypothesis was supported: those high in SDO ($+1 SD$) more strongly supported the mistreatment of the Iraqi insurgent than the American soldier, $b = .89$, $SE = .18$, $t = 4.94$, $p < .001$, whereas those low in SDO ($-1 SD$) opposed mistreatment of the targets equally ($p = .157$).

Table 2
Study 1: Four-step hierarchical regression for the school prayer space scenario.

	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3			Step 4		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
Ideology	.04	.09	.38	-.01	.11	.05	-.02	.11	.15	.01	.11	.11
RWA				.19	.16	1.20	.67	.21	3.26***	.61	.20	3.00**
SDO				-.21	.13	1.65	-.09	.18	.50	-.10	.18	.53
Condition (C)				-.16	.25	.65	-.03	.24	.12	-.13	.24	.55
RWA × C							-.92	.26	3.58***	-.89	.25	3.53***
SDO × C							-.10	.25	.43	-.21	.24	.85
RWA × SDO							-.34	.13	2.65**	-.75	.20	3.70***
RWA × SDO × C										.67	.26	2.57*

Notes:
Reported analyses included only Christian participants (*N* = 211).
*R*² adjusted values are .01 (Step 1), .01 (Step 2), .13*** (Step 3), and .16*** (Step 4).
*R*² change values are .01 (Step 1), .03 (Step 2), .14*** (Step 3), and .04* (Step 4).
*** *p* < .001.
** *p* < .01.
* *p* < .05.

This predicted interaction qualified SDO and Condition main effects that emerged in earlier steps. Consistent with the IOPM, when the judgment premise was objectionable to those low but not high in SDO, double standards in political judgment emerged only among those high in SDO.

Together, Study 1 provided initial support for the ideologically objectionable premise model by demonstrating that when those on both the left and the right find a judgment premise ideologically acceptable (school prayer space), both will engage in double standards in political judgment; and when those on the left but not the right find a premise objectionable (POW mistreatment), double standards will emerge only among those on the right. Furthermore, these findings suggest the utility of the two-dimensional approach to ideological attitudes offered by the dual process model, as RWA and SDO differentially predicted biases in political judgments related to traditional religious norms and values and intergroup dominance and superiority, respectively.

Study 2

Study 1 provided evidence of two patterns of ideologically biased judgments (i.e., symmetrical biases and asymmetrical right bias), across two dimensions of ideological attitudes (RWA and SDO), in ways predicted by the IOPM. However, in the context of the DPM, the IOPM predicts multiple patterns of biased political judgments, based on both the ideological attitude dimension related to the judgment and the objectionableness of the judgment premise. Study 2

therefore tested three additional predictions of the IOPM as applied to the DPM.

The asymmetrical Low RWA bias hypothesis predicts that when the judgment premise is objectionable to those high but not low in RWA, double standards will emerge only among those low in RWA. This IOPM prediction provides the greatest contrast with Altemeyer's (1996; 1998) conclusion that those high in RWA have a dispositional tendency toward committing double standards in political judgment. Study 2 tested this hypothesis with a scenario in which an active military general publicly criticizes the war-time decisions of his Commander-in-Chief, the U.S. President. The identity of the President (George W. Bush or Barack Obama) was varied between subjects. This issue is more strongly related to obedience and respect for existing authority than intergroup dominance or superiority; although military command is hierarchically structured, the general's actions represent disrespect of and disloyalty to legitimate authority, not the intergroup (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or interpersonal (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2007) dominance characteristic of SDO. Therefore, RWA should more strongly predict judgments in this scenario than SDO. Given the relationship between RWA and deference to existing authorities (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), this judgment premise (questioning presidential authority) should be ideologically objectionable to those high in RWA, but acceptable to those low in RWA. According to the IOPM, then, a double standard should emerge only among those low in RWA (asymmetrical Low RWA bias). Thus, those low in RWA, who prefer left-leaning over right-leaning politicians and parties (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), should punish the general who criticized Obama more harshly than the one who criticized Bush, whereas those high in RWA should punish the generals equally.

The IOPM assumes that ideologically objectionable premises short-circuit biases that would emerge under acceptable premises. To provide support for this assumption, participants made separate affective ratings of Bush and Obama. Those low in RWA should like Obama more than Bush, whereas those high in RWA should like Bush more than Obama, given their preference for right-leaning candidates (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a). However, because the premise of questioning presidential authority is ideologically objectionable to those high in RWA, their preference for Bush over Obama should not be reflected in their judgments in the presidential authority scenario.

Study 2 also tested Altemeyer's (1996) mandatory school prayer scenario, described earlier. Given that this scenario is more strongly related to social coercion and traditional religious norms and values than intergroup dominance and superiority, RWA should more strongly predict judgments in this scenario than SDO. In contrast to the contention that RWA predicts double standards in political




Fig. 1. Study 1: Support for school prayer space. Note: Higher scores indicate greater support for school prayer space. Regression coefficients for the slope of each line are followed by the *SE* in parentheses. Reported analyses included only Christian participants (*N* = 211).

Table 3
Study 1: Four-step hierarchical regression for the POW mistreatment scenario.

	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3			Step 4		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
Ideology	.05	.05	.91	-.02	.06	.41	-.03	.06	.51	-.03	.06	.45
RWA				.06	.07	.86	.09	.10	.91	.09	.10	.90
SDO				.27	.07	4.05***	.15	.10	1.51	.13	.10	1.28
Condition (C)				.57	.12	4.57***	.58	.12	4.79***	.58	.12	4.69***
RWA × C							.01	.13	.04	.01	.13	.10
SDO × C							.31	.14	2.28*	.32	.14	2.33*
RWA × SDO							.14	.07	1.93	.10	.10	1.00
RWA × SDO × C										.07	.14	.49

Notes:
Reported analyses included only U.S.-born participants (*N* = 289).
R² adjusted values are .06 (Step 1), .17*** (Step 2), .19*** (Step 3), and .19*** (Step 4).
R² change values are .01 (Step 1), .17*** (Step 2), .05** (Step 3), and .01 (Step 4).
*** *p* < .001.
* *p* < .05.

judgment, the IOPM contends that asymmetrical High RWA bias will be observed in this scenario because the judgment premise (mandatory school prayer) is objectionable to those low but not high in RWA. Therefore, those low in RWA should oppose mandatory school prayer equally, whereas those high in RWA should favor Christian over Muslim mandatory school prayer, as they did for school prayer space in Study 1 and in Altemeyer's (1996) original study.

Finally, Study 2 tested the symmetrical SDO biases hypothesis that when the judgment premise is acceptable to both those low and high in SDO, double standards among both those low and high in SDO will emerge. A scenario was devised in which the Supreme Court has upheld a university's admissions policy (race-based or legacy-based, varied between subjects). Social group preference in admissions policies is more strongly related to intergroup dominance and status differences than coercion to existing authority or traditional norms and values. Therefore, SDO should more strongly predict judgments in this scenario than RWA. This judgment premise (group preferences in admissions policies) should be acceptable to both those low and high in SDO, as they each prefer policies that favor some targets over others (hierarchy-attenuating or enhancing policies, respectively) (Pratto & Cathey, 2002; Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This acceptable premise will allow double standards among both those low and high in SDO to emerge. Because race-based and legacy-based admissions policies attenuate and enhance status hierarchies, respectively, those low in SDO should more strongly support the race-based than legacy-based admissions decision, whereas those high in SDO should more strongly support the legacy-based than race-based admissions decision.

Although the assumptions tested in these two studies of what constitutes an ideologically objectionable premise are based on extant findings on the sociopolitical and intergroup attitudes differentially associated with RWA and SDO, Study 2 explicitly tested whether or not these premises are perceived as objectionable in the ways predicted by the model. To this end, participants rated how objectionable they found the premises examined in these studies. If the premise is assumed to be acceptable to both those low and high in RWA (school prayer space), or both those low and high in SDO (group preferences in university admissions), then RWA and SDO should not predict objectionableness ratings of these premises, respectively. If the premise is assumed to be objectionable to those low but not high in SDO (POW mistreatment), then SDO should negatively predict objectionableness ratings. If the premise is assumed to be objectionable to those low but not high in RWA (mandatory school prayer), then RWA should negatively predict objectionableness ratings. Finally, if the premise is assumed to be objectionable to those high but not low in RWA (presidential authority), then RWA should positively predict objectionableness ratings.

The limitations of using college student samples in research on sociopolitical attitudes are well known (Henry, 2008). Therefore, to generalize support for the IOPM beyond the students sampled in Study 1, Study 2 used an online adult sample. Finally, Study 1 was limited in that the presentation of the two scenarios and the experimental conditions were fixed. In other words, some participants read about the American soldier and then about Christian school prayer space, whereas the others read about the Iraqi soldier and then about Muslim school prayer space. Study 2 improved upon this design by randomly presenting the three scenarios, as well as the experimental conditions.




Fig. 2. Study 1: Support for POW mistreatment. Note: ****p* < .001. Higher scores indicate greater support for mistreatment of the POW. Regression coefficients for the slope of each line are followed by the *SE* in parentheses. Reported analyses included only U.S.-born participants (*N* = 289).

Method

Participants

Two hundred seven current U.S. residents (61% female; 73% White; *M* age = 34 years) completed an online survey through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). Samples obtained from MTurk have been shown to possess greater demographic diversity and representativeness than college student samples, and to meet or exceed the diversity and representativeness provided by typical Internet samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Researchers have established internal and test-retest reliability in MTurk samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011), and have replicated well-established social psychological and decision-making findings with MTurk samples (Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, in press; Mason & Suri, in press; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), all suggesting

its validity as a resource for social science research. Interested individuals clicked on a link to the questionnaire posted on the website, and were compensated 25 cents for their participation.

Materials and procedures

All participants were randomly presented with each scenario (i.e., presidential authority, mandatory school prayer, and university admissions). Participants were randomly assigned to one condition from each of these three scenarios. The order of the three dependent items for each scenario judgment (each measured on 6-point scales; 1 = Strongly disagree; 6 = Strongly agree) was also randomized.

The presidential authority scenario described a U.S. military general publicly questioning the war-time decisions of the President (Bush or Obama, varied between subjects). Three items measuring support for punishing the general were averaged to form a composite measure ($\alpha = .82$). The mandatory school prayer scenario was an exact replication of Altemeyer's (1996) scenario (Christian or Muslim, varied between subjects). Three items measuring support for mandatory school prayer were averaged to form a composite measure ($\alpha = .89$). The university admissions scenario described a Supreme Court ruling that upheld a university's race-based or legacy-based admissions policy, varied between subjects. Three items measuring support for this ruling were averaged to form a composite measure ($\alpha = .86$). Appendix B presents the text and dependent items for these three scenarios. Following these scenarios, participants were presented, in random order, with Hunsberger and Altemeyer's (2006) 20-item RWA scale, the 16-item SDO scale used in Study 1, and a page that included the ideological self-placement item (1 = Extremely liberal; 7 = Extremely conservative) and feeling thermometer ratings (0–100) for a number of political targets, including George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

To explicitly measure the objectionableness of each premise examined in these studies, participants then indicated the extent to which they found the following practices "objectionable", "immoral", and "disgusting": setting aside space in public schools for voluntary prayer; harsh treatment of prisoners of war; mandatory school prayer in public schools; members of the military questioning the authority of the President in a time of war; and admissions policies that favor one group over another (like for minority groups or children of alumni). Participants responded to each item on a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all; 5 = To a great extent). The presentation of the premises, as well as the dimensions of evaluation (i.e., objectionable, immoral, disgusting) were randomized. A composite measure of objectionableness ratings for each premise was formed by averaging across the three dimensions of evaluation for that premise. Finally, participants completed measures of political knowledge and self-reported religiosity, and provided demographic information (age, gender, race/ethnicity, citizenship).

Results and discussion

Preliminary analyses

Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for and correlations among Ideology, RWA, and SDO (as well as for the premise objectionableness ratings, discussed later). As in Study 1, all three variables were positively correlated with one another, and average RWA and SDO scores were comparable to those obtained in the extant literature.

Testing the asymmetrical Low RWA bias hypothesis

According to the dual process model (DPM; Duckitt, 2001) RWA but not SDO should predict judgments in the presidential authority scenario. Furthermore, because this premise is objectionable to those high but not low in RWA, the IOPM predicts that those low in RWA should punish the Obama critic more harshly than the Bush critic, whereas those high in RWA should punish the two critics equally (asymmetrical Low RWA bias).

Table 5 presents the results of the four-step hierarchical regression analysis (described in Study 1) performed on the composite measure of punishing the general critical of the President (0 = Bush critic, 1 = Obama critic). Consistent with the DPM, there was a significant RWA \times Condition interaction, but no significant SDO \times Condition interaction (Table 5, Step 3). Fig. 3 displays the RWA \times Condition interaction. The asymmetrical Low RWA bias hypothesis was supported: those low in RWA (-1 SD) punished the Obama critic more harshly than the Bush critic, $b = 1.10$, $SE = .30$, $t = 3.67$, $p < .001$, whereas those high in RWA ($+1$ SD) punished the two critics equally ($p = .824$). This lack of bias among those high in RWA does not reflect a lack of preference for Bush over Obama: paired sample t -tests of the affective ratings indicated that those high in RWA preferred Bush to Obama, $t(29) = 1.90$, $p = .06$, $M_s = 58.70$ and 36.30 , respectively. Those low in RWA preferred Obama to Bush, $t(154) = 7.65$, $p < .001$, $M_s = 55.65$ and 24.92 , respectively, as reflected in their harsher punishing of the Obama critic. The RWA \times Condition interaction qualified main effects of conservatism, RWA and the experimental Condition that emerged in earlier steps of the regression model.

Consistent with the IOPM, when the premise was objectionable to those high but not low in RWA, double standards emerged only among those low in RWA. Importantly, those high in RWA reported liking Bush more than Obama, supporting the model's contention that objectionable premises short-circuit existing preferences. Moreover, these findings suggest that biased political judgments are determined by the objectionableness of the judgment premise, not the right-wing attitudes of the perceiver.

Testing the asymmetrical High RWA bias hypothesis

According to the DPM, RWA but not SDO should predict judgments in the mandatory school prayer scenario. Furthermore, because this premise is objectionable to those low but not high in RWA, the IOPM predicts that those low in RWA should oppose mandatory school prayer equally across conditions, whereas those high in RWA should more strongly support Christian than Muslim mandatory school prayer (asymmetrical High RWA bias).

As in Study 1, tests in the domain of Christian and Muslim school prayer were limited to Christian participants ($N = 121$).⁴ Table 6 reports the results of the four-step hierarchical regression analysis performed on the composite measure of support for mandatory school prayer (0 = Muslim, 1 = Christian). Consistent with the DPM, there was a significant RWA \times Condition interaction, but no significant SDO \times Condition interaction (Table 6, Step 3). Fig. 4 displays the RWA \times Condition interaction. The asymmetrical High RWA bias hypothesis was supported: those low in RWA (-1 SD) opposed mandatory school prayer equally regardless of the target's religion ($p = .630$), whereas those high in RWA ($+1$ SD) more strongly supported Christian than Muslim mandatory school prayer, $b = 1.82$, $SE = .32$, $t = 5.70$, $p < .001$. This interaction qualified main effects of RWA and experimental Condition that emerged in earlier steps.

Consistent with the IOPM, when the judgment premise was objectionable to those low but not high in RWA, double standards emerged only among those high in RWA. These findings, especially the strong opposition to mandatory school prayer among those low in RWA, are consistent with Altemeyer's (1996) original findings. When considered alongside the support obtained for the symmetrical RWA biases hypothesis (school prayer space, Study 1) and asymmetrical

⁴ A significant RWA \times Condition interaction supporting the asymmetrical High RWA bias hypothesis was observed when all participants, regardless of religious identification, were included in the analysis. A five-step hierarchical regression analysis with participant religious identification as a moderator revealed a Religion \times RWA \times Condition interaction ($p = .046$). A separate analysis of non-Christians participants ($N = 78$) revealed only a significant RWA main effect ($p < .01$), such that RWA predicted support for mandatory school prayer, regardless of experimental condition. The RWA \times Condition interaction among non-Christians was not significant ($p = .871$).

Table 4
Study 2: Descriptive statistics for and correlations among RWA, SDO, ideological self-placement, and the premise objectionableness ratings.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. RWA								
2. SDO	.54***							
3. Ideology	.60***	.45***						
4. School prayer space	-.15*	-.05	-.25***					
5. POW mistreatment	-.30***	-.38***	-.24**	.16*				
6. Presidential authority	.29***	.18*	.20**	.14*	-.01			
7. Mandatory school prayer	-.57***	-.21**	-.40***	.33***	.22**	-.24**		
8. University admissions	.27***	.19**	.25***	.05	.01	.13	.07	
M	2.80	2.63	3.41	2.08	3.95	2.51	3.58	3.55
SD	1.35	1.26	1.72	1.20	1.11	1.08	1.23	1.09
α	.95	.94	–	.85	.89	.80	.81	.81

*** $p < .001$
* $p < .05$.
** $p < .01$.

Table 5
Study 2: Four-step hierarchical regression for the presidential authority scenario.

	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3			Step 4		
	b	SE	t	b	SE	t	b	SE	t	b	SE	t
Ideology	.16	.05	2.95**	.14	.07	2.12*	.13	.07	1.92	.13	.07	1.92
RWA				.11	.09	1.15	.31	.12	2.71**	.31	.12	2.71**
SDO				-.07	.09	.79	-.01	.11	.08	-.01	.11	.09
Condition (C)				.54	.18	2.93**	.50	.18	2.82**	.52	.21	2.51*
RWA × C							-.43	.16	2.71**	-.43	.16	2.70**
SDO × C							-.16	.18	.89	-.16	.18	.86
RWA × SDO							-.03	.05	.65	-.03	.06	-.50
RWA × SDO × C										-.01	.12	.12

Notes:
R² adjusted values are .04** (Step 1), .07** (Step 2), .13*** (Step 3), and .13*** (Step 4).
R² change values are .04** (Step 1), .05* (Step 2), .07** (Step 3), and .01 (Step 4).
** $p < .01$
* $p < .05$.

Low RWA bias hypothesis (presidential authority, Study 2), however, these findings strongly indicate the importance of premise objectionableness in determining when biases will emerge in political judgments. The comparison of the school prayer space and mandatory school prayer scenarios suggests that a preference among those low in RWA for Muslims over Christians (as observed in Study 1) is short-circuited when the judgment premise is ideologically objectionable (mandatory school prayer). Furthermore, observing both asymmetrical Low RWA and asymmetrical High RWA biases within the same sample suggests that double standards in political judgment are turned on and off by the objectionableness of the judgment premise, and are not determined by a tendency among those high in RWA to commit double standards (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998).

Testing the symmetrical SDO biases hypothesis

According to the DPM, SDO but not RWA should predict judgments in the university admissions scenario. Furthermore, because this premise is acceptable to both those low and high in SDO, the IOPM predicts that those low in SDO should more strongly support the race-based than legacy-based decision, whereas those high in SDO should more strongly support the legacy-based than race-based decision (symmetrical SDO biases).

Table 7 presents the results of the four-step hierarchical regression analysis performed on the composite measure of support for the Court's decision (0 = race-based, 1 = legacy-based). Consistent with the DPM, there was a significant SDO × Condition interaction, but no significant RWA × Condition interaction (Table 7, Step 3). Fig. 5 displays the SDO × Condition interaction. The symmetrical SDO biases hypothesis was supported: those low in SDO (−1 SD) favored the race-based over legacy-based decision, $b = -.93$, $SE = .31$,

$t = 2.99$, $p < .01$, whereas those high in SDO (+1 SD) favored the legacy-based over race-based decision, $b = 1.31$, $SE = .33$, $t = 4.03$, $p < .001$. This interaction qualified main effects of liberalism, RWA and SDO that emerged in earlier steps. In addition, an unexpected RWA × SDO × Condition interaction indicated that regardless of RWA level, those high in SDO more strongly supported the legacy-based than race-based decision. Although those low in SDO supported the race-based decision over the legacy-based decision regardless of RWA level, this difference was most pronounced among those low in RWA. Although interesting, these findings do not contradict the




Fig. 3. Study 2: Support for punishment of the general who questioned presidential authority. Note: Higher scores indicate greater support for punishment of the general who questioned presidential authority. Regression coefficients for the slope of each line are followed by the SE in parentheses.

Table 6
Study 2: Four-step hierarchical regression for the mandatory school prayer scenario.

	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3			Step 4		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
Ideology	.10	.08	1.19	-.14	.08	1.76	-.13	.08	1.78	-.13	.08	1.78
RWA				.63	.11	5.74***	.22	.16	1.44	.22	.16	1.43
SDO				-.11	.11	1.00	.14	.16	.87	.14	.16	.85
Condition (C)				1.02	.23	4.46***	.82	.23	3.58***	.82	.24	3.38***
RWA × C							.72	.20	3.62***	.72	.20	3.61***
SDO × C							-.33	.21	1.60	-.33	.23	1.45
RWA × SDO							-.03	.06	.51	-.03	.08	.39
RWA × SDO × C										.01	.13	.01

Notes:
Reported analyses included only Christian participants (*N* = 121).
*R*² adjusted values are .01 (Step 1), .32*** (Step 2), .38*** (Step 3), and .38*** (Step 4).
*R*² change values are .01 (Step 1), .33*** (Step 2), .08** (Step 3), and .01 (Step 4).
*** *p* < .001.

IOPM's prediction that double standards would emerge among both those low and high in SDO.

Explicit ratings of premise objectionableness

According to the IOPM, if a premise is ideologically objectionable, double standards should not emerge; if acceptable, double standards can emerge. To test the assumptions of premise objectionableness in these studies, participants rated the objectionableness of each premise. If an asymmetrical bias (e.g., asymmetrical Low RWA bias) is hypothesized, that particular ideological attitude dimension should linearly predict the premise objectionableness rating. If symmetrical biases (e.g. symmetrical RWA biases) are hypothesized, that particular ideological attitude dimension should not linearly predict the premise objectionableness rating.

Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for and bivariate correlations among RWA, SDO, Ideology, and the five premise objectionable ratings for the entire sample.⁵ As in the main analyses for each scenario judgment, tests of the differential effects of RWA and SDO involve controlling the effect of the one ideological attitude dimension while testing the effect of the other (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010b; Van Hiel et al., 2004). Therefore, multiple regression analyses were performed on the composite objectionableness rating for each of the five premises. The Ideology covariate was entered into Step 1, and RWA and SDO were entered into Step 2. Table 8 reports these analyses for the entire sample.⁶ The predictions were supported for all five premises. RWA did not predict objectionableness ratings of school prayer space (*p* = .882), and SDO did not predict objectionableness ratings for group preferences in university admissions (*p* = .162). SDO negatively predicted objectionableness ratings of POW mistreatment. RWA negatively predicted objectionableness ratings of mandatory school prayer, and positively predicted objectionableness ratings of questioning presidential authority. In four of the five objectionableness ratings, the ideological dimension predicted to be unrelated to the judgment was unrelated to the judgment. The only exception was that SDO predicted objectionableness ratings for

mandatory school prayer; however, SDO predicted *opposition* to mandatory school prayer, which was directly opposite of the predicted RWA effect.

General discussion

These studies tested the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), which posits that biased political judgments will emerge on both the political left and right, but only when the judgment premise is ideologically acceptable to the perceiver. Based on both the content of the perceiver's ideological attitudes and the context of the judgment, the IOPM generates three hypothesized patterns of bias: bias only among the political right, bias only among the political left, and biases among both the political left and right.

These predictions were tested within the context of the dual process motivational model of ideological attitudes (DPM; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a; Duckitt et al., 2002), which posits that RWA and SDO are related but distinct ideological attitude dimensions with differential consequences for sociopolitical and intergroup attitudes. Applied to the DPM, the IOPM generates six hypotheses (three each for RWA and SDO). All three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported along the ideological attitude dimension of RWA. When the judgment premise was ideologically acceptable to both those low and high in RWA (school prayer space scenario, Study 1), double standards among those low and high in RWA emerged. Study 2 demonstrated how biases among those low and high in RWA could be turned on and off by the objectionableness of the judgment premise: double standards emerged only among those low in




Fig. 4. Study 2: Support for mandatory school prayer. Note: ****p* < .001. Higher scores indicate greater support for mandatory school prayer. Regression coefficients for the slope of each line are followed by the *SE* in parentheses. Reported analyses included only Christian participants (*N* = 121).

⁵ Recall that in the main analyses, the school prayer space and mandatory school prayer scenarios were limited to Christian participants and the POW mistreatment scenario was limited to U.S.-born participants. The bivariate relationship between RWA and school prayer space objectionableness was not significant when limited to Christians. Limiting the analysis to Christians did not affect the relationship between RWA and mandatory school prayer objectionableness. Place of birth was not assessed in Study 2; however, limiting the bivariate analysis to U.S. citizens did not affect the relationship between SDO and POW mistreatment objectionableness.

⁶ Recall that in the main analyses, the school prayer space and mandatory school prayer scenarios were limited to Christian participants and the POW mistreatment scenario was limited to U.S.-born participants. The results of the multivariate analyses on school prayer space and mandatory school prayer objectionableness were the same when limited to Christians. Place of birth was not assessed in Study 2; however, limiting the multivariate analysis to U.S. citizens did not affect the results on POW mistreatment objectionableness.

Table 7
Study 2: Four-step hierarchical regression for the university admissions scenario.

	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3			Step 4		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
Ideology	-.12	.06	2.06*	-.04	.08	.55	.04	.07	.62	.03	.07	.40
RWA				-.15	.11	1.46	-.33	.13	2.50*	-.28	.13	2.14*
SDO				-.02	.10	.20	-.33	.13	2.66**	-.39	.13	3.10***
Condition				.01	.21	.02	-.03	.19	.13	.19	.21	.91
RWA × C							.20	.17	1.20	.16	.17	.97
SDO × C							.80	.19	4.29***	.89	.19	4.70***
RWA × SDO							-.03	.05	.61	.09	.08	1.18
RWA × SDO × C										-.25	.11	2.29*

Notes:
R² adjusted values are .02* (Step 1), .02 (Step 2), .17*** (Step 3), and .19*** (Step 4).
R² change values are .02* (Step 1), .02 (Step 2), .16*** (Step 3), and .02* (Step 4).

* *p* < .05.
** *p* < .01.
*** *p* < .001.

RWA when the judgment premise was objectionable to those high but not low in RWA (presidential authority scenario), and emerged only among those high in RWA when the judgment premise was objectionable to those low but not high in RWA (mandatory school prayer scenario). Along the SDO ideological attitude dimension, double standards emerged only among those high in SDO when the judgment premise was ideologically objectionable to those low but not high in SDO (POW mistreatment scenario, Study 1), but emerged among both those low and high in SDO when the judgment premise was acceptable to both those low and high in SDO (university admissions scenario, Study 2). Finally, supporting the prediction that some premises are perceived as objectionable to certain perceivers whereas others are not, Study 2 found that all five premises examined in this paper were perceived as objectionable or not as predicted.

Together, these findings are inconsistent with the conclusion that right-wing authoritarianism uniquely predicts double standards in political judgment (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Peterson et al., 2002). Rather, consistent with theory and research on motivated reasoning both in general and in a political context (Kunda, 1987, 1990; Lord et al., 1979; Morgan et al., 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Uhlmann et al., 2009; Vallone et al., 1985), these findings demonstrate that regardless of position (left vs. right) or dimension (RWA or SDO), ideological attitudes bias political judgment and decision-making. In his critique of Altemeyer's double standards studies, Martin (2001) suggested that Altemeyer had only succeeded in "pushing the buttons" of those high in RWA but not of those low in RWA. These findings suggest that objectionable and acceptable

premises push different "buttons", the former leading to universal objection, and the latter leading to double standards.

Of course, these findings also highlight the importance of premise objectionableness in determining when ideological motives lead perceivers to employ such double standards. The power of premise objectionableness is apparent in both the across-studies comparison of responses to the school prayer space (Study 1) and mandatory school prayer (Study 2) scenarios, and the within-study comparison between the mandatory school prayer and presidential authority scenarios in Study 2. By holding the topic domain (school prayer) and

Table 8
Premise objectionableness ratings as differentially predicted by RWA and SDO.

	Step 1			Step 2		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
<i>School prayer space</i>						
Ideology	-.17	.05	3.37***	-.19	.07	2.97**
RWA				-.01	.09	.15
SDO				.10	.08	1.16
<i>POW mistreatment</i>						
Ideology	-.16	.05	3.36***	-.01	.06	.13
RWA				-.13	.08	1.70
SDO				-.27	.08	3.61***
<i>Presidential authority</i>						
Ideology	.12	.05	2.74***	.01	.06	.25
RWA				.22	.08	2.72**
SDO				.02	.08	.31
<i>Mandatory school prayer</i>						
Ideology	-.29	.05	5.99***	-.09	.06	1.67
RWA				-.54	.08	7.02***
SDO				.19	.07	2.57*
<i>University admissions</i>						
Ideology	.17	.05	3.80***	.10	.06	1.79
RWA				.07	.08	.91
SDO				.11	.08	1.41

Notes:
School prayer space: R² adjusted values are .05** (Step 1) and .05** (Step 2); R² change values are .06** (Step 1) and .01 (Step 2). *POW mistreatment*: R² adjusted values are .05** (Step 1) and .15*** (Step 2); R² change values are .06** (Step 1) and .11*** (Step 2). *Presidential authority*: R² adjusted values are .03** (Step 1) and .07** (Step 2); R² change values are .04** (Step 1) and .05* (Step 2). *Mandatory school prayer*: R² adjusted values are .16*** (Step 1) and .33*** (Step 2); R² change values are .16*** (Step 1) and .18*** (Step 2). *University admissions*: R² adjusted values are .07*** (Step 1) and .08*** (Step 2); R² change values are .07*** (Step 1) and .02 (Step 2).

*** *p* < .001.
** *p* < .01.
* *p* < .05.




Fig. 5. Study 2: Support for Supreme Court decision on group preferences in university admissions. Note: **p* < .05; ****p* < .001. Higher scores indicate greater support for the Supreme Court's decision affirming group preferences in university admissions. Regression coefficients for the slope of each line are followed by the *SE* in parentheses.

target comparison (Christians vs. Muslims) constant, the school prayer space and mandatory school prayer scenarios demonstrated how premise objectionableness determines whether biased political judgments emerge. Although those responses were not captured within the same individuals, Study 2 demonstrated how premise objectionableness could turn biased political judgments on (against Obama critics among those low in RWA; against Muslims among those high in RWA) or off (all mandatory school prayer among those low in RWA; all presidential criticism among those high in RWA). The power of premise objectionableness was further illustrated by the unwillingness of those high in RWA to allow their preference for President Bush to influence their judgments under the ideologically objectionable premise of disrespect for existing authority. The IOPM therefore offers a more complete explanation for how the content of ideological attitudes and the judgment context interact to produce predictable patterns of biased political judgments. The importance of premise objectionableness to political judgment suggests that researchers should consider including measures of premise objectionableness when examining motivated reasoning processes among the political left and right. These measures may function as a priori tests of premise objectionableness, as well as safeguards against conducting such research without properly guaranteeing that motivated reasoning processes can be equally and fairly assessed on both sides of the political spectrum.

Two qualifications to the present findings are important to highlight. First, regarding the presidential authority scenario in Study 2, the comparison of Presidents Bush and Obama provides a good deal of mundane realism in that both presided over the same two wars and were criticized by active generals for their war-time decisions (i.e., General Shinseki's and MacCrystal's criticisms of the Bush and Obama administrations, respectively). However, it is true that President Bush bears more responsibility for initiating and overseeing these wars, and thus may be more deserving of criticism for his role than President Obama. Thus, one might suggest that those high in RWA are biased in not recognizing this distinction between the two targets. Although the present findings across the premise judgment, the affective ratings toward Bush and Obama, and the objectionableness ratings converge in support for the IOPM, future research could garner stronger support for the asymmetrical Low RWA bias hypothesis by replicating this scenario with less specific targets (e.g., a Democratic president vs. a Republican president), or by developing another novel scenario that is ideologically objectionable to those high but not low in RWA that would not be open to such interpretation.

Second, one could suggest that floor effects on the dependent measures explain why no double standards emerged among those low in RWA and low in SDO in the mandatory school prayer and POW mistreatment scenarios, respectively (see Figs. 2 and 4). That is, had these premises not been so objectionable to these perceivers, some biases among them (perhaps in favor of mandatory Muslim school prayer and American POW mistreatment, respectively) could have emerged. There are several reasons to doubt this explanation. First, the findings for the other three scenarios conformed to IOPM predictions, suggesting that the patterns of findings in the mandatory school prayer and POW mistreatment scenarios, which were also consistent with the IOPM, are not anomalies. Second, the objectionableness ratings for these two premises corroborate the IOPM interpretation—in fact, the two most robust coefficients were observed for these premises ($bs = -.54$ and $-.27$, respectively; see Table 8), suggesting that these premises were perceived as quite objectionable. Third, while those low in RWA opposed mandatory Christian and Muslim school prayer equally, if anything, those low in SDO were slightly but nonsignificantly more accepting of Iraqi than American POW mistreatment. This strongly suggests that a double standard in favor of American POW mistreatment would not have emerged on a measure that allowed participants to register an opinion even stronger than “strongly disagree”. Thus, the data suggest premise objectionableness, not floor effects, as

the most likely explanation for these findings. Moreover, although the IOPM is agnostic regarding *how* objectionable these scenarios will be perceived, extreme opposition to mandatory school prayer and POW mistreatment as observed among these perceivers is fully in line with the IOPM prediction that they will find these scenarios objectionable. Future research could more fully examine the role of the *degree* of premise objectionableness in sociopolitical judgments.

Are double standards evidence of cognitive rigidity?

Double standards in sociopolitical judgment have been associated with cognitive rigidity, and evidence linking RWA to such double standards has been interpreted as support for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Jost et al., 2003a; Peterson et al., 2002). Applying this operationalization of rigidity to the present studies, it is difficult to link politically conservative attitudes with cognitive rigidity. That said, others have suggested that rigidity is characterized by the *absence* of double standards (Lindner & Nosek, 2009, p. 88). From this perspective, the judgments of those low in SDO in the POW mistreatment scenario and those low in RWA in the mandatory school prayer scenario may reflect rigid opposition to prisoner abuse and compulsory school prayer, respectively. Of course, adopting this operationalization of rigidity also fails to support the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis in the present studies, as objectionable premises predictably short-circuited double standards on both the left and right. Thus, it is difficult to place the present findings within the context of the debate on the relationship between political ideology and rigidity, dogmatism, and inflexibility (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b; Tetlock, 1984). Future research may determine whether the presence or absence of double standards is associated with cognitive rigidity by examining whether trait-based measures of rigidity (e.g., PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; NFC; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993) moderate these judgments.

The IOPM and the DPM

In this paper, the IOPM hypotheses were tested within the context of the dual process model (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a). This approach provided a stringent test of the hypotheses, as it relied on certain scenarios activating one ideological dimension more than the other. These studies supported all three IOPM hypotheses as related to RWA. Whereas the symmetrical SDO biases and asymmetrical High SDO bias hypotheses were tested, the asymmetrical Low SDO bias hypothesis was not tested due to space considerations in the study materials. Future research could test this hypothesis with a premise that is ideologically objectionable to those high but not low in SDO. For example, if a hierarchy-attenuating policy poses a realistic intergroup threat (e.g., amnesty for undocumented immigrants; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), those high in SDO should object to the policy, regardless of the political leader proposing the policy. However, those low in SDO would find this premise acceptable, and should therefore more strongly support the policy if endorsed by Obama than if endorsed by Bush. Like the presidential authority scenario from Study 2, this hypothetical scenario would have the benefit of political realism, as both Obama and Bush supported legislation that would have provided a path to citizenship for some undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. (DREAM Act and Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, respectively).

Overall, these findings were generally consistent with the DPM. RWA more strongly predicted judgments in scenarios related to coercive action (mandatory school prayer), deference to authority (presidential authority), and conformity to traditional moral and religious norms and values (mandatory school prayer; school prayer space) (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a). On the other hand, SDO more strongly predicted judgments in scenarios related to intergroup dominance (POW

mistreatment; university admissions) and social stratification (university admissions).

Consideration of the DPM is especially relevant in the present context for several reasons. First, contrary to Altemeyer's (1998) suggestion, these findings indicate that biased political judgments are not limited to right-wing authoritarianism. Second, the consideration of both ideological attitude dimensions suggests that Altemeyer (1996) was unable to capture double standards among those low in RWA on the issue of affirmative action not because of flexibility and consistency in the minds of those low in RWA, but because of the mismatch between the dimension of ideological belief assessed (RWA) and the hierarchy-attenuating policy examined. Together, these findings strongly indicate the utility of the DPM's two-dimensional approach to ideological attitudes.

Support for the DPM was somewhat qualified by the three-way interactions observed in the school prayer space (Study 1) and university admissions (Study 2) scenarios. Although the DPM does not anticipate interactive effects of RWA and SDO on intergroup attitudes (Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006), the present studies and other evidence (Crawford et al., in press) suggest that RWA and SDO may have interesting interactive effects in sociopolitical judgments, which could be explored in future research.

Theoretical applications of the IOPM

One of the strengths of this paper is that it tested the IOPM hypotheses within the two-dimensional framework of the DPM, generating a number of testable hypotheses. That said, the IOPM can be applied to other conceptualizations of ideological attitudes, including a one-dimensional left–right distinction (Jost, 2006; Knight, 1999) and other recent multi-dimensional perspectives, such as Stenner's (2009) three dimensions of conservatism (authoritarianism; laissez-faire; status quo), or Janoff-Bulman's (2009) inclusion of libertarian and communitarian dimensions in the traditional left–right continuum. Moreover, future research could extend the role of premise objectionableness beyond political judgments to those related to religious belief systems, moral foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), cultural worldview defenses (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), and social identities or categories (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

The processing of objectionable premises

These studies clearly demonstrate that premise objectionableness matters for how people make political judgments. Future studies should address how objectionableness premises are processed. For example, do objectionable premises provide a useful heuristic for political judgments requiring little cognitive effort, or do they present a trade-off between the ideological motives violated by the judgment premise and the motives that favor one target over the other, requiring more effortful processing to reconcile? Cognitive response analyses (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) may clarify these processes. If objectionable premises provide a judgment heuristic, this may suggest that they operate like moral intuitions such as disgust, which have primacy in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). This interpretation may be bolstered by the fact that the objectionableness ratings in Study 2 assessed the extent to which these premises were perceived as “disgusting” and “immoral”.

Conclusion

People on both the political left and right bring their ideological beliefs to bear on their political judgments (Lord et al., 1979; Morgan et al., 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Uhlmann et al., 2009; Vallone et al., 1985). Across the ideological attitude dimensions of RWA and SDO,

these studies tested and supported the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), which posits that all ideological attitudes can lead to biased political judgments, but only when the judgment premise is ideologically acceptable to the perceiver. Thus, the IOPM recognizes the interaction between the content of ideological attitudes and the situational constraints of the judgment context (Blass, 1991; Fleenon, 2004). In observing a link between authoritarianism and double standards in political judgment, Altemeyer (1998; p. 86) suggested that only those high in RWA “speak out of both sides of their mouths from one situation to another”. These studies indicate that we can all speak from both sides of our mouths, depending on the objectionableness of what we're speaking about.

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Appendix A. Materials in Study 1

School prayer space scenario

Suppose that a law was passed that allowed public schools in New Jersey to designate special areas of the school for Christian (*Muslim*) student worship. If a Christian (*Muslim*) student desired to enter this space during the day, he or she would be allowed to.

Dependent measures. This is a good law, and should be passed.

If I had the chance to vote on this law, I would vote *against* it. (reverse scored)

I would vote for representatives who voted in favor of this law.

POW mistreatment scenario

A report was released today detailing the mistreatment of an American soldier (*Iraqi insurgent*) by Iraqi insurgents (*American soldiers*). The recently released American soldier (*Iraqi insurgent*) claims that the Iraqi insurgents (*American soldiers*) used tactics that were “basically torture”, including keeping him awake all night, making him stand in his own urine, and depriving him of light by making him wear a sack over his head for several days. The Iraqi insurgent (*American*) forces have denied the allegations.

Dependent measures. The treatment of this American soldier (*Iraqi insurgent*) was justified.

The treatment of this American soldier (*Iraqi insurgent*) was moral.

The treatment of this American soldier (*Iraqi insurgent*) was basically torture. (reverse scored)

Appendix B. Materials in Study 2

Presidential authority scenario

The U.S. President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It is therefore rare that an active military officer would question his authority, especially when the United States is at war. However, such an incident occurred in recent years when an active four-star general publicly questioned the military decisions of President George W. Bush (*Barack Obama*) and his administration in a time of war. This incident proved to be deeply embarrassing for the President and his administration.

Dependent measures. The general should have been reprimanded for questioning the authority of his Commander-in-Chief.

The general was right to question the President's authority. (reverse scored)

The general should have been forced to resign for questioning the authority of his Commander-in-Chief.

Mandatory Christian school prayer

Suppose a law were passed requiring the strenuous teaching of religion in public schools. Beginning in kindergarten, all children would be taught to believe in God, pray together in school several times a day, memorize the Ten Commandments and other parts of the Bible, learn the principles of Christian morality, and eventually be encouraged to accept Jesus Christ as their personal savior.

Mandatory Muslim school prayer

Suppose you were living in a modern Arab democracy, whose constitution stated there could be NO state religion—even though the vast majority of the people were Muslims. Then a fundamentalist Islamic movement was elected to power, and passed a law requiring the strenuous teaching of religion in public schools. Beginning in kindergarten, all children would be taught to believe in Allah, pray together facing Mecca several times each day, memorize important parts of the Koran, learn the principles of Islamic morality, and eventually be encouraged to declare their allegiance to Muhammad and become a Muslim.

Dependent measures. This is a good law, and should be passed.

If I had the chance to vote on this law, I would vote against it. (reverse scored)

I would vote for representatives who voted in favor of this law.

Race-based court decision

A Supreme Court ruling has upheld the rights of a major University to use race as a factor in determining university admissions. Although some argue that this practice of “affirmative action” is unfair to equally qualified students, the University argues that these practices make up for past discrimination and other disadvantages. The justices in the majority offered the following opinion: “Academic merit has to be everything a student has achieved, measured against the opportunities and circumstances that that student has faced.” This rationale was used to support the Court's decision to allow the University to continue its race-based admissions policy.

Legacy-based court decision

A Supreme Court ruling has upheld the rights of a major University to use one's status as a so-called “legacy” as a factor in determining university admissions. “Legacies” are the relatives (like sons or daughters) of wealthy and powerful graduates and alumni. Although some argue that this practice is unfair to other equally qualified students, the University argues that these practices are the right of the University to use admissions criteria that they believe are appropriate. The justices in the majority offered the following opinion: “Academic merit can include a host of personal information that the University decides is appropriate and relevant to their admissions decisions.” This rationale was used to support the Court's decision to allow the University to continue its legacy-based admissions policy.

Dependent measures. The Supreme Court made the right decision.

If I were a justice on the Supreme Court, I would rule *against* the University's race-based (*legacy-based*) admissions policy. (reverse scored)

There are no problems with the University's race-based (*legacy-based*) admissions policy.

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